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Abstract
The main focus of this dissertation is to empirically test a
number of assumptions of simple monetary models of the balance of
payments using annual data on sixteen Latin American countries. The 
usual assumption of rapid price arbitrage is shown not to hold for 
most of these countries. Moreover, by using the technique developed 
by Granger, it is shown that the domestic rate of inflation is not an 
exogenous determinant of the respective official settlements balance 
of payments for most of these countries. Therefore, single equation 
models of the balance of payments which use the domestic rate of
inflation as a regressor suffer from simultaneity bias. In addition,
estimates of the demand for real cash balances per capita indicate a 
stable relationship for all countries.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One issue of importance to many nations is their national 
economic position regarding changes in liabilities to and claims on 
other countries. As a matter of policy, attention is directed 
toward maintaining a balance on international payments along with 
achieving domestic macroeconomic goals, e.g., price level stability. 
Recently, a great deal of attention has been directed toward develop­
ing the proposition that the official settlements balance of payments 
is a monetary phenomenon and that effective exchange rates reflect 
the relative purchasing power of national currencies. This monetary 
approach to balance of payments theory is the basic framework within 
which this paper is presented.
In particular, I focus on several assumptions made by 
researchers in the field which have allowed them to simplify the 
model greatly and draw several implications. Specifically, the 
model, in its most highly distilled form, suggests that a small open 
economy cannot operate an independent monetary policy and maintain a 
fixed exchange rate of its currency with that of a reserve currency 
country. This means that the stock of money existing in a small 
economy is determined by world conditions. Given the positive 
relationship between the rate of inflation and money supply growth, 
the small open economy is expected to experience a rate of inflation
1
determined by world money growth and hence the rate of inflation is 
outside of its control.
The main arguments of this paper are that the reliance on the 
law of one price which has taken a prominent role in the presentation 
of the monetary approach is an invalid empirical approximation, that 
the rate of inflation experienced by a small open economy cannot, in 
general, be treated as an exogenous variable, and that monetary 
independence is less of an all-or-nothing proposition than might be 
supposed.
The monetary approach to the balance of payments begins with 
the definition of the balance of payments as the change in official 
reserve assets, under a fixed exchange rate regime. Hence, the 
operation of monetary policy is certainly affected by the balance of 
payments as the following diagram indicates. Suppose the following 
T-account represents the assets and liabilities of the central bank of 
a non-reserve currency country:
Suppose further that a reserve currency country, such as the 
United States, Increases its nominal stock of money. This increase 
in world money, under a fixed exchange rate system, will be distributed 
in proportion to the share in world money each country enjoys. Thus,
Assets Liabilities
Gold
Foreign Exchange 
SDR's
Government Securities
Currency in Circulation
Required Reserves of 
Commercial Banks
Accounts of the Treasury
Outstanding Borrowings
3other things constant, the central bank of a small open economy will 
have its assets increased via an inflow of reserves— gold, foreign 
exchange, and SDR's.
The central bank must then take appropriate action to balance 
its accounts. Several courses of action are open to it. First, it 
could try to sterilize the inflow by reducing one of its other assets. 
This is likely to take the form of a sale of government securities.
The end result of this process is to bring the accounts of the central 
bank back into balance at the initial level of assets and liabilities. 
That is, an inflow of reserves is matched by the requisite increase 
in domestic currency necessary to purchase the foreign reserves. The 
central bank then sells governemnt securities and its liabilities are 
drawn down in one or more of the liability categories depending on 
who purchases the securities. Generally such sterilization is ruled 
out as being impossible to carry out over the long run— the securities 
held by the central bank are finite and will not increase if the 
central bank chooses to try to prevent an expansion of the money stock.
A second alternative open to the central bank in the face of 
an inflow of reserves is simply to purchase the foreign exchange, i.e., 
passively accept the inflow. This purchase could take the form of an 
increase in currency in circulation or some other liability. Thus, 
if we rule out sterilization, then a foreign reserve inflow results in 
an increase in the nominal stock of money above what the central bank 
had planned. In this way, the monetary policy of the small country is 
dependent upon monetary conditions in the rest of the world.
In this paper, I analyze these issues on an empirical level 
using annual data on sixteen Latin American countries: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. This data base is useful in this context for several 
reasons. First, each of these countries are small in the sense that 
conditions in each of these countries cannot affect the rest of the 
world. Second, this group of countries affords a wide variety of 
economic experiences which will place the additional burden on the 
hypotheses of the simplistic version of the monetary approach, out­
lined above, of having to explain that variety. Finally, the group of 
countries analyzed here permit me to make several cross-country com­
parisons.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In Chapter II, I present 
descriptive statistics on the background of Latin America. These 
statistics describe average rates of growth of several variables for 
each of the countries as well as the respective measures of varia­
bility. In Chapter III the simple monetary approach is described and 
empirical estimates are obtained and compared to previous work in the 
area. In Chapter IV I analyze the demand for money in each of the 
sixteen countries. In Chapter V, I analyze the proposition that the 
rate of inflation experienced by a small country will not differ 
significantly from the "world" rate of inflation. Finally, in Chapter 
VI, I analyze the issue of the exogeneity of the domestic rate of 
inflation of each of these countries with respect to their respective 
balance of payments and their rates of monetary growth. In addition,
I present an appendix describing the sources of the data and notes 
on the method of constructing several series. I also present another 
appendix which describes the construction of rest-of-the-world price 
indices for each of the sixteen countries.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND ON LATIN AMERICA
In this chapter I describe, in broad terms, some economic
characteristics of the sixteen Latin American nations analyzed in
this study^: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In addition, I provide comparable
2
statistics for the United States. The purpose of this chapter is 
generally one of description rather than explanation. No particular 
theoretical hypothesis is r igorously tested in the discussion. The 
simple statistical analyses, of changes in specific characteristics, 
offered here indicate a wide variety of experience to which a few 
theoretical issues will be subjected to empirical testing in subse- 
quest chapters.
A. The Real Sector
The variety of economic experience that exists across Latin 
American countries is evident in all sectors of their economies. I 
define the real sector to be those elements of the macroeconomy which 
are non-financial in nature: output, expenditure, prices, and their
components, e.g., domestic versus foreign, public versus private.
1. Real Domestic Characteristics
The real gross domestic product of the Latin American countries 
grew, in per capita terms, at average annual percentage rates varying
7from -0.46 for Uruguay to 4.72 for Brazil over the period 1947-1976.
The corresponding rate for the United States was 1.82% per annum over 
the same period. Only five countries experienced real per capita 
income growth greater than 2.5%: Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Peru. Table 1 lists the average annual growth rates 
of selected variables as well as their respective standard deviations.
A
With respect to real per capita income growth, y/N, two 
observations are apparent. Firstly, in most cases the average rate 
of growth was not significantly different than the rate for the U.S.,
3
in a statistical sense. Specifically, only the economies of Brazil 
and Uruguay grew, in real per capita terms, at rates different than 
the U.S. Brazil had the fortune of developing through real growth, 
whereas Uruguay suffered from declining real output per man.
However, the variety of countries with rates of growth similar 
to the U.S. is remarkable. From countries with long histories of 
continuous and variable inflationary experiences and political unrest, 
such as Argentina and Chile, to countries with acceptable inflation 
rates and subdued political problems— such as the five Central American 
countries— Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, 
virtually no difference exists between these nations and the U.S. in 
real per capita income growth. This suggests that in a model of a 
world economy with, for example, the United States acting as the rest 
of the world, the difference in real income growth as between these 
small countries and the rest of the world will not be important in 
explaining reserve flows, i.e., the balance of payments in a fixed
exchange rate system, as in a monetary model of the balance of pay-
„ 4 ments.
A second observation concerning the rate of real per capita 
income growth is that the standard deviation was one-and-a-half to two 
times larger for nearly all of the Latin American countries than it 
was for the United States. The significance of this phenomenon is 
suggested by reference to the Lucas (19'73) analysis of output-inflation 
tradeoffs and the "natural rate" hypothesis.
Specifically, Lucas decomposes real output into secular and 
cyclical elements. As Lucas points out "with a stable Phillips 
tradeoff, policies which lead to wide variation in prices must also 
induce comparable variation in real output." Moreover, as Lucas 
states the main implication of the "natural rate" hypothesis: "the
higher the variance of demand, the more unfavorable are the terms of 
the Phillips tradeoff." As columns 4, 6, and 8 of Table 1 indicate, 
the standard deviations of nominal gross domestic product (a proxy for 
demand shifts), the GDP price deflator and consumer prices, respec­
tively, imply that the Latin American countries were likely to have 
experienced less favorable tradeoffs'* and have experienced more vari­
able inflation than the United States.
This can be supported, in a rough-and-ready way, for the Latin 
American countries by rank-correlating the standard deviation of 
nominal income growth and the standard deviation of the growth in the 
GDP price deflator. That is, I let dispersion in nominal income 
growth proxy for demand shifts— fluctuations about trend. The greater 
is the dispersion in inflation the greater will be the dispersion in
TABLE 1
ANNUAL GkoWTH FATE OF INCOME AND THE PRICE LEVEL (%)
1947-19761
Country
(y /n) Y
A
P
GDP ^CPI
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Argentina 1.92 5.42 29.15 18.74 25.56 20.48 30.72 33.19
Bolivia 1.85 6.27 27.37 28.54 23.01 30.36 22.63 28.06
Brazil 4.72 5.69 30.34 15.54 22.74 17.28 23.97 14.71
Chile 1.07 5.19 45.84 45.66 42.74 48.12 43.23 45.34
Colombia 2.35 2.65 16.36 5.74 11.19 5.68 11.02 7.24
Costa Rica 2.94 4.13 10.39 6.18 4.19 5.69 4.76 5.94
Ecuador 2.29 4.14 10.92 7.74 5.49 6.05 5.22 5.52
El Salvador 2.66 5.86 8.43 7.15 2.94 6.53 4.73 6.52
Guatemala 2.11 5.94 8.19 7.73 3.01 5.20 3.22 4.83
Honduras 1.04 3.51 6.92 3.92 2.90 2.52 2.96 3.39
Mexico 2.23 3.62 12.39 5.93 6.87 4.79 6.80 5.31
Nicaragua 3.66 7.19 8.81 8.10 2.30 5.95 4.23 7.31
Paraguay 0.99 4.53 • 19.67 15.18 16.16 17.18 16.58 19.26
Peru 2.75 3.90 16.56 7.12 11.23 7.03 11.08 7.00
Uruguay -0.46 2.91 37.38 22.10 36.54 21.88 27.98 22.88
Venezuela 2.22 4.50 9.06 9.87 3.40 9.27 3.49 4.66
United States 1.82 2.99 6.98 3.32 3.78 3.04 3.61 3.41
A circumflex indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable, 
y = real gross domestic product; N = population; Y = nominal gross domestic product; Prnp = GDP 
implicit price deflator = Y/y, 1970 = 1.00; Pppp = Consumer Price Index, 1970 = 1.00.
1. Income growth rates for Uruguay cover 1955-1975; for Costa Rica and Ecuador, 1950-1976; 
for Bolivia, 1950-1975.
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demand about its trend.^ For the sixteen Latin American countries 
the rank correlation between the standard deviation of the rate of 
growth of the GDP deflator and the standard deviation of the rate of 
growth of nominal GDP is 0.92, significant at the one percent level 
(see Table 2).
While this sort of casual empiricism is not strictly conclusive 
it does yield some information regarding the economic situation of the 
Latin American countries. Specifically, relative to the U.S., these 
countries were more susceptible to unstable "Phillips" tradeoffs and 
hence were less likely to adequately achieve inflation and employment 
goals for their respective economies with a given amount of policy 
action. Honduras is one possible exception among the sixteen coun­
tries. The standard deviations of inflation and nominal income growth 
for Honduras were not significantly different from the respective 
measures of variability for the U.S.
Another characteristic of some interest is the role of central 
government expenditure in Latin America. I list in Table 3 the mean 
and standard deviation of the annual growth in real per capita central
A
government expenditure, g/N, and the respective statistics for the 
annual growth in nominal central government expenditure, G, for each 
country. In addition, I list the statistics for the ratio of nominal 
central government expenditure to nominal income, G/Y.
The central government sector of the Latin American countries, 
as a demander of resources, generally grew, both in nominal and real 
per capital terms, faster than in the U.S. (0.9%). In fact, ten
A
nations had an average g/N of more than 2.5%: Argentina, Bolivia,
TABLE 2
RANK-ORDER CORRELATIONS OF ANNUAL GROWTH RATES1
Y PGDP ^CPI
A
y
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Mean 0.98**
PGDP S.D. 0.81** 0.92**
* Mean 0.99** 0.96**
PCPI
S.D. 0.85** 0.78** 0.79** 0.82**
Mean -0.46+ -0.56* -0.50*
y
S.D. -0.08 0.48+ -0.12 0.32 -0.01 -0.29
A Mean 0.83** 0.80** 0.80**
G
S.D. 0.54** 0.70** 0.49+ 0.68** 0.49+ 0.51* -0.20 0.21
Mean 0.94** 0.88** 0.96** -0.39
TR
S.D. 0.81** 0.94** 0.78** 0.94** 0.79** 0.82** -0.40 0.33
A circumflex, * , indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable: Y = nominal GDP; y = real GDP;
PGDp = implicit price index; PCPI = consumer price index; G = nominal central government expenditure;
TR = sum of nominal current account exports and imports.
tsignificant at a - 0.10; * significant at a - 0.05; ** significant at a - 0.01.
1. Correlations are across the 16 Latin American countries only, i.e., they exclude the U.S.
TABLE 3
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ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES AND ITS AVERAGE PROPORTION IN GDP (%)
1947-19761
Country
(r?n) G G/Y
Kean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Argentina 2.96 13.90 32.89 45.05 10.95 2.43
Bolivia 4.00 9.88 16.55 15.56 12.52 1.70
Brazil 5.42 11.70 30.94 16.57 13.28 4.17
Chile 1.42 20.17 53.29 49.04 18.72 4.26
Colombia 1.43 13.89 15.29 12.26 8.54 1.55
Costa Rica 6.96 11.18 20.98 7.32 17.22 1.23
Ecuador 4.46 11.26 13.06 12.40 11.50 2.40
El Salvador 1.99 10.75 7.08 11.56 13.19 1.50
Guatemala 1.17 9.57 8.46 11.88 9.74 0.87
Honduras 3.98 12.41 9.85 11.83 10.90 2.64
Mexico 5.44 9.48 17.96 10.58 12.89 1.72
Nicaragua 6.52 16.02 11.43 15.79 10.49 2.27
Paraguay 0.08 0.09 9.86 7.89 10.07 1.20
Peru 4.21 12.66 18.02 12.73 15.90 2.57
Uruguay 0.61 14.06 50.92 18.46 15.75 1.73
Venezuela 7.09 14.46 13.15 19.98 19.18 5.12
United States 0.85 15.37 6.01 13.71 19.29 2.93
A circumflex indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable.
g = real central government expenditure per calendar year, 
deflated by the GDP implicit price index.
G = nominal central government expenditure per calendar year.
Y = nominal GDP.
1. Data on central government budgets were not available for all 
years; see Appendix A for limitations for each country.
13
Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and
A
Benezuela. In terms of variability in G, the U.S. lies somewhere in 
the middle of the distribution across the Latin American countries. 
However, the U.S. growth in real per capita central government 
expenditure was more variable than these countries, except for Chile 
and Nicaragua.
Also of interest, with respect to the role of the central 
government, is the fact that none of these countries had as great a 
proportion of nominal GDP emanating from the central government as 
did the U.S.— only Chile and Venezuela differ from the U.S. insigni­
ficantly in this regard. Moreover, in only three countries— Brazil, 
Chile and Venezuela— was the fraction of GDP attributable to the 
central government more variable than in the United States.
Referring to the Lucas model (see footnote 7), greater 
variability in demand should reflect itself in greater variability 
in inflation. I calculated the rank-correlation of the standard 
deviation of the rate of inflation (as measured by the growth in the 
GDP implicit price deflator) and the standard deviation of the rate of 
growth of nominal government expenditure— used as a proxy for demand 
fluctuations. The cross-country rank correlation is 0.68, significant 
at the one percent level. The implication being that those Latin 
American countries which had greater variability in central government 
demand were more susceptible to inflationary variability.
2. Real International Characteristics
I present in Table 4 statistics on several measures of the 
importance of the foreign sector in Latin America. I define nominal
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TABLE 4
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF TOTAL TRADE 
EXPENDITURE AND ITS AVERAGE PROPORTION IN GDP (%)
1947-19761
Country
(tr?N) TR TR/Y
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Argentina -0.24 22.42 32.34 41.02 14.59 3.98
Bolivia 5.78 66.94 27.86 68.52 33.36 14.51
Brazil 4.62 19.07 29.74 20.47 9.99 1.20
Chile 1.48 38.22 54.69 76.45 19.86 4.34
Colombia 2.51 11.11 16.74 13.22 19.48 2.48
Costa Rica 3.68 9.00 12.18 11.60 45.31 6.89
Ecuador 4.31 14.06 13.12 17.41 28.96 5.75
El Salvador 5.64 10.02 11.41 12.47 41.53 8.77
Guatemala 4.06 10.85 10.66 12.40 26.12 4.59
Honduras 2.94 10.84 8.81 11.40 46.52 7.68
Mexico 1.29 9.74 11.68 12.16 16.18 4.64
Nicaragua 8.23 15.17 13.38 16.04 39.72 12.51
Paraguay 0.36 16.16 19.04 19.54 20.01 3.24
Peru 1.63 15.29 14.79 15.94 30.40 5.23
Uruguay -1.67 18.70 28.94 29.34 23.59 6.01
Venezuela 3.99 13.82 10.73 17.99 44.50 6.36
United States 4.13 9.67 9.29 11.23 8.00 2.15
A circumflex indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable.
tr = real trade expenditure (exports plus imports) deflated by GDP 
implicit price index.
TR = nominal trade expenditure.
Y = nominal GDP.
1. Data on exports and imports were not available for all years; 
see Appendix A for limitations for each country.
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trade expenditure, TR, as simply the sum of nominal current account
exports and imports. The mean and standard deviation of growth for
/\
the real foreign sector expenditure flow per capita, tr/N, and the
A
corresponding statistics for growth in nominal trade flow, TR, are 
listed in the columns 1 to 4 in Table 4. In addition, the statistics 
for the ratio of nominal trade flow to nominal income, TR/Y, are 
listed in Table 4.
In terms of mean values, most of the Latin American countries 
experienced lower growth in real per capita trade flows than the U.S. 
(4.1%). Indeed, only six countries had their real per capita trade 
flows grow faster than 4% per annum: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Venezuela. The average nominal trade 
growth, however, was greater for Latin American countries than for 
the U.S. As might be expected, the average ratios of nominal trade 
to GDP were significantly greater for Latin America than the U.S., 
with the notable exception of Brazil.
On the other hand, in nearly every case for the three measures 
for the foreign sector, the Latin American countries had greater vari­
ability in these measures than did the U.S. For example, although 
the U.S. did have relatively high real per capita trade growth, only 
Costa Rica and Mexico had a variability as low as that for the U.S.
Again referring to the Lucas model (see footnote 7), I computed 
a rank-correlation between the variability of growth in nominal demand 
— as proxied by the standard deviation of the rate of growth of nomi­
nal trade flows— and the variability in the rate of inflation— as 
measured by the standard deviation of the rate of growth of the GDP
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Implicit price deflator. Once again the higher was the variability in 
demand, across countries, the higher was the variability of inflation 
— the rank correlation is 0.94, significant at the one percent level. 
The strength of the correlation suggests that the Latin American coun­
tries which experienced greater variability in the growth of foreign 
trade were more likely to experience greater inflationary variability.
B. The Monetary Sector
As indicated in the last section, the experience of the Latin 
American countries was .7 aried with respect to "real" variables over 
the period 1947-1976. Specifically, the average growth of output, 
prices, government expenditure and foreign trade differ greatly across 
these countries. Moreover, so did the standard deviation of these 
growth rates. The variety of the experiences in these characteristics 
allowed us to draw some inferences in regard to stabilization policy, 
as reflected in Lucas’ (1973) model.
The experience of the Latin American nations in the monetary 
sector was also diverse in several respects. I define the -onetary 
sector, broadly, as being represented by aggregate measures of the 
demand for and supply of money. Again I present statistics on annual 
growth rates of a number of monetary aggregates and also include 
statistics on a few behavioral parameters.
Specifically, the narrow money (Ml) and high powered money 
(H) stocks, both in nominal terms, are used to represent the overall 
supply of money. In addition, the stock of high powered money is
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decomposed into its foreign component (F) and the domestic component 
(DH). I also analyze the income velocity of money, the money 
multiplier, and the proportion of high powered money held by the 
respective central bank in the form of official international 
reserves.
Several general aspects of the monetary sector vis-a-vis the 
real sector are apparent in looking at Tables 5 to 8. First, the 
distribution across Latin America in average growth rates of monetary 
variables was equally as varied as the distribution for mean growth 
rates in "real variables. In some cases monetary variables were 
more diverse, notably the domestic component of high powered money.
An exception to this generalization was the money multiplier. This 
parameter showed marked similarity across Latin America.
Second, the distribution (across countries) in the standard 
deviation of annual growth rates (within countries) was generally 
more diverse for the monetary variables than the "real" variables.
The money multiplier was again an exception. The multiplier was 
fairly well concentrated about its mean over time for all countries.
The coefficient of variation always being less than one and frequently 
very much so.
Finally, only when the high powered money stock is decomposed 
does a difference in orders of magnitude show clearly mis-a-vis growth 
rates of "real" mariables. But for nearly all monetary variables, 
the statistics for the United States were very much different than 
those for Latin America. This is in contrast to the real sector where,
TABLE 5
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF MONETARY AGGREGATES (%) 
1947 - 19761
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Country
A
Ml
Mean S.D.
H
Mean S.D.
Argentina 31.64 28.64 29.28 35.17
Bolivia 26.16 25.02 26.78 24.95
Brazil 29.18 13.27 27.62 15.33
Chile 44.12 37.23 47.03 38.77
Colombia 16.38 5.84 16.75 10.28
Costa Rica 11.05 7.78 11.01 9.49
Ecuador 11.90 11.70 11.19 12.27
El Salvador 8,38 9.00 8.82 8.11
Guatemala 7.81 8.48 8.37 10.01
Honduras 7.84 9.08 8.02 10.30
Mexico 12.36 6.19 12.82 12.33
Nicaragua 10.60 11.06 10.34 9.89
Paraguay 19.72 15.58 21.17 15.21
Peru 15.68 8.80 17.22 11.51
Uruguay 26.07 20.68 27.01 21.50
Venezuela 11.14 10.16 10.34 10.51
United States 3.56 2.58 3.25 3.82
A circumflex, ~ , indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable 
Ml = nominal narrow money stock; H = nominal high powered money.
1. Data on money were not available for 1976 for Chile and Uruguay.
TABLE 6
RANK-ORDER CORRELATIONS OF ANNUAL GROWTH RATES1
A
- Y PGDP PCPI y
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
A Mean 0.97** 0.95** 0.96** -0.41
Ml
S.D. 0.65** 0.91** 0.62** 0.83** 0.64** 0.73** -0.48f 0.39
Mean 0.99** 0.95** 0.99** -0.41
H
S.D. 0.88** 0.73** 0.88** 0.74J** 0.84** 0.67** -0.55* -0.01
A Mean 0.84** 0.84** 0.83** -0.51*
F
S.D. 0.63** 0.48+ 0.58* 0.51* 0.64** 0.73** -0.33 0.14
* Mean 0.41 0.46+ 0.38 -0.44+
DH
S.D. -0.10 0.50* -0.11 0.21 -0.14 0.05 -0.32 0.08
Mean -0.28 -0.10 -0.06 -0.25
V
S.D. 0.44+ 0.65** 0.44+ 0.63** 0.45+ 0.61* -0.57* 0.37
A circumflex, * , indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable: Y = nominal GDP; y = real GDP;
Pgdp = implicit price deflator; p cpi H consumer price index; Ml = nominal narrow money stock;
H = nominal high powered money stock; F = foreign reserves; DH = domestic component of high powered money;
V = income velocity of money = Y/Ml.
t significant at a ■= 0.10; * significant at a = 0.05; ** significant at a ■ 0.01. m
1. All variables are growth rates except velocity. These correlations are across the 16 Latin American
countries only, i.e., they exclude the U.S.
TABLE 7
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ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF THE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMPONENTS OF 
HIGH POWERED MONEY AND THE RATIO OF THE FOREIGN COMPONENT 
TO TOTAL HIGH POWERED MONEY (%)
1947-1976
F_____  DH 0 =■ F/H
Country Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.,D.
Argentina 29.16 78.97 41.56 53.00 18.29 9.,85
Bolivia 26.14 75.70 58.90 133.51 37.08 21.,15
Brazil 28.82 47.62 40.80 64.56 32.18 20.,46
Chile 44.86 77.52 110.42 157.83 50.48 42.,67
Colombia 16.11 37.36 39.71 121.82 41.98 17.,21
Costa Rica 13.39 41.96 11.72 15.76 30.64 9.,98
Ecuador 10.87 28.36 15.24 23.24 55.76 12.,65
El Salvador 6.57 19.08 16.00 249.73 67.09 21., 66
Guatemala 7.88 21.07 26.71 98.24 65.42 17.,31
Honduras 13.78 35.33 42.57 258.52 60.18 25.,98
Mexico 9.64 28.67 18.71 26.10 38.70 16.,53
Nicaragua 11.54 38.73 17.51 177.72 67.59 28.,78
Paraguay 21.03 101.54 43.05 151.87 35.84 35.,02
Peru 14.77 31.50 22.14 21.81 38.56 13.,04
Uruguay 25.77 33.60 -2792.35 15805.76 109.28 37.,15
Venezuela 12.89 28.65 -386.46 1894.63 124.76 50.,26
United States -1.23 5.68 5.16 6.64 32.20 14.,05
A circumflex indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable.
F = Official international reserve assets = gold, foreign exchange 
and special drawing rights.
DH = Residual difference between high powered money and its foreign 
component, i.e., DH = H - FH.
1. Data on money were not available for 1976 for Chile and Uruguay, 
and on foreign reserves for 1976 for Mexico.
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TABLE 8 
RANK CORRELATIONS OF
THE RATIO OF FOREIGN RESERVES TO HIGH POWERED MONEY 
WITH THE AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF SELECTED VARIABLES
Real Sector 
0 s F/H
Monetary Sector 
0
Y -0.59* ftl -0.50*
PGDP -0.60* H -0.61*
PCPI -0.50* F -0.49+
y 0.28
A
Dpi -0.49+
e -0.5$*’
TR -0.55*
TR/Y1 0.51*
A circumflex, ~ , indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable:
Y = nominal GDP; y = real GDP; ?GDP 2 implicit price deflator;
PCPI = consumer price index; G = nominal central government expenditure; 
TR= sum of nominal current account exports and imports; Ml = nominal 
narrow money stock; H = nominal high powered money; F = nominal foreign 
reserves; DH = nominal domestic component of high powered money.
 ^statistically significant at a = 0.10; * statistically significant
at a = 0.05.
1. This variable and 6 are measured in percent and not as a rate of 
change as are all other variables.
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as I noted earlier, real per capita income growth for Latin America 
was very similar to the U.S. This last point (greater differences 
between the U.S. and Latin America) holds even more strongly with 
respect to the standard deviation of the monetary growth rates. The 
only exception to this rule was the proportion, 0, of the high 
powered money stock held as foreign reserve assets.
1. Domestic Monetary Aggregates
I have listed in Table 5 the mean and standard deviation of 
the annual growth rates of the stock of narrow money— currency held 
by the non-bank public and demand deposits at commercial banks, and 
high powered money— total currency in circulation and commercial 
bank reserves, for each country. As alluded to above, the statistics 
for Latin America were between two and ten times the respective 
magnitude for the United States. It is therefore not surprising to 
note, given the quantity theory of money, that the Latin American 
countries, in general, experienced greater nominal income growth than 
the U.S. Moreover, when we recall that average real per capita 
income grew in Latin America at a similar rate to the U.S., it is also 
not surprising to note that average rates of inflation in Latin 
America were correspondingly greater than for the U.S. Only three 
countries had average annual growth rates in these money aggregates of 
less than 10%: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Indeed, as suggested by the quantity theory, in the long run 
nominal income growth and nominal money growth should be equivalent, 
holding velocity constant. I compiled several rank-order correlations
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of statistics of growth rates in Table 6. These correlations indicate 
a strong correspondence between average nominal income and money growth 
across countries— between 0.97 and 0.99, as well as a strong corres­
pondence between average inflation and average nominal money growth 
— between 0.95 and 0.99. Furthermore, no significant correlation 
exists between average nominal money growth and real income growth 
rates across these countries as implied by the classical (money) 
neutrality proposition (see Lucas, 1972); these correlations were 
approximately -0.41, insignificant at the 10% level.
Another interesting aspect of the data refers to a corollary
g
to the neutrality proposition as expressed by Barro (1968, 1977).
Under a rational-expectations model of expected price formation, the 
effect of deliberate and fully anticipated monetary policy on real 
output and employment is negligible. Therefore, as Barro reasons, it 
is only the unanticipated component of nominal money supply growth 
that affects real variables. I used a simple method of judging 
whether the variety of experience in Latin America was consistent with 
this idea. I let the standard deviation of nominal income growth 
represent a demand shift, a la Lucas. Furthermore, I let the standard 
deviation of money stock growth proxy as fluctuations about its trend,
i.e., a measure of unanticipated money growth. I then rank-correlated 
these measures across Latin America.
The correlations for unanticipated narrow money and base money 
growth and the proxy for demand shifts are 0.91 and 0.73, respectively 
— both significant at the one percent level (see Table 6). This 
result conforms with Barro's hypothesis (and his results for the U.S.
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— see Barro, 1977, p. 555), that unanticipated money growth has a 
strong expansionary effect. I also rank-correlated the average growth 
rate of nominal income with the standard deviation of money growth 
across countries. These correlations are 0.65 and 0.88 for narrow 
and base money, respectively— also highly significant.
In terms of the rate of inflation, I noted earlier that 
nominal money growth was very strongly and positively related to 
inflation. As Barro points out, this represents both anticipated and 
unanticipated influences. By rank-correlating the standard deviation 
of money growth with average rates of inflation, the partial effect of 
the unanticipated portion can he obtained. For narrow money, the 
correlations are 0.62 and 0.64 for the GDP price deflator and the 
consumer price measures of inflation, respectively. For base money, 
the correlations are 0.88 and 0.84 (see Table 6).
These correlations are not consistent with Barro*s results in 
that his analysis implies that unanticipated money growth should have 
a negative effect on the price level, i.e., lowering the rate of 
inflation as compared to what it would be if money growth were fully 
anticipated, possibly causing deflation. However, Lucas* model 
suggests that greater variability in demand can also affect the rate 
of inflation and greater variability in real output relative to trend 
can negatively affect inflation. It then becomes an empirical 
question as to which is larger. Since unanticipated money growth is 
strongly related to fluctuations in demand but not to fluctuations in 
real output growth relative to trend for Latin American countries (see 
Table 6), the positive effect of unanticipated money growth on
I
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inflation could be rationalized (ad hoc) as an effect through
aggregate nominal demand. Indeed, fluctuations in real output growth
relative to trend exhibit an (insignificant) negative correlation
with measures of average inflation (see Table 2).
Overall, there seems to be a significant relationship between
monetary growth and inflation, nominal income growth, and fluctuations
in nominal income growth about trend across the range of economic
experience exhibited in Latin America. No inferences in terms of
causality should be drawn since these statistics merely represent
coincident movements with no statements made about linearity of the
9
relationship or origin of influence.
2. The Components of High Powered Money
I define the foreign component, F, of high powered money as 
the sum of (gross) official international reserve assets'^: gold,
foreign exchange and special drawing rights. The domestic 
component, DH, is simply the residual difference between high powered 
money and its foreign component. An increase in the foreign com­
ponent represents an inflow on international accounts, hence a 
balance of payments surplus. Moreover, it indicates a potential 
source through which an economy can be influenced by rest-of-the-world 
economic and political factors.
The domestic component of high powered money, on the other 
hand, represents the assets of the central bank of a country which are 
of a purely domestic (and public) nature. Specifically, DH indicates 
the level of obligations of the central government to the central
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bank. In this respect, the domestic component demonstrates the 
source through which domestic monetary policy can influence an 
economy.
I compiled the mean and standard deviation of the annual 
growth rates of both components of high powered money in Table 7.
I also included there statistics on the proportion, 0, of high 
powered money of a foreign origin. This ratio can be thought of as 
a policy parameter because 0 represents the degree to which a nation 
has assets useable in international transactions relative to assets 
it has available for all transactions. Barring easily available 
international credit, e.g., unlimited low-cost loans from the 
International Monetary Fund, a low value of 0 implies a limited amount 
of "world" money. Thus, in the event of needing a larger amount of 
("world") cash than is available, substantial transactions costs might 
be incurred in shifting the central bank portfolio to a higher 
concentration of foreign reserves in its high powered money than it 
has at that moment, in a fixed exchange rate system.
As alluded to earlier, the average growth rates of the foreign 
and domestic oomponents of high powered money were generally larger, 
more variable and more frequently statistically different from U.S. 
aggregates than were the overall monetary aggregates and the real 
variables. In only three cases was foreign reserve growth less than 
ten percent: El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Except for Uruguay
and Venezuela, the central banks of Latin America expanded domestic
27
credit at rates in excess of 10% per annum. Also, for only six 
countries was the mean proportion of high powered money held as 
foreign reserves similar to the U.S.: Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica,
Mexico, Paraguay and Peru.
The relationship between growth in the foreign and domestic 
components and other variables is of some interest, particularly in 
monetary models of the balance of payments. I computed rank- 
correlations across countries for the components of high powered 
money and other variables. In general, the correlations involving 
the growth in the foreign component were significant, whereas the 
correlations were insignificant for the domestic component (see Table 
6).
Counter to the Barro model predictions, unanticipated money 
growth in the form of the standard deviation of foreign reserve growth 
was positively correlated with average inflation— the rank-correla-r 
tions were 0.58 and 0.64 for the GDP price deflator and the CPI, 
respectively. However, the domestic component was (insignificantly) 
negatively rank-correlated with inflation— the rank correlation of the 
standard deviation of the growth in DH and average inflation was 
-0.11 for the GDP deflator and -0.14 for the CPI. It is tempting to 
rationalize these results, again in an ad hoc fashion. I refrain from 
doing that here, only restating that these correlations represent 
partial effects with no assurance that the ceteris paribus condition 
holds.11
One interesting statistic is the significant negative correla­
tion between average real income growth and average foreign reserve
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growth. As Implied by the monetary approach to the balance of 
12payments, as the real growth in income of a small country rises, 
ceteris paribus, it should experience a deficit balance of payments.
The rank-correlation across Latin America between average real income 
growth and average foreign reserve growth was -0.51, significant at 
the 5% level.
With respect to the parameter, 0, the ratio of foreign 
reserves to high powered money, for the Latin American countries, a 
higher average ratio was associated with lower growth of monetary 
aggregates, lower growth in the components of high powered money, lower 
growth in nominal income, and lower average inflation (see Table 8).
In addition, a higher 0 was associated with a higher ratio of nominal 
trade expenditure relative to nominal income. Again, no conclusions 
regarding causality can be validly drawn from these simple corre­
lations.
3. Other Parameters
I compiled statistics on two additional parameters for the 
Latin American countries. The means and standard deviations of the 
income velocity of money and the money multiplier are listed in Table
9.
As indicated in the table, velocity— the ratio of nominal income 
to the nominal narrow-money stock, was not extremely variable relative 
to other characteristics of these countries. However, except for 
Argentines and Brazilians, Latin American residents generally "turned 
over" their currency one-and-a-half to three times more rapidly, on
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TABLE 9
INCOME VELOCITY AND THE MONEY MULTIPLIER 
1947 - 19761
Country
V = 
Mean
Y/Ml
S.D.
Ml/H
Mean S.D.
Argentina 4.52 1.50 1.21 0.43
Bolivia 10.87 5.10 1.12 0.09
Brazil 4.80 0.88 1.77 0.20
Chile 9.10 2.11 1.65 0.55
Colombia 6.57 0.60 1.77 0.23
Costa Rica 6.13 0.62 1.67 0.12
Ecuador 7.41 1.27 1.31 0.08
El Salvador 7.11 0.77 1.22 0.16
Guatemala 9.72 0.97 1.13 0.06
Honduras 9.32 1.30 1.42 0.10
Mexico 8.02 0.51 1.49 0.26
Nicaragua 8.69 1.38 1.53 0.11
Paraguay 10.41 1.77 1.08 0.19
Peru 7.02 1.47 1.33 0.17
Uruguay 6.42 1.29 1.11 0.07
Venezuela 7.45 0.81 1.55 0.15
United States 3.51 0.92 2.73 0.18
A circumflex, - , indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable: 
Y = nominal GDP; Ml H nominal narrow money stock; H = nominal high 
powered money; V = income velocity of money.
1. Data on income were not available for all years, see Appendix A. for 
data availability.
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average, than residents of the U.S. In other words, Latin Americans 
held less, one-third to two-thirds less, of their nominal income in 
the form of cash.
The money multiplier— the ratio of narrow money to base money 
— was also not extremely volatile over the period. While the mean 
multipliers were lower for Latin American countries than for the U.S. 
there was no statistical difference. The magnification to narrow money 
of impulses to base money was between 1.5 and 2.5 times greater in the 
U.S. than the impact effect for Latin America.
I also computed rank-correlations between velocity and some 
"real" variables, listed in Table 6. These statistics indicate that 
the greater the unpredictability of prices, as measured by the standard 
deviation of the rate of inflation, the greater were fluctuations in 
velocity about its trend, as measured by the standard deviation of 
velocity. The correlations were 0.63 and 0.61 for the GDP price 
deflator and CPI, respectively. Moreover, countries with greater 
fluctuations in demand relative to trend, as measured by the standard 
deviation in nominal income growth, had greater fluctuations in 
velocity relative to trend— a rank-correlation of 0.65, significant 
at the one percent level.
C. Exchange Rate Regimes
Throughout the discussion no mention was made as to the 
exchange rate policy of the Latin American countries analyzed here.
I now turn to this issue. Its importance for other policy issues is
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conveyed, almost by definition, in the ability, or lack thereof, of 
a small country to operate an independent monetary policy.
Two extreme forms of exchange rate regime can be identified.
A fixed exchange rate system is one in which the monetary authorities 
of a small (non-reserve currency) country agree to purchase or sell 
at a fixed price the quantity of "world" money required to settle the 
balance of payments accounts. For example, if greater demand for the 
small country's goods exists than that country demands from abroad, 
then the authorities must purchase the "world" money used by foreign­
ers to pay for the exported goods of the small country.
The fixed price can be changed, but the essential attribute of 
the system remains. If the demand for the goods of a small country 
on such a system increases, relative to the country's imports, say 
because of greater growth in rest-of-the-world money relative to 
demand, then the foreign reserves of the small country will increase. 
Assuming no sterilization, the high powered money of the small country 
will increase. Hence, even if the monetary authorities of the small 
country are not applying an easy monetary policy, their money supply 
will increase.
At the opposite extreme is a completely flexible exchange rate 
system. Such a system allows the reserve currency (e.g., the U.S. 
dollar) price of a small country's currency to be completely market 
determined. For example, if greater demand for the currency of a small 
country exists relative to its supply, then the price of that currency 
will rise— the currency will appreciate.
Thus in terms of adjustments to balance of payments, under a
flexible exchange rate regime, disequilibria will be resolved by the
adjustment of price rather than quantity of small country currency.
That is, since the demand for the goods of a country, generated
13abroad, can be translated into the supply of "world" money to the 
small country, an excess demand for the goods of a country can be 
represented as an inflow of "world" money— foreign reserves. The 
fixed exchange rate regime resolves this disequilibrium by intervening 
in the market for, in this case purchasing at a fixed price, the 
currency of the world. The flexible exchange rate system resolves the 
disequilibrium by adjusting the price at which currencies are 
exchanged, via the "invisible hand."
Over the period 1947-1976, only three Latin American curren­
cies were fixed in terms of the U.S. dollar: El Salvador's colon,
Guatemala's quetzal, and Honduras' lempira. No country in this sample 
operated under a freely floating exchange rate regime. In fact, 
nearly all countries operated essentially a fixed exchange regime 
but adjusted the fixed exchange price periodically. Brazil and Chile 
are two notable exceptions. Brazil adopted a regime sometimes 
referred to as a crawling peg (see Heller, 1978). Chile devalued its 
currency frequently and changed its currency unit twice in the period 
under study.
I have grouped the countries into three categories: a fixed
exchange regime, an intermittently-adjusted fixed exchange rate 
regime, and a step-up fixed exchange rate regime. In the first cate­
gory, I have, of course, placed the three Central American countries
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mentioned above. In the second category I have placed seven coun­
tries: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela. In the last category I have placed the remaining six 
countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay.
I have calculated simple average growth rates for each group 
for three variables: real per capita income, the GDP implicit price
deflator, and the narrow money stock. These average growth rates are 
listed in Table 10. Realizing that as we move from Group I to Group 
III the exchange rate system goes from a fixed system to a system 
which is closest to a freely floating system, several points are 
noticed.
In terms of real per capita income growth, those countries in 
the second category, intermittent exchange rate adjustments, had the 
highest real growth. The countries which frequently adjusted their 
exchange rate had the lowest real growth. These differences are not 
great. Furthermore, I do not attribute the differences to the 
exchange rate regime.
The differences across groups in terms of average rates of 
narrow money growth and average rates of inflation are great. As we 
move from the first group to the last, both the average rate of 
monetary expansion and the average rate of inflation increase in 
obvious steps. Moreover, the steps in inflation seem to correspond 
to the steps in money growth.
That I have grouped these countries in this way allows us to 
see the effects of the exchange rate regime vis-a-vis other policy 
goals. Specifically, the statistics in Table 10 indicate that those
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TABLE 10
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF SELECTED 
VARIABLES BY EXCHANGE RATE REGIME
REGIME y/N
A
Ml
A
P
GDP
GROUP I: CONSTANT
El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras
1.94 8.01 2.95
GROUP II: INTERMITTENT CHANGES
Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela
2.44 13.21 7.09
GROUP III: FREQUENT CHANGES
Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Uruguay
1.90 28.93 26.96
A circumflex, “ , indicates a percentage rate of change of the variable 
y _ real GDP; N = population; Ml = nominal narrow money stock;
1 ? G D P  = implicit price deflator.
countries which adjust their currency price of a reserve currency, 
such as the U.S. dollar, generally experience greater inflation. This 
should not be construed as evidence of instability of floating 
regimes. Rather the results suggest that by adjusting the domestic 
currency price of a reserve currency, whether intermittently, 
frequently or freely, a country can operate a monetary policy which 
is less susceptible to outside influences and more responsive to the 
policy goals of that nation. Thus, the countries in Group III have 
experienced monetary expansion but also because they have decided that 
greater monetary expansion was a relevant policy aim.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II
1. See Appendix A for a discussion of the sources of the data, 
the definition of variables, a description of problems in constructing 
a number of series and solutions undertaken to resolve these problems. 
All variables are measured in domestic currency units, except where 
noted otherwise.
2. While the U.S. is vastly different in many ways from all 
these nations, e.g., standard of living, comparisons are drawn in 
general terms. That is, no attempt is made here to suggest that the 
U.S. should be considered the model to which these nations should gear 
their policy goals. Rather the comparisons are made to point up these 
differences so that treating the U.S. as the rest of the world will he 
a useful way of framing these countries as "small" countries in the 
terminology of international trade theory.
3. This is judged by dividing the difference in growth rates by 
the square root of the sum of the variance of each rate divided by the 
number of observations, assuming the growth rates are independent.
This statistic has a Student-t distribution.
4. See Swoboda (1977), p. 23. This will be tested later in 
the discussion of the relationship between the domestic and world 
rates of inflation.
5. It is not my intention to test Lucas' model. However, these 
implications should be drawn explicitly. Moreover, the test results 
reported by Lucas for the five Latin American countries he studied are 
consistent with my conclusions. Specifically, Lucas' results indicate 
unfavorable tradeoffs for Argentina and Paraguay. As Table 1 indicates 
these two countries have significantly different means and standard 
deviations in nominal income growth and inflation rates than the U.S. 
Favorable tradeoffs exist for Guatemala, Honduras and Venezuela—  
countries which have means and standard deviations of these growth 
rates similar to the U.S.
6. The correlation between the variance of nominal income 
growth and the rate of change of the GDP price deflator might be 
expected to be large if real income is constant. That is, if nominal 
income is Y = Py, where p is the GDP price deflator and y is real GDP, 
then Y = P + y where a circumflex indicates a percentage rate of 
change. Thus,
VAR(Y) = VAR(P) + VAR (y) + 2 COV(P,y).
If VAR(y) =» 0 = COV(£,y) then a nearly perfect positive correlation 
between VAR(^) and VAR(I) should exist. However, neither VAR(y) nor 
COV(P,y) is zero. Therefore, the correlation between VAR(Y) and 
VAR(P) will only be significant and close to one if VAR(y) is unimpor­
tant.
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7. Lucas (1973) estimates the following relationship:
Pt “ a0 + al *t + a2 Vl + a3 K t - V  (i)
where a circumflex indicates a percentage change, x is nominal 
income. Taking expected values and subtracting from (i), I obtain
cd /\d . /vd . a
Pt = al xt + a2 xt-l + a3 yct-r (il)
where a "d" superscript indicates deviations from the respective 
mean. I then square (ii) and take expected values to obtain:
Var(Pt) = (a* + a\) VAR (£3) + a^ VARtf^^)
+ a3(ai + a2) C O V ^ , ^ ^ )
+ a1&2 COV(xt,xt_1) (iii)
assuming VAR(xt) = VAR(xt ^). Note that
2 2 > n  
SVar(xt) _ ai + a2 '
Thus the effect of an increase in demand variance on inflation 
variance is positive, holding other things constant. Empirically,
2 2from Lucas' estimates (p. 332) for the U.S., an +a„ = 0.589 and for 
2 2Argentine a^ + a2 = 1.306.
8. As with the Lucas model, I also make no attempt at specify­
ing and rigorously testing Barro's model. The simple tests applied 
here are merely expressing some familiarity with the recent literature 
on the important questions of economic policy. The models of Barro 
and Lucas (as well as Sargent and Wallace, 1975) can well stand on 
their own, but they are useful for policy implications as even the 
simplistic correlations suggest.
9. Pierce (1976) discusses the notion that correlation can 
imply causality in the case of linear relationships but reminds us 
that even in the linear case the direction is unknown a priori.
10. For a discussion of problems that can arise in using this 
definition, see Appendix A.
11. For example, the monetary approach to balance of payments 
theory suggests that if a small country expands its domestic money
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supply at a rate faster than the demand for its money is growing, 
then domestic dishoarding will take place, i.e., a balance of payments 
deficit will occur. From Table 5 we see that many countries in Latin 
America have expanded their money supplies rapidly, yet they have 
also experienced inflows of foreign reserves— a balance of payments 
surplus. In using these simple correlations we have not held the 
demand for the currencies of these countries to growing at a fixed 
rate. Moreover the demand for the Latin American currencies also 
comes from the rest of the world through the demand for the produce 
of Latin America.
12. See, for example, Swoboda (1977).
13. See, for example, Stern (1972).
CHAPTER III
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE SIMPLE MONETARY 
MODEL OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
In this chapter, I focus on attempts to empirically implement
tests of a simple monetary model of the balance of payments. I do
not critically review the empirical literature; Magee (1976) has
adequately done so.^ " Rather, I derive the typical specification of
the simple model, copy (for the purpose of comparison) some results
of other researchers and present the estimates of the model for Latin
America. In passing, I mention several econometric points regarding
2
the application of the tests.
The monetary approach to the balance of payments emphasizes
the essential role of money in the process of resolving divergences
between (gross national) income and (domestic) expenditure, which a
balance of payments disequilibrium represents. That is, an excess of
expenditure— on all goods including capital goods— over income within
a country implies an excess demand for goods. Within the context of
that nation's economy, this further implies, via Walras' Law, an •
3
excess (flow) supply of money. In the context of the world economy, 
this is met by an offsetting excess (flow) demand for the currency of 
the deficit country (equivalent to the supply of goods forthcoming) 
to satisfy the original divergence of expenditure from income.
The model, in its most highly distilled form, suggests that an 
economy which is small, in terms of world trade, but open to trade,
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cannot operate an independent monetary policy and maintain a fixed
exchange rate of its currency with that of other nations. This, of
4
course, implies— given the strong evidence available regarding the 
relationship between money supply growth and inflation— that the rate 
of inflation is an exogenous variable— for a small open economy—  
determined by world money growth.
to the balance of payments can be derived as follows. Suppose real 
cash balances demanded are a function of real income and a nominal 
interest rate; the nominal money supply is proportional to the mone­
tary base. The latter being, for my purposes, decomposed^ into the 
foreign and domestic assets of the monetary authorities (or, for 
simplicity, the central bank).
A. A Simple Model of the
Monetary Approach
A simple (and frequently used"*) model of the monetary approach
That is,
^  = L(y,i) (1)
MS = h*H (2)
H = F + DH (3)
where y is real income, i is a nominal interest rate, h is the money 
multiplier, and F and DH are the foreign (international reserves) and 
domestic components, respectively, of the monetary base, H. A
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serious flaw In specification (1) is the lack of a term for population, 
i.e., the demand for real cash balances is generally specified in per 
capita terms.
Assuming (continuous) stock equilibrium:
M*1 = MS
or
P L(y,i) = h*(F + DH).
Taking logarithmic derivatives I obtain, as a flow equilibrium, the 
following:
d log P + d log L = d log h + d log (F + DH).
Letting a  ^denote percentage changes, I have:
P + L = h +  |- F + DHII n
Solving for the (official settlements) balance of payments, I obtain^: 
L L
e.p = p dy +-i.di-h-(l-e)-DH, (4)
Li Li
where 0 = F/H, 0 > 0, "d" is the differential operator, and the
subscript indicates a partial derivative of the liquidity preference
function with respect to the variable in the subscript.
The model expressed in equation (4) relates the balance of
payments position of a small open economy, under a fixed exchange rate
regime, to domestic variables. Implicitly, the influence of the rest
/\
of the world is incorporated in the domestic rate of inflation, P,
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which is determined by rest-of-the-world money supply and real 
income growth.**
Factors which affect changes in the domestic demand for real 
cash balances (and therefore foreign reserve flows) but which do not 
affect the rest of the world are also incorporated in equation (4).
For example, holding constant rest-of-the-world real income and
/V
money growth (impounded by holding P constant), if a small country s 
rate of real income growth increases its growth in the demand for real 
cash balances will increase inducing an inflow of reserves. Thus, 
the coefficient on the change in real income, dy, should reflect the 
real income elasticity of demand for real cash balances.
B. An Empirical Comparison
Putting aside a rigorous treatment of specific criticisms 
of previous empirical work in this area, I present results of work 
done by other researchers and a comparative analysis of similar 
estimation for Latin American nations. Recall that the simple model 
expresses a behavioral relationship for real cash balances demanded, 
an institutional relationship for the money supply process (propor­
tionality of the money supply and the monetary base), a definition of 
the monetary base, and an equilibrium condition equating the nominal 
stocks of money demanded and supplied. From this model I obtain an 
equation to be estimated of the form:
0F = ^  P + P2 dy + B3 di + 34 h + B5(1-0)DH + u (4’)
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Estimates of the 3 coefficients have been obtained using the ordinary
9
least squares method.
I estimated an ordinary least squares regression cf a form 
given below, similar to equation (4'), using annual data for sixteen 
Latin American countries. The data sources are given in Appendix A. 
Actually, I performed two regressions for each country: the first
uses as the dependent variable a measure of the official settlements 
balance of payments scaled by the level of high powered money. The 
first estimated equation is^:
0F = 3q +  3J p +  3 j  y  + 3 3  h  + 3 j ( i - e ) » D H  + v  (5)
where P is the rate of growth^ of the Consumer Price Index with 
1970 = 1.00; y is the growth in real gross domestic prodmct in 1970 
prices; h is the growth in the money multiplier; DH is tte growth in 
domestic credit; 0 is the ratio of foreign reserves to hfgh powered 
money, F/H; and
6A  ■ < w ilos Et - log Et~i>
- fft/Ht)-(Ft - Ft_1)/Ft
- <Et - Ft_p/Ht 
“ V Et
where Bt is the official settlements balance of payments ±n time 
period t.
In the second specification I use, as the dependen.t variable, 
the same measure of the official settlements balance— the first
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difference in foreign reserves— however scaling it by the level of 
foreign reserves; hence the dependent variable is the growth in 
foreign reserves:
F = Bg + P + 3JJ y + h + BJCCi” e)/e>-i& + w (6)
where the explanatory variables are the same as those in specifica­
tion (5) and the error terms, v and w, are assumed to be normally 
distributed serially uncorrelated random variates with zero mean and 
constant variance.
The coefficient on the rate of inflation, B|> is expected to 
obtain the value of unity. This reflects the linearly homogenous 
nature of the demand for nominal cash balances with respect to the 
price level (nominal income and population). As the price level 
rises nominal cash holdings must rise to maintain the level of real 
cash holdings. The greater is the increase in the price level (the 
greater is the rate of inflation), the greater is the required 
increase in nominal cash balances. If the money supply is outside 
the control of the monetary authorities, as is assumed in. the simple 
monetary model, then the adjustments of nominal money denand to a 
higher price level will be through the adjustment of foreign reserve 
holdings. The coefficient 3^ represents the effect of an increase in 
the price level on the nominal stock of foreign reserves, i.e., the 
official settlements balance of payments.
The coefficient on the rate of growth of real income, 3^ * ^as 
an expected positive sign. If the variable were real per capita 
income growth and we were reasonably certain that velocity were
constant or that the country under analysis were highly developed and 
its population level did not change, then we would expect PJJ to t>e 
equal to +1 inasmuch as the coefficient would be the per capita 
income elasticity of the demand for real cash balances per capita. 
However, as alluded to earlier, the typical specification used by 
other researchers has been one which does not incorporate the notion 
that the demand for real cash balances is not an aggregate relation­
ship, rather it is one which is appropriately defined in per capita 
terms.
The coefficient on the rate of change of the money multiplier, 
is expected to obtain the value of minus unity. This reflects the 
relationship of the components of high powered money to the money 
multiplier when the nominal money stock is determined in the rest of 
the world. When the money supply is fixed, changes in the money 
multiplier are distributed over the components of the high powered 
money stock in proportion to the shares of those components in the 
total money base. The share for the foreign component of the base, F, 
is 0. Hence, the share of the domestic component of the base DH, is
A
(1-8). Therefore, when 0 F is the dependent variable, the rate of
A
change of the money multiplier, h, will have a coefficient of minus 
unity. However, when F is the dependent variable [specification (6)], 
the appropriate independent variable, corresponding to the money
a
multiplier, should be h/0 in order for the coefficient to be minus 
one. Hence, I do not expect the coefficient on the rate of change
A
of the money multiplier when F is the dependent variable, to be -1.
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The coefficients on the rate of change of the domestic credit
A A
component of high powered money, (1 - 0)DH and ((1 - 0)/0)DH, are 
expected to obtain the value of minus unity. This also reflects the 
money supply relationship, with money supply constant and the money 
multiplier held fixed. The problem faced with respect to the proper
A
specification of the variable when F is the dependent variable 
[specification (6)] is avoided in that the growth in domestic credit 
times its share in high powered money is divided by the foreign 
reserve share,® . I present results from estimating (5) and (6) in 
Tables 11 and 12, repectively.
I note several general similarities. First, with a few 
exceptions, an analysis of the residuals failed to indicate the 
presence of serial correlation. Those countries for which, there was 
an indication of such correlation in the residuals, have Lad the 
variables transformed by an estimate of the first-order autocorrela­
tion coefficient and the results I present are for the transformed 
variables. The general lack of first order serial correlation is to be 
expected since the variables in the regressions are essentially first 
differences. But the fact that some of the regressions dc show some 
sign of autocorrelation in the residuals indicates the possibility of 
a higher order correlation which the Durbin-Watson statistic is not 
useful for indicating.
A second similarity across countries, which I note, is that 
nearly all the regressions, and both specifications, are significant. 
While this in itself is not surprising, we should also note that the 
coefficient for the scaled domestic credit growth is almost always
TABLE 11
ESTIMATION OF THE SIMPLE MODEL FOR LATIN AMERICA1 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: 0*F
Time
Period
Country
(1)
Constant 
(2)
p
CPI
(3)
| 1 1 1
h
(5)
(1-6)DH 
(6)
R2
(7)
DW
(8)
1947-75 Argentina -0.014
(0.050)
0.499*
(0.174)
0.346
(0.499)
-0.260
(0.217)
-0.213*
(0.095)
0.152 2.19
1951-75 Bolivia 0.081
(0.076)
0.518*
(0.190)
0.127
(0.795)
1.641
(0.977)
-0.187
(0.098)
0.293+ 1.73
1947-76 Brazil 0.187
(0.096)
0.320
(0.293)
-0.358
(0.552)
-0.174
(0.483)
-0.415*
(0.126)
0.252+ c
1947-75 Chile 0.010
(0.105)
0.463*
(0.170)
1.098
(1.193)
-0.745
(0.377)
-0.155*
(0.064)
0.195+ c
1947-75 Colombia 0.048
(0.077)
0.508
(0.368)
-0.140
(1.090)
-0.866
(0.513)
-0.127*
(0.040)
0.234+ 2.12
1951-76 Costa Rica 0.051
(0.039)
0.404
(0.208)
0.928*
(0.439)
-0.641
(0.385)
-0.712*
(0.151)
0.561+' 2.04
1951-76 Ecuador 0.015
(0.039)
0.845*
(0.411)
1.819*
(0.528)
-1.150
(0.819)
-0.892*
(0.176)
0.608+ 2.49
1947-76 El Salvador 0.018
(0.030)
0.332
(0.320)
0.316
(0.323)
0.272
(0.458)
-0.059
(0.111)
-0.010 c
1947-75 Guatemala 0.102*
(0.030)
1.141*
(0.426)
-0.906*
(0.385)
-0.614
(0.592)
-0.448* 
. (0.089)
0.454+ 2.03
(continued)
TABLE 11 (continued)
Time
Period
Country
(1)
Constant
(2)
p
CPI
(3)
A
■y
(4)
A
h
(5)
(1-0)DH 
(6)
R2
(7)
DW
(8)
1947-76 Honduras 0.210*
(0.087)
1.746
(1.156)
-2.369
(1.367)
-1.938*
(0.836)
-0.396*
(0.116)
0.384t 2.08
1947-75 Mexico 0.071
(0.038)
1.181*
(0.289)
0.838*
(0.429)
-2.250*
(0.398)
-1.071*
(0.138)
0.711+ c
1947-76 Nicaragua 0.066
(0.055)
-0.083
(0.535)
1.454*
(0.542)
1.050
(0.655)
-0.206*
(0.091)
0.311+ 2.19
1947-76 Paraguay 0.296
(0.423)
1.154
(1.409)
-7.361
(6.177)
-5.541
(6.085)
-0.022
(0.234)
-0.034 2.37
1946-76 Peru 0.090
(0.060)
0.511
(0.303)
0.052
(0.561)
-0.039
(0.268)
-0.534*
(0.167)
0.278+ 2.09
1956-75 Uruguay -0.006
(0.141)
0.820*
(0.306)
-4.105
(2.381)
-1.871
(1.241)
0.002*
(0.0005)
0.582+ 2.02
1947-75 Venezuela -0.101
(0.177)
1.959
(2.287)
2.800
(2.089)
3.259
(1.899)
0.061*
(0.020)
0.228+ c
1. Standard error in parenthesis.
A circumflex, indicates a percentage rate of change for the variable: F E foreign reserves;
P _ E consumer price index; y e real GDP; h = the money multiplier; DH = the domestic component 
or nigh powered money; 0 = the ratio of F to high powered money.
* coefficient statistically different than zero; t regression statistically significant.
c regression corrected for autocorrelation.
TABLE 12
ESTIMATION OF THE SIMPLE MODEL FOR LATIN AMERICA1 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: F
Time
Period
Country
(1)
Constant
(2)
p
CPI
(3)
A
y
(4)
A
h
(5)
DH
(6)
R2
(7)
DW
(8)
1947-75 Argentina -0.320
(0.203)
2.757*
(0.661)
2.928
(1.959)
-1.410
(0.814)
-0.095*
(0.040)
0.362+ 2.02
1951-75 Bolivia 0.111
(0.227)
1.868*
(0.563)
-1.147
(2.411)
5.470
(2.940)
-0.052*
(0.116)
0.411+ 2.25
1947-76 Brazil 0.209
(0.218)
1.765*
(0.682)
-1.416
(1.290)
-0.867
(1.077)
-0.135*
(0.043)
0.281+ c
1947-75 Chile -0.138
(0.178)
1.314*
(0.268)
0.730
(2.139)
-1.718*
(0.662)
-0.028
(0.014)
0.535+ 1.86
1947-75 Colombia 0.068
(0.164)
1.261
(0.787)
0.390
(2.315)
-2.461*
(1.085)
-0.128*
(0.040)
0.299+ 2.37
1951-76 Costa Rica 0.133
(0.138)
1.516
(1.007)
2.482
(1.576)
-1.943
(1.428)
-0.571*
(0.122)
0.549+ 1.94
1951-76 Ecuador 0.051
(0.076)
1.315
(0.804)
2.412*
(1.032)
-2.683
(0.600)
-0.592*
(0.136)
0.490+ 2.22
1947-76 El Salvador 0.072
(0.054)
0.587
(0.545)
0.439
(0.517)
0.094
(0.771)
-0.314*
(0.108)
0.203+ c
1947-75 Guatemala 0.153*
(0.045)
1.456*
(0.620)
-1.210*
(0.550)
-1.258
(0.856)
-0.467*
(0.089)
0.480+ 2.03
(continued)
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TABLE 12 (continued)
Time
Period Country
Constant
(2)
^CPI
(3)
y
(4)
h
(5) (1)
R2
(7)
DW
(8)
1947-76 Honduras 0.293*
(0.090)
1.879
(1.283)
-2.541
(1.392)
-2.327*
(0.922)
-0.438*
(0.069)
0.622t 2.28
1947-75 Mexico 0.111
(0.115)
1.792
(1.111)
1.726
(1.328)
-2.705*
(1.149)
-0.220*
(0.086)
0.165 c
1947-76 Nicaragua 0.106
(0.069)
-0.140
(0.636)
2.043
(0.643)
0.532
(0.776)
-0.307*
(0.056)
0.641+ 2.53
1947-76 Paraguay 0.345
(0.286)
0.539
(0.941)
-4.025
(4.052)
-3.680
(4.091)
-0.022*
(0.008)
0.116 2.35
1947-76 Peru 0.180
(0.134)
1.350
(0.730)
0.113
(1.322)
-0.550
(0.566)
-0.376*
(0.080)
0.399+ 1.83
1956-75 Uruguay -0.010
(0.122)
0.902*
(0.264)
-4.019*
(2.045)
-2.027
(1.071)
0.002*
(0.0007)
0.513+ 1.92
1947-75 Venezuela -0.049
(0.094)
0.836
(1.210)
1.896
(1.057)
1.008
(0.968)
0.031*
(0.013)
0.161 c
1. Standard error in parenthesis.
A circumflex, ", indicates a percentage rate of change for the variable: F = foreign reserves;
- consumer price index; y = real GDP; h = money multiplier; DH = domestic component of high 
powetdd ftiduey} § = taL io o f  f1 to liigh powered money.
* coefficient statistically different than zero; t regression statistically significant, c regression 
corrected for autocorrelation.
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statistically different from zero for all countries and both
specifications, but no such regularity exists for the otber variables
either across countries or between specifications. The cme notable
exception to this is Guatemala. However, in only seven ceases, for
2
both specifications, are the corrected R ' s greater than D.5: Chile,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Urugmay.
An even more startling similarity is that when I t-est the 
coefficients of these regressions against their theoretic.sl values, 
the imprecision of the estimation becomes apparent in thait the range 
of acceptance is relatively large. For example, the coefficient,
3|, is expected to obtain a value of +1. A t-test is usef to judge 
whether the estimated coefficient, is significantly different 
from the hypothesized value, 3°. The interesting similarity is that, 
of the coefficients which are statistically different frctm zero, most 
are also statistically different from the theoretical value. Indeed, 
for only two countries, Ecuador and Mexico, is the estirsred 
coefficient of the domestic credit expansion variable, 3^, not 
significantly different from the hypothesized value, and rhis occurs 
for specification (5) only. In other words, in nearly ai_l cases the 
coefficient for domestic credit expansion is statistically different 
from zero and minus unity. I present similar hypotheses tests in 
Table 13. This table shows the t-ratio as calculated for those
coefficients frotn Tables 11 and i2 which are statistically different 
from zero. Those coefficients which I consider being consistent with
my expectations are denoted by an asterisk in either Table ll or 12.
TABLE 13
T-RATIOS FOR HYPOTHESIS ON COEFFICIENTS FOR LATIN AMERICA
From Table 11 From Table 12
- *CPI y h (1-0)*DH [(1-0)/0]»DH
Country • V  e°! -1 V  02 ~ 1 H0! S3 - -1 V  - -1 Ho; " -1
Argentina -2.877 -- -- 8.308 22.792
Bolivia -2.533 -- — - -- 58.514
Brazil -- -- -- 4.645 20.006
Chile -3.150 -- -- 13.142 70.942
Colombia --  ? -- -- 21.572 22.042
Costa Rica -- -0.163** -- 1.904 3.521
Ecuador -0.376** 1.552** -- 0.611** 3.001
El Salvador -- -- -- -- 6.350
Guatemala 0.330** -4.945 -- 6.201 5.991
Honduras -- -- -1.121** 5.203 8.182
Mexico 0.628** -0.378** -3.138 -0.515** 9.098
Nicaragua -- 0.837** -- 8.746 12.384
Paraguay -- -- -- -- 121.778
Peru -- -- — - 2.795 7.796
Uruguay -0.588** -- -- 2100.690 1335.500
Venezuela -- -- -— 51.944 15.406
A circumflex, ", indicates a percentage rate of change for the variable: P^pi = consumer price index;
y = real GDP; h = money multiplier; DH 5 domestic component of high powered money; 0 = ratio of foreign 
reserves to high powered money.
** NOT significantly different from hypothesized value.
  NOT significantly different from zero.
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and a double asterisk in Table 13. Column 6 in both Table li and Table 12
lists the coefficient for the domestic credit expansion variable for
all countries. Nearly all of these are significantly different from
zero, but— as columns 5 and 6 of Table >3 indicate— in nearly all
cases they are also significantly different from minus unity.
The two countries which have coefficients for the domestic
credit expansion variable which are consistent with our expectations,
i.e., are significantly different from zero but not significantly
different from -1, also have the first and second highest corrected 
2
R 's for specification (5) [but not for specification (6)]. Indeed,
2
Mexico, which has the highest corrected R in specification (5), does
not have a significant association between the explanatory variables
and foreign-reserves-scaled balance of payments, specification (6).
Overall,.the regression results both across countries and
between specifications are not overwhelming in favor of the proposed
model. That is, the summary statistics are not strongly supportive
of the model— the regressions may be significant according to an 
2
F-test but the R ' s are, in general, small. Moreover, although the
F-test indicates some relationship, the importance of most of the
variables is not discemable in that the coefficients are insignifi- 
14cant.
An attempt was made to separate the affects of domestic credit 
expansion on the balance of payments from the affects of the ratio of 
foreign reserves to high powered money, 0. That is, I ran regres­
sions of the following form for each country:
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F = aQ + ax P + a2 y + a3 h + 6 + a5 DH + z (61)
I did not report the estimation since these regressions 
resulted in no net gain in terms of discerning the relative impor- 
tance of 0 vis-a-vis DH or in improving the performance of the 
other explanatory variables.
The generally poor results do not imply that the monetary 
model is not useful in explaining movements in official reserve 
assets for Latin American countries during this period. Rather, the 
paucity of good results does imply that the model as specified as a 
single equation estimated via OLS is not sufficiently efficient at 
untangling the underlying relationships that I expect to exist.
Perhaps with better data and/or a more elaborate model the usefulness 
of the simple monetary model would be apparent.
' With this in mind I would now like to focus on recent 
empirical work done by other researchers on the simple model. The 
work is summarized in TableJ4. These results are, of course, not 
the complete scope'*''* of the work done by these researchers, but it 
is fair to say that these results reflect the general tenor of their 
analysis in terms of the sample for which the research was conducted 
and their satisfaction with the performance of the simple model. I 
should mention at this point that while other researchers do include 
an interest rate variable in their analysis, none was included for 
the Latin American nations. This is due to the lack of reliable 
"market" interest rate data and/or a discount rate series of suf­
ficient (time series) length. Moreover, in no case considered in 
Table 4 is the coefficient on the interest rate variable significantly
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TABLE 14
RECENT EMPIRICAL WORK1 ON THE MONETARY APPROACH TO THE 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
A. Bean on Japan, Quarterly data 1959 - 1970, OLS;
1. Table 14.1, column 2:
0-£ => 1.19 Pppt + 0.52 y - 0.11 i - 0.82 h - 0.67 (1-0)DR 
(5.38) CPI (6.36) (-1.22) (-5.29) (-8.32)
R2 = 0.65 DW - 1.99
2. Table 14.2, column 2:
F = 0.89 P„pl + 0.37 y - 0.13 i - 0.82 h - 0.52 (1-S)/0)DH 
(4.87) (4.71) (-1.70) (-4.88) (-6.20)
R2 « 0.48 DW = 1.96
B. Genberg on Sweden, Quarterly data 1950 - 1968, 2SLS; Table 13.9, 
line 2:
(1-0).DH = 0.011 - 0.53 0-F + 0.02 G 
(0.004) (0.27) (0.06)
0-F = 0.39 + 1.06 Ppp_ - 0.04 y - 0.01 i - 0.23 h 
(0.26) (0.45) (0.25) (0.03) (0.30)
- 1.23 [(1-0)•DH] - 0.04 In(M )
(0.63) (0.02)
C. Guitain on Spain, Annual data 1955 - 1971, OLS;
1. Table 15.6, equation 4:
AF = 25.11 - 0.507 P (*)2 V - 0.881 ADH; R2 = 0.969 
(-1.851) ' (-11.678) DW = 3.144
2. Table 15.6, equation 10:
A2F = -1.253 (*)2 4P - 0.056 Ay - 0.853 A2DH; R2 = 0.882
(-1.366) (-9.644) DW = 3.064
3
D. Zecher on Australia, Quarterly data 1951 - 1971, OLS;
0-F = 0.65 P_pT +1.11 y - 0.035 £ - 0.89 - 1.06 (1-0)DH
(3.70) (6.54) P (-0.75) (-5.08) (-7.97)
R2 => 0.93 DW = 1.69
1. Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics, except for Genberg.
2. Coefficient not reported by Guitain.
3. Zecher uses a 16 quarter weighted average to measure permanent
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different from zero. The countries studied by other researchers are, 
in general, more highly developed than those in the Latin American 
sample. Also, quarterly data for the variables in the model were 
available, allowing, if nothing else, greater degrees of freedom in 
the model. In addition, all work reported in Table |4 covers a period 
ending in 1971 or previously— before the so-called U.S. dollar crisis. 
That is, the sample period covered by their analysis is one during 
which the international money system could be considered as being a 
stable fixed exchange rate regime with the U.S. dollar acting as a 
reserve currency.
The above factors, all basically of a statistical nature, would 
tend to favor the performance of the simple model. In general, using 
the usual statistics to assess the performance of a single equation 
estimation, the results for the countries presented in TableJ4are 
good. However, upon closer examination this "goodness-of-fit" can be 
seriously questioned. Indeed, given the criticisms below, the results 
described in TableJ4 are no better than those for the Latin American 
countries described in Tables |1 and (2. Moreover, I propose here that 
the results presented in tables 11,12 and 14 are sufficiently poor as to 
contradict the claim that these results represent a test of the valid­
ity of the monetary approach to the balance of payments. Not that the 
monetary model cannot be validated; rather that it has yet to be 
validated.^
I begin the discussion of the empirical work with a general 
setting of the scene. Bean analyzes the Japanese economy using 
quarterly data for the period 1959-1970. She estimates equations of
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of the form of specifications (5) and (6) using the ordinary least 
squares technique. Genberg studies the Swedish economy using 
quarterly data for the period 1950-1968. He estimates a variant of 
specification (5) as the second stage of a two-stage least squares 
process with the high powered money-scaled domestic credit expansion 
variable being predicted in the first stage. Guitian*s work concerns 
the Spanish economy using annual data for the period 1955-1971. He
estimates a variant of specification (5) also using the OLS tech­
nique. Zecher analyzes the Australian economy using both quarterly 
and annual data for the period 1951-1971. He estimates an equation 
of the form of specification (5) using the OLS technique. On first 
blush the results seem to be consistent with the monetary approach 
in that the equations fit well and the coefficients have the 
expected signs and magnitudes. These are, however, first-order tests
and can be questioned. Guitian presents results with the highest 
2
R ; I analyze his work first.
A number of clarifying comments are in order. First, Guitian 
relates the first difference in foreign reserves, i.e., the official
settlements balance of payments, to the level of prices and real gross
domestic product and also the first difference in domestic credit. 
Guitian uses several measures of the latter in his research; the 
results presented in Table 14 refer to his fourth measure which con­
forms to the definition used for the Latin American countries and those 
other countries mentioned above. He also estimates an equation using 
the first difference of the balance of payments, i.e., the second
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difference in foreign reserves, and relates that to the rates of
inflation and real GDP growth and the second difference in domestic
credit. That is, in Guitian1s first specification, the balance of
payments— whether official settlements are in surplus or deficit— is,
in part, determined by the average level of prices. Whereas in his
second specification, changes in the balance of payments— whether a
surplus/deficit worsens or improves— is, in part, determined by the
rate of inflation. The theoretical justification for these two
specifications is not at all clear. This in part might account for
the poor performance of the price level and GDP variables despite the
2
very large corrected R 's.
Even pushing this aside, we should be cautious in attaching
any meaning whatsoever to Guitian's results on a very simple level.
Namely, as Granger and Newbold (1974) warn, low Durbin-Watson statis-
2
tics even with very high R 's can be a sign of a spurious regression. 
That is, whenever the DW test is applied to least squares residuals 
and the residuals fail the test, some specification error is 
indicated. Guitian reports DW statistics of 3.144 and 3.064 which 
pass the test of no autocorrelation in the residuals against the 
alternative hypothesis of positive autocorrelation but not against the 
alternative of negative autocorrelation where the DW statistics is 
4 - d. In this case the appropriate values to consider are 0.856 and
0.936. The critical value for 17 observations and three explanatory 
variables plus a constant term is 0.900. Thus in Guitian's first 
specification the presence of negative serial correlation is indicated, 
and in his second specification the test proves inconclusive— but just
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barely. In light of the above, it is not meaningful to interpret
Guitian's results as either validating or^  discounting the monetary
approach in that the appropriate statistical techniques to allow us
to make such a decision based on hypothesis tests, e.g., simple t-
tests on coefficients, have not been applied.
Bean and Zecher both use specifications very similar to those
applied to the Latin American data and both researchers use the OLS
technique of estimation. Genberg uses a two-stage technique; so I
save his work for last. We can analyze the work done by Bean and
Zecher simultaneously since nearly all of my comments apply to both.
The most obvious flaw in their work is that neither Bean nor
Zecher explain why there is no constant term in their regression
results. If the coefficient is not significant under normal t-tests
why not mention this. (This by the way is not the appropriate test
for the significance of the constant term (see Williams (1959)), The
main point is: are these regressions in some sense indicative of a
goodness of fit of the monetary model to the data for Japan and
Australia, respectively? The problem in answering this question is
that if the regression results were produced using standard statisti- 
2
cal packages the R 's were not calculated properly, and more impor­
tantly the Durbin-Watson statistics are meaningless.^
Since Bean and Zecher report DW statistics near a safe value, 
we should consider what an accurate representation of the existence of 
negative serial autocorrelation would mean. That is, if DW is under­
estimated sufficiently, such that upon reestimating we obtain a DW- 
statistic around 2.70 for Japan and 2.50 for Australia, then we could
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reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in favor of the 
alternative of negative serial correlation. This would invalidate 
the usual t-tests.
Beyond this, similar problems to those encountered for the 
Latin American countries vis-a-vis the imprecise estimation of 
coefficients remain, particularly for Japan. That is, while the 
coefficients are statistically different from zero they are also 
statistically different from their theoretical values. Again these 
criticisms should not be interpreted as being skeptical of the 
monetary approach but rather of the simplistic fashion in which it has 
been tested.
Genberg does try to account for the possibility of a more 
elaborate interaction between domestic credit component of high 
powered money and the foreign reserves component by postulating a 
central bank reaction function. That is, in the literature it has 
been claimed that a central bank can sterilize the inflationary 
influence of a balance of payments surplus, an increase of foreign 
reserves, by reducing the stock of government securities it holds—  
"destroy" domestic credit. Genberg attempts to test this hypothesis 
by performing' a two-stage least squares regression of two equations.
The first stage consists of an estimation of the central bank 
reaction function:
(1 - 0) *DH = Oq + 0*F + (*2 * G + z (7)
A
where G is the growth in government debt outstanding and z is a 
random error term serially uncorrelated with zero mean and constant
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variance. The predicted values from this regression were then used 
to obtain the results for a specification similar to (5):
e«F = e0 + p + 32 y + B3 i + 34 h + B5((l - 0)*DH)*
+ B6 log Mt_1 (8)
where ((1 - 0)*DH)* is the expected high powered money-scaled domestic 
credit expansion variable from regression equation (7) above.
The usual tests for judging the significance of this relation­
ship (8) do not hold since it was estimated via a two step procedure. 
Dhrymes (1971) does suggest some asymtotically efficient statistics. 
However, the procedure Genberg applies is incorrect. The purpose of 
the two step estimation is to purge the suspected endogenous variable, 
in this case (1-0)*DH of any possible correlation with the error 
term in the second step of the procedure. By specifying the purging 
equation as in (7) Genberg inadvertently includes the error term 
associated with 0*F. That is, the correct procedure calls for the 
first stage to predict values of (1-0)*DH from a regression of 
itself on all the exogenous variables of a specification similar to 
(5) and other exogenous variables not included elsewhere in the 
system. This is clearly a major error on the part of Genberg in 
applying this technique since rather than purging the possible simul­
taneous equations bias he has reinforced it.
These claims of improper implementation of the monetary model 
have not been made elsewhere. As was alluded to earlier, Magee 
(1976) does criticize these researchers on a number of statistical
points. But In no case Is his criticism so strong as to suggest that 
that if this empirical work is an attempt at validating the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments in truth the approach has yet to 
be validated.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III
1. While I am in agreement with much of Magee's comments, some 
differences remain, e.g., although it is apparent that the estimation 
procedures do not allow us to discover whether M^ or Ms is influencing 
the balance of payments, it remains unclear whether the statistics are 
at all meaningful.
2. Some questions can be raised as to the appropriateness of 
empirical work aimed at testing the validity of viewing a balance of 
payments disequilibrium as a monetary phenomenon. These issues are 
of more than econometric importance although they can be expressed as 
such. That is, one can apply statistical analyses to econometric 
problems without first resolving difficulties in the interpretation 
of the theoretical constructs. Subsequently, criticisms can be levied 
against the analysis for failing to use an appropriate technique. In 
this way these queries can be viewed as econometric problems.
3. We can either assume that there are two markets: money and 
goods, or we can have three markets— the third being securities. 
Assuming gross substitutability in the latter case (it necessarily 
holds in the former), any deficit in the balance of the current and 
capital accounts implies a surplus in the money account, i.e., an 
excess supply of money.
4. See Cagan (1956) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963), as well 
as studies on Latin American countries: Deaver (1970), Diz (1970),
Harberger (1963), and Vogel (1971).
5. See, for example, Bean, Genberg, Guitian, and Zecher in
Frankel and Johnson (1976). Further and more explicit comments and 
criticisms of previous work will be described later.
6. The following identity can be used to derive the components 
of high powered money (see Zecher in Frenkel and Johnson (1976):
F + OA = H + 0L
where F is the foreign reserve assets of the monetary authorities, 
gold and foreign currency holdings, and OA is all other assets. H 
is high powered money representing the liabilities of the authorities 
to the (domestic) public and defined in the usual way as currency in 
circulation plus legal bank reserves— required and excess, and OL is
all other liabilities. Hence the domestic credit component of the
monetary base can be obtained as a residual, i.e.,
DH = H - F = OA - OL.
7. The change in the official reserve holdings of the central 
bank has been recommended as the appropriate definition of the balance
64
of payments by Mundell (see his textbook, International Economics, 
1968, p. 141).
8. See Swoboda (1977).
9. Except for the work of Genberg (1976), OLS has been applied 
to estimate the equation.
10. The change in real income was appropriately transformed 
to yield an elasticity. Since no data on market interest rates were 
available for Latin America, I deleted that variable. See Appendix 
A for sources and notes on all variables.
11. The growth rates for all variables were calculated as 
first logarithmic differences, except fcjr domestic credit which in 
some cases obtained a negative value. D.Hwas, in those cases, 
calculated as a standard percentage change.
12. Since most of the empirical work done in the past analyses 
developed, and in some cases highly industrialized, economies, the 
order of magnitude of some coefficients are not expected, in general, 
to be the same, e.g., as between Sweden and Costa Rica. That is, 
those countries with higher real income growth, ceteris paribus, will 
experience greater growth in official reserves— relative to the rest 
of the world. Specifically, the higher the growth in real income 
(per capita) the higher will be the growth in foreign reserves, 
depending on the real income elasticity of real cash balances. Less 
developed economies will exhibit higher real income elasticities of 
real cash balances than will more highly developed economies and thus 
the estimated coefficient, B2> should be higher for a less developed 
economy which is growing faster than an industrialized nation.
13. There is no a priori justification for estimating equations 
(5) and (6) without a constant term. That the equations are specified 
without one is a result of specifying the demand for real cash balan­
ces as:
—  =L(y,i).
If the demand for real cash balances were instead specified as 
-p- = A* Q(y,i),
where A varies over time, say, as a function of the level of the 
population, then the empirical specification would include the con­
stant terms, Bq and BA, which would reflect autonomous growth in the 
demand for real cash balances. Leaving the constant term out of the 
regression will lead to some difficulty in interpreting the goodness 
of fit of an estimation.
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14. We might not be able to draw clear distinctions regarding 
the applicability of the simple model to all countries because of the 
violation of a number of assumptions in the data for one country
but not the other. Specifically, the existence of stronger trends 
and more similar movements among the variables in the analysis for 
one country may appear to reduce the importance of a particular 
variable for that" country and not another, i.e., multicollinearity. 
Moreover, those countries which have experienced greater fluctuations 
in their balance of payments, for whatever reason, will require 
explanation for a phenomenon of greater variation and hence place a 
greater burden upon the same explanatory variables, e.g., domestic 
credit expansion, to account for the greater total variation.
15. Table 14“indicates the performance of the simple model 
described in equation 5 as reported by other researchers. An attempt 
has been made to present those results which are in some sense com­
patible with those I present in Tables n  and 12 f°r Latin American 
nations which are included in my sample. More complete results can be 
obtained for the other countries by consulting the original sources.
16. For empirical work, applied in a more sophisticated 
fashion, which tests the monetary approach, see Blejer (1977) and 
Girton and Roper (1977).
17. The appropriate DW statistic to use in the case of a 
regression without a constant is obtained by first regressing the 
same specification but including a constant term. The statistic 
usually produced by the standard package and that defined by Durbin 
and Watson is:
d =
n
2 (e 
t=2 1
t=l
The calculation of the'd statistic generally assumes the mean value 
of the least squares residual is zero— which is not, in general, the 
case when a regression is estimated without a constant term. The 
statistic should be:
_ t=2s - et-l>‘d' =
-  2
2 (e. - e)Z 
t=l c
We know that the second moment of a random variable about any point 
other than its mean will result in a larger sum of squares. Thus, for
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the same values of et the statistic d will underestimate d', since 
the denominator of d is larger than the denominator for d'.
CHAPTER IV
THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN LATIN AMERICA
A. Introduction
An important ingredient of the monetary approach to balance of 
payments theory is the stability of the demand for money. The monetary 
approach postulates an equivalence between the rate, per unit time, of 
domestic hoarding/dishoarding and an official settlements balance of 
payments surplus/deficit, at a given price lemel.^ Domestic hoarding 
is s. uply the adjustment of desired nominal cash balances to actual 
money supplied. In a closed economy, hoarding would determine the 
price level. In the context of a small open economy, the price level 
is determined by world conditions in the long run. In the short-run 
the price lemel of a small open economy can be affected by small country 
conditions as well.
The central character of the demand for money in balance of pay­
ments theory lies in the resolution of the balance of payments statement 
through movements of official reserves. That is, the monetary approach, 
in general, dispenses with analyzing the various accounts in the balance 
of payments statement and focuses on the overall or money account. In 
this respect the settlement of international accounts requires a mone-r 
tary outflow for deficits and an inflow for surpluses.
Therefore, for reliable and meaningful predictions from a 
balance of payments theory which utilizes the monetary approach,
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tractable relationships between the desired quantity of money and 
other variables must be formulated and their validity tested.
In this chapter, I discuss the stability of money demand
relationships in Latin American countries. In particular, I analyze
the correspondence between the behavior of demanders and suppliers
of money over different periods in time. In addition, I test
various specifications of the demand for real cash balances with the
aim of verifying several theoretical propositions established and
verified for the cases of the United States and other industrialized
2
countries as well as some Latin American countries.
B. Theoretical Aspects of the Demand 
Demand for Money
The demand for real cash balances has been the subject of 
studies by many authors. However, much of the current stock of 
knowledge of empirical estimates of money demand functions has been 
derived from the theoretical framework established by Milton 
Friedman (1956a, 1959 and 1971). The theoretical aspects of the 
monetary analysis for Latin America I use here also draw heavily on 
the Friedman framework.
The essential features of monetary analysis are that the 
quantity theory of money is a demand theory relating the desired ratio 
of nominal stock of money to nominal income that individuals hold to 
a small number of variables; that money is an asset which individuals 
hold as some part of their wealth and as such money yields services
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which are demanded and for which standard demand theory tools are 
applicable for specifying the demand function; that this demand 
function can be derived, essentially, from utility maximization sub­
ject to a wealth constraint.
These assertions yield a model of the demand for money which
relates the nominal stock of cash balances to the returns on money
and other (non-human) assets and to wealth. The returns on assets are
easily defined from the description of the asset. Thus, the real
return on money corresponds to the volume of goods which one unit
commands, i.e., the price level— assuming no interest is paid on 
3
demand deposits. The price level helps to define the real return on 
all alternative assets as well. Other assets, the yields for which 
are included in the demand for money, are nominal assets such as 
bonds— the yield being the market (nominal) rate of interest on those 
bonds; real assets such as equities which appreciate with increases 
in the general level of prices— the yield being the market interest 
rate plus the expected rate of inflation; real goods whose returns are 
not in money such as physical goods— the implicit yield being the 
expected change in the money value of goods, i.e., the expected rate 
of inflation.
The principles of demand theory require that changes in 
nominal units of monetary variables will affect in an equiproportion- 
ate way the nominal demand for money. That is, if nominal money 
demand is^ :
M = f(P, d^ , ie, PE; Y)
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where:
M = nominal stock of money;
P = the general price level;
1^  = the market rate of Interest on bonds;
ie = the market rate of Interest on equities;
P = the expected rate of change of the price level;
Y = nominal income;
then an increase in P and Y, by the same percentage amount, will 
increase M in the same way. In other words the demand for real cash 
balances, M/P, is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and money 
(nominal) income:
where y = real income = Y/P.
The rates of return on alternative assets are expected to 
reflect the gross substitutability of assets in portfolio bolding 
(excluding explicit risk considerations). That is, the rates of 
return are measures of the opportunity cost of holding cash instead 
of other forms of wealth. Specifically, the higher are the returns 
to holding assets other than money, the lower will be the quantity of 
real cash balances.
On the other hand, increases in real income will be translated 
into a greater demand for real cash balances."* That is, an increase 
in real income represents an increment to wealth. This greater stock
71
of wealth permits new combinations of portfolio choice previously 
unattainable. Depending on whether this increase in real income 
is (perceived as) permanent or transitory, individuals will generally 
hold a greater quantity of real cash balances at all opportunity 
costs,^ i.e., demand will increase as for a normal good.
Several questions can be raised in regard to the specification 
of the money demand function. In the context of a small (non-reserve 
currency) open economy, operating under a fixed exchange rate regime 
the price level may be determined, at least in the long run, by world 
factors. The demand for money could then be expressed as:
M = f(i, PE; P; Y)
where i is a weighted average of rates of return on all asset alter­
natives to money and P is the world-determined price level. If 
nominal income, Y, were to rise, say because of productivity 
increases, then the nominal stock of money would increase.^ Unless 
the increase in nominal balances was validated by the monetary 
authorities, residents of the small country would begin hoarding 
thereby inducing a balance of payments surplus. This result is 
counter to income-determination models of international trade which 
would suggest that an increase in income will cause a current account 
deficit and since the interest rate, i, is being held constant then 
a balance of payments deficit should result.
One possible way around this difference would be if Instead 
of facing a fixed price level in the short run (determined by world 
conditions), some flexibility was permitted. The increase in
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productivity, other things equal, would put downward pressure on 
domestic prices. In this way real cash balances would be increased. 
The (temporarily) lower small-country prices would induce inflows 
of international reserves as foreign consumers seek to take advantage 
of the difference in price levels (assuming the exchange rate is 
unchanged), and domestic residents reduce their (now too high) real 
cash balances. The increase in nominal money corresponding to the 
inflow of reserves temporarily increases actual real cash balances 
above desired inducing small-country residents to further dishoard 
while the average level of prices rises to the world level.
In this case the resultant outflow of reserves will not be
equal to the full amount of the inflow of reserves which was induced
by the initial lowering of prices. Rather only that part of the
rest-of-the-world dishoarding which corresponds to the initial
increase in nominal (and, at that instant, real) income will show
up as a balance of payments deficit. Hence, by allowing adjustments
to international accounts disequilibria to be resolved through cash
balance adjustment (and in turn price level adjustments) rather than
8constraining adjustments to have not short-run effects on prices 
(because of instantaneous price arbitrage), the monetary approach's 
predictions are the same as "traditional" theory. In this respect,
I believe it is appropriate to analyze the demand for money in real 
terms and permit the data to demonstrate whether or not the specifi­
cation is in error.
Another question with respect to specification of the demand 
for money function is the appropriate definition of money. Frequently
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opportunity cost measures and quality adjustment factors (see
Klein, 1974) are not available. Hence, using a definition of money
which includes various forms of deposits is likely to result in a
misspecification of the money demand function. Lothian (1976) has
proposed and demonstrated that, since a narrow definition of money
is more closely related to transactions motives and less dependent
on opportunity cost and quality differences, high powered money is
in many instances a better measure of money than the standard Ml and 
9
M2 definitions. In empirical analysis below, I consider the results 
of specifying the demand in terms of high-powered money.
Another problem frequently encountered in monetary analysis 
is the measurement of opportunity costs of holding money. Generally, 
any measure used should reflect market conditions in the sense that 
the rates chosen are feasible alternatives for the holders of money.
In this respect central bank discount rates are not very useful in 
themselves. The typically highly regulated time and saving deposit 
rates are also poor reflections of market conditions for assets 
although the assets to which those rates apply are feasible alter­
natives to cash.
A second issue with respect to opportunity cost measures 
concerns the term structure of interest rates. In terms of 
inflationary expectations as the only determinant of term structure, 
the alternative cost aspect of a wide variety of interest bearing 
assets would be reflected in long-term interest rates. If liquidity 
enjoys a premium then from an initial specification of a short-term 
interest rate the remaining term structure can be developed by
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incorporating liquidity preferences and expectations of infla- 
10tlon.
In the context of a small open economy, an integrated capital 
market is likely to result in domestic interest rates equalling 
those prevailing in the rest of the world. As interest rates 
generally incorporate information on expectations of inflation, 
rest-of-the-world rates of interest might also measure the opportun­
ity cost of holding the currency of a small open economy if long-run 
inflationary expectations are similar— say because of long-run 
convergence of rates of inflation.
This issue and other questions concerning the specification 
of the demand for real cash balances will be taken up in a later 
section of this chapter. Suffice it to say that these empirical 
questions are of a rather general nature and apply to all cases of 
money demand estimation. I would like to describe the behavior of 
money holders in Latin America before proceeding to the estimation 
of demand functions.
B. The Stability of the Monetary Sector •
A major factor in the stability of the monetary sector is 
the stability of the behavior of the actors in regard to their 
pattern of money holdings. I showed In Chapter II that, in general, 
the velocity of money— a demand characteristic— was generally less 
variable than the nominal stock of money— a supply characteristic.
In this way, I expect the observations on money to trace out a 
demand relationship rather than a stable supply relation.
A simple way of demonstrating the stability of the monetary 
sector and more importantly the demand side is by comparing behavior 
for various sub-periods to determine the strength of relationships 
across time. In Table 15 I have listed the average annual ratio of 
three parameters: c, the ratio of currency holdings to demand
deposits of the non-bank public; r, the ratio of commercial hank 
reserves to demand deposits; V, the ratio of nominal income to 
nominal money, i.e., velocity. I calculated the annual averages over 
several periods. The first period, 1947-1976, covers fully the 
available data. The second period, 1956-1971, approximately covers 
the period of a world-wide U.S. dollar exchange standard. The 
remaining two periods split the period of greater and more variable 
rates of inflation worldwide, 1966-1975.
The currency/deposit ratio, c, measures the behavior of the 
public as it affects the composition of the nominal stock of 
money.^ The reserve/deposit ratio, r, reflects in part the pre­
ferences of banks and also restraints in the form of reserve require­
ments. Velocity, V, reflects money holders1 behavior as it relates 
to transactions turnover of cash balances. That is, velocity shows 
the frequency with which individuals use each unit of currency and 
demand deposits for transactions in one time period (in this case, a 
year).
In looking at the figures in Table 15, I observe several 
striking features. First, in nearly all Latin American countries, 
the currency/deposit ratio is much greater than in the U.S. Only 
Brazil and Venezuela are similar to the U.S. Moreover, as we go
TABLE 15
SELECTED MONETARY PARAMETERS, AVERAGE FOR VARIOUS PERIODS
c = currency/demand deposit ratio 
r = bank reserve/demand deposit ratio 
V = income velocity of money (Ml)
1947-1976(30) 1956-1971(16) 1966-1970(5) 1971-1975(5)
c r V c r V c r V c r V
Argentina 0.97. 0.87 4.57 1.10 . 0.45' •. 5.3.3 0.92. 0.32, . 5.57”- 0.65": 0.38 ' 5.21
Bolivia 3.18 0.62 10.87 4.08 0.57 9.10 3.52 0.64 7.69 2.40 0.73 7.88
Brazil 0.43 0.26 4.80 0.38 0.29 4.98 0.32 0.28 5.90 0.73 0.16 5.66
Chile 0.62 0.57 9.16 0.64 0.53 1 0 . 2 0 0.67 0.67 10.37 0 . 8 6 1.55 7.78
Colombia 0.68 0.27 6.58 0.62 0.24 6.26 0.55 0.30 6.05 0.50 0.38 6.32
Costa Rica 0.74 0.30 6.13 0.68 0.31 6.28 0.56 0.31 5.94 0.45 0.34 5.22
Ecuador 0.99 0.53 7.41 0.96 0.50 7.56 0.79 0.53 6.72 0.63 0.59 5.70
El Salvador 1.16 0.60 7.17 0.93 0.63 7.55 0.85 0.92 8.12 0.75 0.96 6.89
Guatemala 1.52 0.69 9.83 1.34 0.62 9.81 1.27 0 .66 10.03 1.13 0.90 9.76
Honduras 1.13 0.38 9.35 1 .22 0.34 9.72 1 . 0 1 0.36 9.39 0 . 8 6 0.36 7.76
Mexico 0.89 0.38 8.03 0.81 0.28 8.28 0.71 0.26 8.01 0.73 0.49 7.78
Nicaragua 0.84 0.38 8.56 0.81 0.40 8.59 0.67 0.55 8.59 0.55 0.44 7.53
Paraguay 1.33 0.90 10.42 1.42 0.91 11.33 1.37 1.28 10.63 1.18 1.49 10.56
Peru 0.99 0.50 7.12 0.99 0.55 7.77 1.05 0.50 7.71 1.15 0.53 5.06
Uruguay 2.08 0.67 6.41 2.34 0.62 6.07 2.87 0.65 6.74 2.08 0.82 7.48
Venezuela 0.66 0.42 7.40 0.55 0.43 7.42 0.49 0.40 7.59 0.36 0.41 6.45
United States 0.28 0.19 3.57 0.26 0.18 3.74 0.28 0.18 4.28 0.30 0.17 4.68
1. Velocity figure for Uruguay covers 1955-1975.
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across the table from the averages for the full period to the 
smaller periods, the c ratio declines for most Latin American 
countries whereas for the U.S. the currency/deposit ratio increases. 
Brazil, Chile and Peru are exceptions to this. The changes are not 
dramatic, however, except for the period 1971-1975.
Second, bank reserves relative to demand deposits are greater 
in Latin America than in the U.S. for all periods. Only Brazil’s 
reserve/deposit ratio for 1971-1975 is similar to the U.S. ratio.
Again when we look at the period 1971-1975 we see that most Latin 
American nations increased their reserves relative to demand 
deposits whereas the U.S. reduced its ratio, marginally. The 
reserve/deposit ratio is remarkably steady for most of these coun­
tries across periods. Argentina and Brazil have a significantly 
smaller ratio in 1971-1975 than any other period.
Third, the frequency of turnover of Ml, velocity, was 
generally much greater for Latin American countries than for the U.S. 
However, in going from the longer periods to the subperiod 1971- 
1975, most Latin American countries exhibit a decreased velocity 
whereas the U.S. shows an increased velocity. This tendency, of 
converging velocity, is striking for several countries. In particu­
lar, Argentina (5.2), Brazil (5.7) and Peru (5.1) have a rate of 
turnover not much different than that for the U.S. (4.7).
In Table 16 I have listed the average annual growth rates of 
money (Ml), the average level of prices (P) and velocity (V).
Several features of the economic situation in Latin America are 
apparent in Table 16. First, as compared to the U.S., the mean
TABLE 16
SELECTED ANNUAL GROWTH RATES,1 AVERAGE FOR VARIOUS PERIODS, %
Ml = nominal narrow money stock 
P h price level, Consumer Price Index 
V = income velocity of money (Ml)
1947-1976(30) 1956-1971(16) 1966-1970(5) 1971-1975(5)
A A
Ml P V
A A A
Ml P V Ml P V Ml P V
Argentina 31.64 30.72 1 .10 22.85 23.99' 4.38 25.65 17.69 -6.40 58.02 49.73 4.98
Bolivia 26.16 22.63 -0.07 21.57 16.30 -8.01 9.71 5.74 0.70 22.67 18.73 2.76
Brazil 29.18 23.97 1.06 34.60 30.79 1.95 26.90 24.19 4.16 33.26 19.11 -1.70
Chile 44.12 43.23 1.71 32.63 24.17 -2.25 33.21 23.42 -0.40 115.85 112.35 3.92
Colombia 16.38 1 1 . 0 2 0.44 16.09 9.97 -0.83 16.86 9.59 -1.61 19.34 17.44 4.01
Costa Rica 11.05 4.76 -0.95 8.94 2.11 -1.66 12.24 2.51 -2.10 19.93 12.81 -1.37
Ecuador 11.90 5.22 -1.78 10.80 3.09 -2.66 16.12 4.61 -5.29 22.97 12.63 -0.34
El Salvador 8.38 4.73 0.05 3.82 0.53 0.75 4.72 1.07 0.38 16.44 8.26 -4.96
Guatemala 7.81 3.22 1.29 4.70 0.43 0.80 5.97 1.49 1.19 14.32 8.12 -1.66
Honduras * 7.84 2.96 -0.93 6.73 1.29 -0.38 9.22 1.71 -2.41 10.50 6.12 -2.70
Mexico 12.36 6.80 0 . 1 0 10.51 3.84 -0.05 11.54 3.61 -1.39 16.43 11.40 0.73
Nicaragua 10.60 4.23 -1.79 5.57 0.56 0.44 3.16 2.16 3.14 15.66 8.95 -1.40
Paraguay 19.72 16.58 -0.05 1 0 . 6 6 5.91 0.38 7.94 1.26 -2.08 17.84 10.94 0.82
Peru 15.68 11.08 0 .8 8„ 15.71 8.50 -2.03 19.75 9.27 -4.63 22.23 1 1 . 8 8 -5.50
Uruguay 26.07 27.98 3.20 31.99 30.51 -0.28 42.43 46.81 6.69 43.02 52.54 8.66
Venezuela 11.14 3.49 -1.90 7.58 1.54 -0.34 7.70 1.58 -1.40 24.80 5.55 -7.40
United States 3.56 3.61 3.42 3.47 2.58 2.65 4.97 4.17 2.20 5.86 6.53 2.94
1. A circumflex indicates a percentage growth rate of the variable.
2. Velocity growth figure for Uruguay covers 1956-1975.
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growth rates of money and prices for all periods are generally
higher, and significantly so. The cases for which the rates of
growth in prices are lower in the 1956-1971 and 1966-1970 sub-
periods than for the U.S. are cases when the differences are in
excess of two percentage points. Second, the percentage change in
velocity for most Latin American countries is intermittently
negative and its absolute value is generally different than the
growing velocity of the U.S.
Finally, as between periods, the pattern for Latin America
in money and price level growth corresponds to that of the U.S. In
nearly all cases monetary expansion and inflation have increased.
However, the same correspondence between Latin America and the U.S.
is not so clear in terms of the pattern over time of the percentage
change in velocity. Indeed in going from the period 1966-1970 to
the period 1971-19 75 only 9 Latin American countries have increased
the rate of change of the rate of turnover of their currency— as
has been the pattern for the U.S. Moreover, nine Latin American
countries have, on average, a declining velocity for 1971-1975 as
opposed to the increasing velocity of the U.S.,
In Table 17 I have listed the average annual growth rates of
real per capita money (m) and income (y). The predictions of the
quantity theory are that, holding velocity constant, a one-to-one
correspondence exists between real money and income growth (per 
12capita) in the steady state. Since velocity was not constant for 
these countries for all periods, by adding the growth in velocity 
(Table 16) to the difference between the growth in real per capita
TABLE 17
REAL PER CAPITA ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF MONEY AND INCOME,1 
AVERAGE FOR VARIOUS PERIODS, %
m = real per capita narrow money (Ml) 
y = real per capita gross domestic product
1947-1976(30) 
A y
1956-1971(16) 
m y
1966-1970(5) 
m y
1971-1975(5) 
m y
Argentina -0.74 1.92 -2.78 2.57 6.60 2.83 6.97 2.00
Bolivia 1.20 1.85 2.18 0.54 1.37 3.55 1.28 3.04
Brazil 2.42 4.72 0.94 3.24 0.05 4.74 11.38 7.53
Chile 1.26 T.04 6.33 2.52 7.87 2.77 1.71 -3.07
Colombia 2.52 2.35 3.07 1.72 4.69 2.97 -0.84 3.32
Costa Rica 2.84 2.94 3.35 1.81 6.75 3.77 4.53 3.49
Ecuador 3.54 2.29 4.78 1.35 8.72 0.76 7.47 6.16
El Salvador 0.82 2.66 0.12 1.84 0.44 1.14 5.12 1.77
Guatemala 1.53 2.11 1.24 2.19 0.92 2.04 3.34 2.61
Honduras 1.91 1.04 2.59 1.37 4.69 1.40 0.54 -1.29
Mexico 2.27 2.23 3.30 2.94 4.50 3.25 1.61 2.10
Nicaragua 3.52 3.66 2.27 2.22 -1.44 1.29 3.40 2.00
Paraguay 0.62 0.09 2.18 1.42 4.19 1.62 4.06 3.11
Peru 2.02 2. 75- 4.37 2.14 7.61 1.49 7.37 2.36
Uruguay -2.80 -0.46 0.15 -0.44 -5.66 1 . 0 2 -1 0 .66 -0.84
Venezuela 4.22 2.22 2.47 2.35 2.57 0.90 16.40 1.90
United States -1.43 1.82 -0.50 1 . 8 8 -0.26 1.96 -1.49 1.36
1. A circumflex indicates a percentage growth rate of the variable.
2. Real per capita income growth figure for Uruguay covers 1956-1975.
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money and Income, a zero discrepancy should result on average, 
except for rounding. The statistical discrepancy was small (less 
than one percentage point) for most countries for the two longer 
periods. However, for the two periods since 1966, the number of 
countries for which the discrepancy was greater than one percentage 
point increased. Interpreting the quantity equation as a demand 
theory suggests that this discrepancy might he a reflection of a 
short-run disequilibrium.
Several other characteristics of Latin American countries 
are reflected in Table 17. Namely, for the most part, real per 
capita cash balances have been increasing for Latin America whereas 
in the U.S. m has been decreasing. The only consistent exception 
was Uruguay which exhibited large percentage decreases in real cash 
balances.
Also, across time periods, the growth in real per capita 
cash balances tends to alternate both in direction and magnitude. 
However, as between 1966-1970 and 1971-1975, the descriptive 
statistics in Table 17 suggest that as real per capita income growth 
increased (decreased) so did real cash balances per capita. Argen- ~ 
tina, Colombia, Ecuador,'Paraguay and Peru are exceptions to the 
correspondence of changes in y and m between the two short periods.- 
Only six of the remaining Latin American countries had a pattern 
similar to the U.S.— a lower y and thus a lower m in 1971-1975 than 
in 1966-1970.
Thus overall the descriptive statistics of Tables 15-17 
indicate that: broad patterns of behavior in Latin America were
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different than the U.S. In magnitude and direction of change; 
short-run disequilibria did exist; and a stable basic money demand 
relationship was broadly consistent with annual changes in the 
time series.
C. The Demand for Money in Latin America
In an earlier section, I discussed several theoretical 
aspects of the demand for money. I present below a summary of 
a ttempts to estimate a country specific demand function which addres­
ses some of the questions raised earlier. Repeating for clarity, 
the demand for real cash balances is homogeneous of degree zero in 
money income and the price level and inversely related to the per 
unit cost of real cash balances. In the case of no explicit return 
on money the cost of holding money can be measured as the rate of 
return on alternative assets— the opportunity costs of money.
As mentioned earlier this simple specification Is not so 
simple to implement. Permanent real income and permanent real cash 
balances should be used empirically. Difficulty in constructing such 
series led me to use measured real aggregates. Interest rate data 
of a consistent and useful variety is not available for the Latin 
American countries.
Several measurements were utilized to try to capture the 
affect of alternative costs on the demand for real cash balances per 
capita. First, the expected rate of inflation is a measure of the 
potential decline in the value of real balances. Adaptive price
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expectations— using the past history of the price level for one 
step ahead forecasts, or rational price expectation— using 
information of the model which generates the price level, would be 
helpful in describing the demand function. Difficulty in obtaining 
satisfactory price expectation series led me to choose a simpler 
course. Specifically, I used the first difference in the actual 
rate of inflation— a measure of the acceleration of the price level,
i.e., how rapidly nominal cash balances deteriorated between last 
period and the current period. I expect a more rapid deterioration 
in the purchasing power of nominal balances to lead to a decline in 
real cash balances— part of an increasing tax on real balances.
A second measure I used to capture the opportunity cost of 
holding real cash balances was, in part, Klein's (1974) measure of 
the implicit competitive rate of return on money. Klein's measure 
is:
= ijd -•-)
where i^ = the rate of return on money, i^ = the marginal rate of 
return on commercial bank investments, H = nominal high powered money, 
and M = nominal narrow money. If i^. is assumed constant then, since 
ln(i^/ij) = - ln(H/M), the log of the ratio of high powered money to 
narrow money can be used as a measure of the opportunity cost of 
holding money relative to the rate of return on money, i.e., 
ln(H/M) =
A third measure of the opportunity cost of holding money is 
the world rate of interest on alternative assets. That is, if capital
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markets are Integrated then Interest rate arbitrage will assure, 
over time, that interest rates will equalize adjusting for risk.
In this-regard, I used, alternatively, the 3 month U.S. Treasury 
bill yield as a proxy for a short-term world interest rate and the 
yield on a 30 year U.S. government bond as a proxy for the long­
term world interest rate.
Finally, I constructed short-term and long-term interest 
rates for each country based on a sequence of assumptions. First,
I utilized the Fisher equation for each country and the U.S. as 
follows:
\  ■ rk + Jk
and
i = r + Pus us us
where i^ = the nominal interest rate in country k, r^ = the real
■^Erate of interest and P^ = the expected rate of change of the price
level. Second, I used the rate of growth of real per capita income
as a proxy for the real rate of return. Third, I assumed the" 
expected rate of inflation equals the actual rate. Thus, for each 
country, k,
i^ = i + (r. - r ) + (P. - P )Ek us k us k us
is the estimated nominal interest rate. Alternatively, using the 
short-term and long-term rates of interest for the U.S. allowed me 
to derive two proxies for each country.
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I estimated the demand function in the following general
form:
in mt - B„ + in y( + ByC.,,. + 6,1,. + ut (9)
ut ' put-l + et
where
m^ = real cash balances per capita 
“ M./(P N);
y = real measured income per capita 
= Y/(P*N);
c^ = change in the rate of inflation
= p - f> • 
t t-1 *
= Klein’s measure of return on money 
= In (H/M)t;
ifc = U.S. or derived interest rate.
In addition, I included a lagged dependent variable to capture 
the short-run demand behavior when that seemed appropriate. Indeed, 
as indicated in the previous section, some shift in behavior between 
periods suggests that some adjustment process might show itself in 
the estimation. An alternative way of accounting for possible shifts 
is by including a set of dummy variables in each regression. This 
latter method has two disadvantages. First, the eyeballing of the 
data necessary to come up with a set of, essentially, ad hoc dummy 
variables is time intensive. Secondly, the potential set of dummies 
might prove to be very expensive in terms of precious few degrees of 
freedom.
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I have listed in Tables 18-20 estimates of the demand for
real cash balances per capita for each country. Each table only
lists one equation per country which represents the best fit as
13Indicated by the summary statistics. Table 18 lists the short-run 
demand function using the implicit measures of opportunity costs, 
and C^ . Table 19 lists the long-run demand function using the 
variety of explicit opportunity costs, ius and ig^’ as well as 
implicit costs. Finally, Table 20 lists the short-run regressions 
corresponding to Table 19. All specifications have been corrected 
for first order serial correlation and have been estimated for the 
period 1948-1976.14
Several general features of these regressions are apparent. 
First, the coefficient of determination, adjusted for degrees of 
freedom, is reasonably high. Notable exceptions are: Argentina,
Chile, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru all for the long-run function 
only.
Secondly, the per capita income elasticity of demand for real 
cash balances per capita is positive, significant and, for the most 
part, not statistically different from unity. Moreover, the direct' 
estimates of the income elasticity are generally less than one in 
numerical value (although not statistically so) for the short-run 
specifications but generally greater than one for the long-run speci­
fication (again not statistically so). This aspect of the data is 
capturing the dichotomy between permanent and transitory real income. 
Perhaps by appropriately estimating a permanent income series, an
TABLE 18-
THE DEMAND FOR REAL CASH BALANCES PER CAPITA
In / M { + c3t + B-1 V  Ut = pUt-l + Gt111 (p.l7 t " B°+By
long-runB
income
elas­
1 2
ticity of
-2
Country By Bcl Bc2 B -1
demand R SER P
Argentina 0.722*+ -0.276* 0.948* 13.885 0.796 0 . 1 1 2 0 . 0 0 1
(0.188) (0 .1 0 2) (0.113)
Bolivia 0.045 -0.421* -2.015* 0.846* 2.922 0.821 0.156 -0.130
(0.347) (0.106) (0.950) (0.117)
Brazil 0.351* 0.424* 0.610 0.814 0.093 -0.187
A (0 .1 1 0) (0.153)
Chile 1.114*+ -0.329 0.834* 6.895 0.749 0.179 -0.171
(0.505) (0.246) (0.123)
Colombia 0.733*+ -0 .2 1 1* 0.424* 1.274 0.909 0.062 -0.109
(0.277) (0.124) (0.194)
Costa Rica 1.376*+ -0.303 0.025 1.411 0.953 0.055 -0.116
(0.272) (0.318) (0.182)
Ecuador 0.877*+ 0.597* 2.176 0.965 0.066 0.045
(0.310) (0.158)
El Salvador 0.361* -0.491* 0.739* 1.381 0.843 0.077 -0.141
(0.174) (0.234) (0.187)
(continued)
TABLE 18 (continued)
Country B
y 'cl' '-1
long-run 
income 
elas­
ticity of 
demand R2 SER
A
P
Guatemala ,0.785*+ 0.283* 1.095 0.768 0.054 -0.444
4 (0.180) (0.158)
Honduras 0.649*t -0.734* 0.824* 3.691 0.875 0.082 0.104
(0.266) (0.380) (0.113)
Mexico 0.391* -0.158 0.602* 0.982 0.941 0.056 -0.045
(0.181) (0.239) (0.182)
Nicaragua 0.976* -0.758* 0.117 1.105 0.918 0.075 -0.414
4 (0.216) (0.280) (0.172)
Paraguay 0.383* -0.409* 0.891* 3.504 0.754 0.123 0.403
4 (0.191) (0.161) (0.123)
Peru 0.548* -0.266 0.731* 2.039 0.927 0.087 -0.178
4 (0.130) (0.349) (0.088)
Uruguay 0.797+ -1.802* 0.151 0.939 0.651 0 . 1 2 2 0.144
(0.881) (0.468) (0.249)
Venezuela 0.568 -0.597 0.508* 1.154 0.903 0.049 -0.473
(0.148) (0.064) (0.116)
00
00
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Standard errors in parenthesis, Constant not shown.
1. The first measure of opportunity costs is the first difference 
in the rate of inflation.
2. The second measure of opportunity costs is the log of the ratio 
of high powered money to ML.
3. The long-run income elasticity of demand is B /(1-B_.), where 
1-B  ^is the speed of adjustment of desired tS actual real cash 
balances.
4. Nominal Ml was deflated by the CPI for: Chile, Honduras, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. All other countries had Ml de­
flated by the implicit GDP price deflator.
* = significantly different from zero at a = 0.05 one-tailed test.
t => not significantly different from unity at a = 0.05 two-tailed 
test.
TABLE 19
THE DEMAND FOR REAL CASH BALANCES PER CAPITA
° So + ®y ln + sc2 c*t + ®l'1t + V  ut ■ 5Vl + et
Country e
y »2i.
interest 
rate elas­
ticity g 
at mean
R2 SER AP
Argentina 0.486 -1.716 -0.060 -0.019 0.146 -0.701
A (0.398) (2.830)
Bolivia 1.575*+ -1.191* -1.352 -0.052 0.632 0 . 1 0 2 -0.383
(0.299) (0.611) (1.967)
Brazil 0.745*f -0,777* -7.477* -0.322 0.771 0.082 -0.451
(0.185) (0.343) (4.119)
Chile 1.805*+ -9.982* -0.350 0.256 0.183 -0.663
(0.585) (3.628)
Colombia 1.124*+ -0.309* 1.315 0.046 0.838 0.060 -0.402
(0.167) (0.133) (1.309)
Costa Rica 1.484* -0.629* -2.082* -0.082 0.953 0.052 -0.189
(0.113) (0.351) (1.204)
Ecuador 1.273*t 8.901* 0.349 0.951 0.057 -0.273
(0.230) (2.651)
El Salvador 1.094*t -0.196 -0.007 0.678 0.082 -0.144
(0.168) (1.436)
(continued)
M^ ) c'eo+ V"(
TABLE ' 19
Ks)t * b =2
(continued)
c« + VS + v ut *PV l  + et
interest
rate elas­
tic! ty^
1 O 9 >at mean
Country
ey Sc2
1 i
■CD H* 
 ^
| 
CO
R2 SER $
2
Guatemala 1.098*+ -0.128 -0.008 0.694 0.055 -0.548
2 4 (0.149) (0.166)Honduras * 1.968*+ -0.505 -0 . 0 2 0 0.335 0 . 1 0 0 -0.596
2 (0.522) (0.661)
Mexico 0.941*+ -0.130 -0 . 0 1 2 0.813 0.054 -0.560
(0.087) (0.084)
Nicaragua 1.217*+ -0.626 -0.027 0.878 0.091 -0.421
(0.148) (3.130)
Paraguay 1.365*+ -6.069 -0.261 0.158 0.126 -0.673
4 (0.538) (5.186)
Peru 1.007*+ 3.387* 0 . 1 2 0 0.571 0 . 1 0 1 -0.707
(0 .2 2 2) (1.981)
Uruguay 0.563+ -1.607* -4.356* -0.215 0.791 0 . 101 0.347
(0.699) (0.358) (2.032)
Venezuela 0.811*+ -1.075* -1.783 -0.063 0.744 0.093 -0.278
(0.287) (0.405) (2.091)
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Standard error In parenthesis. Constant not shown.
1. This measure of opportunity costs Is the log of the ratio of 
high powered money to Ml.
2. The Interest rate used for Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico was
derived using purchasing-power parity and a Fisher equation,
see text. All other countries used either the short-term (S) 
or long-term (L) U.S. interest rate.
3. The elasticity was calculated by multiplying coefficient Bj, 
by the appropriate mean interest rate.
4. The CPI was used to deflate Ml for: Bolivia, Honduras and Peru.
* = significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, one-tailed test.
^ =* not significantly different from unity at a = 0.05, two-tailed 
test.
TABLE 20
THE DEMAND FOR REAL CASH BALANCES PER CAPITA 
10 (o)t - Bo + Sy '"(kxX + S=21 Czt + h1t + "-1 ln(^ )c^ * V  “t * "Vl + 6t
long- long-
Country 8
y ° 1 9 2 ^ 2 *-1
inter­
est rate 
elastic- 
ity ajj 
mean
B"i
run
interest
elas­
ticity
of 4 demand
run
income
elas­
ticity
of 4 demand R2
SER
(p)
Argentina 0.712+ -6.789 0.945*' -0.238 -4.327 12.981 0.654 0.140
1 s (0.476) (6.024) ' (0.132) (-0.045)
Bolivia ’ 1.127*+ -0.436 0.254 -0 . 0 2 0 -0.027 1.512 0.563 0.124
(0.401) , (3.161) (0.198) (-0.244)
Brazil 0.732*+ -8.116* 0.311* -0.349 -0.507 1.063 0.823 0.089
(0.219) (4.230) (0.155) (-0.219)
Chile 1.641*+ -12.204* 0.657* -0.427 -1.245 4.789 0.643 0.163
1 (0.404) (3.276) (0.134) (-0.157)
Colombia 0.722*+ 0.934 0.361 0.033 0.052 1.129 0.905 0.063
1 (0.282) (1.504) (0.218) (-0.115)
Costa Rica 1.344*+ -2.218* 0.108 -0.087 -0.098 1.508 0.958 0.053
(0.260) (1.263) (0.180) (-0.106)
Ecuador 0.695*+ 2.130 0.588* 0.084 0.204 1.685 0.972 0.062
(0.290) (1.215) (0.149) (0 .1 2 1)
El Salvador 0.582*+ -1.076 0.553* -0.038 -0.085 1.302 0.818 0.082
(0.209) (1.593) (0.176) (-0.144)
(continued)
TABLE 20 (continued)
Country
By Bis2 'iL2 ' P- 1 '
inter­
est rate 
elastic­
ity a| 
mean 
e"i
long-
run
interest
elas­
ticity
of 4 demand
long-
run
income
elas­
ticity
of 4
demand R2
SER
(P)
Guatemala 0.827*+ -0.562 0.291* -0.024 -0.028 1.167 0.758 0.055
5 (0.267) (2.593) (0.166) (-0.445)
Honduras 0.842*+ -1.075 0.831* -0.038 -0.227 4.992 0.858 0.087
2 (0.389) (1.789) (0.133) (0.105)
Mexico 0.407*+ -0.048 0.576* -0.004 -0 . 0 1 1 0.960 0.941 0.056
(0.178) (0.098) (0.175) (-0.041)
Nicaragua 0.761*+ -1.192 0.378* -0.051 -0.082 1.223 0.913 0.085
(0.245) (2.724) (0.169) (-0.328)
Paraguay 1.636*+ -11.829* 0.706* -0.509 -1.728 5.561 0.663 0.117
2 5 (0.486) (4.147) (0.118) (0.005)
Peru ’ 0.496* -0.068 0.752* -0.009 -0.036 2.0 0 2 0.934 0.088
(0.143) (0.145) (0.098) (-0 .1 2 0)
Uruguay 0.758+ -9.711* .092 -0.479 -0.528 0.835 0.412 0.150
(1.138) (4.059) (0.318) (0.030)
Venezuela 0.702*+ -1.117 0.497* -0.039 -0.078 1.397 0.819 0.099
(0.254) (2.198) (0 .2 0 1) (0.043)
NOTES TO TABLE 20
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Standard error in parenthesis. Constant not shown.
1. In only three cases was the implicit opportunity cost measure, 
In(H/Ml), in the chosen specification: Bolivia ™ -0.845;
Colombia «■ -0.232*; Costa Rica = -0.643*.
2. The interest rate used for Mexico and Peru was derived using 
purchasing power parity and a Pisher equation; see text.
All other countries used either the short-term (S) or long­
term (L) U.S. interest rate.
3. The elasticity was calculated by multiplying coefficient 3^  
by the appropriate mean interest rate.
4. The long-run elasticities were calculated by dividing coeffi­
cients 3  ^and 8y by (1-B_^ ).
5. The CPI was used to deflate Ml for: Bolivia, Honduras and Peru.
* = significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, one-tailed test.
t = not significantly different from unity at a = 0.05, two-tailed 
test.
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estimate of the permanent Income elasticity could be obtained which 
would be consistent between short-run and long-run demand specifi­
cations. The estimates of Income elasticities, listed in Tables 18 
through 2 0 , do reflect, however, the general predictions of the 
theoretical demand model. Namely, despite the variety of monetary 
experiences represented by the sample of Latin American countries 
studied, increases in real income per capita show up in (nearly) 
equivalent increases in real per capita cash balances.
By way of comparison, the estimates of income elasticities for 
several countries made in previous studies can he analyzed. Diz 
(1970) estimates the long-run income elasticity for Argentina as 
1.17 (see his Table 7, p. 98); Silveira's (1973) estimate for Brazil 
is 0.75 (p. 120, equation 4); Deaver's (1970) estimate for Chile is
0.63 (see his Table 3, p. 35); Adekunle's (1968) estimate for Costa 
Rica is 0.94 and for Mexico is 0.61 (see his Table 5, p. 263). These 
estimates should be compared to my Table 19, since the other authors 
do not include a lagged dependent variable in their regressions.
Except for Argentina and Brazil, my estimates are much higher than 
those taken from those other studies. The difference might be _ 
reconciled by noting that my estimates refer to 1948-1976, whereas '
for the other studies their analyses ended by 1962 and generally 
Involved fewer observations. That is, over a longer period, velocity 
is more likely to tend to its steady-state value, zero. This suggests 
that the income elasticity will be closer to unity. In the case of 
Argentina other forces have reversed this tendency. Specifically,
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velocity has Increased over time in Argentina thereby diminishing 
the impact of changes in real income on real money holdings.
Third, the implicit and explicit opportunity costs measures 
generally exhibit an inverse relationship with real cash balances. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. rates of interest (short and long-term) and 
the derived country rates are not generally statistically different 
from zero. I note that the two measures I have labelled implicit 
opportunity costs are almost always significantly and negatively 
related to real cash balances per capita (Table 18). Chile, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela do not exhibit significant coef­
ficients on these Implicit measures.
Regarding the measures I have labelled explicit opportunity 
costs, only Colombia, Ecuador and Peru exhibit a positive interest 
rate coefficient for the long-run demand function (Table 19). A 
positive interest rate coefficient for the short-run demand only 
shows up for Colombia and Ecuador.
Although the coefficient estimates for the interest rate
variables are less than satisfactory, I believe the generally negative
values are indicative of a rational responsiveness of Latin American
residents to the opportunity costs of holding money. -It is note- '
worthy to point out that, except for Costa Rica, those countries which
have negative and significant interest rate coefficients are
generally the countries which experienced higher and more variable 
15inflations : Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.
Finally, in estimating the demand for real cash balances in 
stock adjustment form (short-run specification), I was able to compare
98
speeds of adjustment of actual real cash balances to desired— the 
difference In long-run equilibrium being zero. That Is, suppose"*"^
In (mt/mt_1) «* X{ln (m^/m^)} (10)
where mt = real cash balances per capita, a superscript "d"
Indicates a desired level, and X is the speed of adjustment. Then,
In mfc = X In m^ + (1 - X) In (H)
If the previously specified demand function represents the desired 
level of real cash balances demanded then the estimated demand function 
function should be:
In mt = X 8q + X 8-j^ In yt + X 82j C^t + X 83^ '
+ (1 - X) In mt_ 1 (1 2)
In the long-run X = 1, hence the original specification is the 
long-run functional form. The closer is X to one, the more rapidly 
do individuals adjust their actual real money holdings to their 
desired level. 1
In terms of the regression coefficient for the lagged depen­
dent variable, mt the closer is the coefficient to zero the more 
rapid will be the adjustment. Moreover, by dividing the estimated 
coefficients for the independent variables by the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable, the "long-run" elasticity (or coefficient 
for Interest rates) can be obtained. In Tables 18 and 20 I have 
listed the regression estimates, 8 = (1 - X), as well as the
estimates for the long-run real per capita income and interest rate 
elasticities of demand for real cash balances.
If is close to zero (and therefore X is close to one), the 
hoarding function is operating rapidly. This suggests that those 
countries which adjust their real cash holdings more rapidly than 
others are also likely to adjust more rapidly to monetary impulses 
through the balance of payments. I arbitrarily classify those 
countries whose speed of adjustment is at least 70% per annum as 
exhibiting fast adjustment; those with at least 40% but less than 70% 
per annum exhibit a moderate speed; those with X less than 40% per 
annum are classified as exhibiting slow adjustment.
As indicated in Tables 18 and 20, most countries in this 
sample adjust their real cash holdings with moderate to slow speeds. 
Only Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay operate quickly in both 
specifications (without and with an interest rate as an explanatory 
variable). The most surprising results are the extremely slow 
adjustments of Argentina (5.2%), Chile (16.6%) and Paraguay (10.9%). 
Each of these'countries has experienced high rates of inflation and, ' 
except Paraguay, each has devalued frequently over the period 
studied. This is, however, consistent with the descriptive statis- - 
tics presented in Tables 15-17. Specifically, a stable demand 
relationship holds with some short-run disequilibria as reflected 
in the generally slow speed of adjustment.
I have also specified a short-run money demand function using 
high powered money (deflated by the price level and population).
The basic justification, as described more fully by Lothian (1976),
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is that using a monetary aggregate which is more sensitive to data 
not readily available, e.g., using Ml or M2 when appropriate interest 
rate data do not exist, Involves a specification error which is not 
conducive to estimating a stable demand relationship.
In Table 21 I have estimated the following equation:
In hfc = A0O + X In yfc + X &2±t + (1 - (13)
ut = put-l + et
where h^ = H/(P*N) is real high powered money (H) per capita in time 
t. The results for high powered money are similar to those for Ml in 
several respects.
First, the short-run income elasticity is generally signifi­
cant and not different from unity. Second, the interest rate variable,
although negative, is significant in only a few cases. Third, the 
2
corrected R Ts are generally high with only Uruguay (0.107) being 
insignificant and Bolivia (0.575) being relatively low.
Finally, with regard to the speed of adjustment, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and Uruguay each have rapid adjustment processes. However, 
nearly every other country (except Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia) have 
very slow speeds of adjustment, X less than 40% per annum. '
D. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the stability 
of the money demand relationship. In this connection both the 
descriptive statistics of Table 15-17 and the regression analyses
TABLE 21
THE DEMAND FOR REAL HIGH POWERED MONEY PER CAPITA
Country 3
y 3is 0iL
inter­
est rate 
elastic- 
ity a^  
mean
B-&- 0i"
long- 
run 
interest 
elas­
ticity 
of 3 
demand
long- 
run 
income 
elas­
ticity 
of 3 
demand R2
SER
(P)
Argentina 0.580+ -2.430 0.991* -0.085 -8.957 61.053 0.746 0.198
A (0.449) (4.242) (0.014) (0.031)
Bolivia 1.162*+ -0.477 0.241 -0.0 2 2 -0.029 1.530 0.575 0 . 1 2 2
(0.384) (2.958) (0.190) (-0.227)
Brazil 0.789*+ -0.494 0.542* -0 . 0 2 1 -0.046 1.724 0.987 0.073
(0.195) (3.002) (0.108) (-0 .0 1 0)
Chile 2.623* 13.259* 0.785* -0.464 -2.158 12.191 0.956 0.208
1 4 (0.523) (4.277) (0.100) (0.126)
Colombia ’ 0.764*+ 0.035 0.528* 0.006 0 . 0 1 2 1.620 0.885 0.090
A (0.302) (0.094) (0.182) (-0.066)
Costa Rica 1.568*+ -6.771* 0.1 1 1 -0.312 -0.351 1.764 0.895 0.064
(0.298) (2.780) (0.187) (-0 .2 0 0)
Ecuador 0.268 2.148 0.923* 0.084 1.096 3.478 0.992 0.085
(0.329) (1.707) (0.082) (0.260)
El Salvador 0.352* -1.790 0.991* -0.064 -6.795 37.596 0.994 0.076
(0.178) (1.700) (0.105) (0.187)
(continued)
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TABLE 21 (continued)
Country B
y A s PiL ®-l
inter­
est rate 
elastic- 
ity a$ 
mean
V
long-
run
interest
elas­
ticity
of 3 demand
long-
run
income
elas­
ticity
of 3 demand R2
SER
(P)
Guatemala^’^ 0 .8 6 6*+ -0.172 0.277 -0 . 0 1 0 -0.014 1.197 0.777 0.067
4 (0.225) (0.217) (0.186) (-0.285)
Honduras 0.903*+ -2.397 0 .8 6 6* -0.085 -0.634 6.726 0.796 0.096
4 (0.414) (1.895) (0 .1 2 2) (0.153)
Mexico 0.490* -5.078* 1.076* -0.178 -2.334 6.433 0.942 0.097
(0 .2 0 1) (2.530) (0.094) (0.135)
Nicaragua 0.344 5.648 0.746* 0.243 0.958 1.356 0.983 0.093
(0.278) (4.261) (0.151) (-0.150)
Paraguay 1.984*+ -4.028 0.730* -0.173 -0.637 7.295 0.937 0.124
1 4 (0.550) (5.563) (0.190) (-0.143)
Peru ’ 0.713*+ 0.031 0.689* 0.004 0.013 2.293 0.940 0 . 1 1 1
1 4 (0.203) (0.182) (0.109) (-0.071)Uruguay ’ 1.772*+ 0.129 0.306 0.047 0.068 2.556 0.107 0.135
(1.005) (0 .1 0 0) (0.257)
Venezuela 0.675*+ -0.351 0.837* -0 . 0 1 2 -0.075 4.130 0.987 0.097
(0.304) (2.071) (0.087)
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NOTES TO TABLE 21
Standard error In parenthesis. Constant not shown.
1. In only one case, Brazil, was the implicit opportunity cost,
Pt - in the chosen specification: Brazil = -0.237*.
2. The elasticity was calculated by multiplying coefficient B^  by 
the appropriate mean interest rate.
3. The long-run elasticities were calculated by dividing coeffi­
cients, B^  and By, by (1-B_^ )«
4. The CPI was used to deflate H for: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
* = significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, one-tailed test.
7 * not significantly different from unity at a = 0.05, two-tailed 
test.
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of Tables 18-21 Indicate that the standard framework for monetary 
analysis Is useful In the context of these Latin American countries.
Several Important reservations must be expressed here.
First, more elaborate and fruitful attempts at modeling "permanent" 
series should be made. That Is, permanent income and price level 
series should be generated and utilized in the regression analysis. 
Second, incorporating expectations of Inflation which are closer to 
rational behavior (in the Muthian sense) than the simple myopia 
utilized here would also be informative. Finally, better interest 
rate data would be helpful. As this last caveat may be very difficult 
to remedy other possible opportunity cost measures should be explored.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV
1. See Dombusch (1973) as an exponent of the monetary 
approach who uses this framework.
2. See Friedman (1959) for empirical estimates of the demand 
for money in the U.S.; see Friedman and Schwartz (forthcoming) for 
such estimates for the U.S. and U.K.: see Adelkunle (1968), Clark 
(1973), Gandolfi and Lothian (1978), Macesich (1970), and Melitz 
(1976), for such estimates for industrialized countries; see Deaver 
(1970), Diz. (1970), and Silveira (1973) for such estimates for some 
Latin American countries.
3. The nominal rate of return on money would be the interest 
paid on demand deposits. Klein (1974) discusses ways this is 
accomplished and he incorporates these in a money demand specifica­
tion for the U.S.
4. This formulation is taken from Friedman (1956a), p. 10.
5. This ignores the permanent/transitory dichotomy of income 
measurement propounded by Friedman and used to rationalize the 
cyclical rise in velocity with the secular decline in velocity in the 
U.S. See Friedman (1959), pp. 330-35.
6 . Some adjustments might be made to transitory movements in 
real income; see Friedman (1959), p. 336.
7. Since the price level is fixed, real income has increased 
and so, therefore, have real cash balances demanded with i and P^ 
constant.
8 . Just how short is the short-run is an empirical issue. 
However, even the most die-hard believer of rapid price arbitrage 
would have to concede that realistically not all prices will be 
arbitraged immediately. This raises the corollary question of the 
appropriate measure of the average level of prices which should be 
incorporated in the nominal money demand equation. My guess is that 
a more general index such as the GNP deflator or the CPI is better 
than a traded-goods price index for money demand analysis. The latter 
index is, however, more likely to demonstrate the effects of rapid 
arbitrage since the commodities analyzed are likely to be more nearly 
homogeneous.
9. Chetty (1969) has demonstrated the high degree of sub­
stitutability of time deposits (and hence M2) with the basic defini­
tion of money Ml.
10. I do not plan to analyze term structure as it affects the 
demand for money in Latin America. Rather, I simply compare money 
demand estimates using alternatively short and long-term interest 
rates.
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11. This ratio would be all the more Important If the 
comparison were between currency and demand plus time deposits at 
commercial banks, as In Cagan (1965) and Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963). In that way, the substitution between currency and interest 
and non-interest bearing near moneys could be accounted for. In 
the cases I study here no such distinction is made. The ratio as
it stands nevertheless reflects preferences to some degree.
12. The quantity theory is not always expressed in per 
capita terms but doing so does not affect the predictions.
13. Two points should be raised here. First, the usefulness 
of summary statistics as we normally use them depend crucially upon 
meeting the assumptions regarding the error term. Second, to avoid 
being fooled into accepting a spurious regression, I occasionally 
accepted one specification over another because the estimates were 
more in line with intuition than in the case of the "better" fitting 
regression.
14. Bolivia, Costa Rica and Ecuador cover 1952-1976, and 
Uruguay covers 1956-1975.
15. See Chapter II.
16. This form presumes that last periods desired real hold­
ings are equal to the actual real holdings of that period.
CHAPTER V
THE DYNAMICS OF INFLATION: PART I--LATIN AMERICAN
AND WORLD INFLATION
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze within a theoreti­
cal and empirical framework the relationship between the rate of 
inflation experienced by sixteen Latin American countries and rates 
of inflation external to those countries. In the first part of the 
analysis, I discuss the proposition regarding convergence of rates 
of inflation, and apply statistical tests to determine whether the 
proposition is valid. The second part of the analysis essentially 
deals with the purchasing-power-parity principle, and I apply 
ordinary least squares regression analysis to shed light on the 
issue of the influence of measures of world inflation on the domestic 
rate of inflation.
A. Introduction
One general implication of the monetary approach to balance 
of payments theory is that a small open economy maintaining a fixed : 
exchange rate, in terms of an international asset, cannot operate 
a monetary policy independent of the rest of the world.^ Ignoring 
the possibility of sterilization, the monetary authorities of a 
small country, when faced with a balance of payments surplus— an 
increase in official international reserve assets, can incur a quan­
tity of additional liabilities equivalent to the increase in assets
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thereby expanding the nominal stock of high-powered money. This
Increase of course leads to an expansion of the nominal stock of
2
money through the money-multiplier supply process. The Increase in 
the quantity of money will lead to a corresponding (one-shot) rise 
in the price level at full employment.
In the context of a growing world economy, a small country 
will continue to receive impulses to its nominal stock of money 
through the foreign component of its high powered money stock if the 
rest of the world continues to increase its supply of money relative 
to demand.
The argument is symmetric with respect to greater growth in
the demand for money, by the rest of the world, relative to supply,
inducing small country balance of payments deficits and reductions in
3
its nominal stock of money. Given the evidence regarding the 
relationship between money supply growth and inflation, the influ­
ence of rest-of-the-world money growth on small-country money growth 
implies that the rate of inflation a small open economy faces is an 
exogenous variable determined by the world rates of money growth and., 
real income growth'neither of which is affected by the behavior and/or' 
policy actions of a small country. These latter growth rates (for 
the rest of the world) affect changes in the distribution of inter­
national reserve assets and hence high-powered money growth of a small 
open economy. Therefore a corollary of the monetary approach to a 
balance of payments theory for small open economies maintaining fixed 
exchange rates is that rates of inflation will tend to converge to a
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"world" rate of Inflation which is determined by "world" money 
supply growth.^
In this chapter, I present results of statistical tests aimed 
at verifying two interrelated assumptions of the monetary approach to. 
balance of payments theory using data on Latin America. Firstly, I 
show that the convergence of rates of inflation obtains for reasonably 
long periods, say fifteen to twenty years. However, for shorter 
periods during which policy considerations are of greatest importance, 
say three to five years, I provide evidence of considerable diversity 
in average rates of inflation across Latin American countries and 
the United States.
Secondly, I provide evidence below which indicates that 
variation in a "world" rate of inflation generally does not explain 
much of the variation in the domestic rate of inflation experienced 
by the Latin American countries. Moreover, I show that the trans­
mission of percentage point increases in rates of inflation does not 
occur contemporaneously— within the current period. Together with the 
notion alluded to in the previous paragraph, that convergence of rates 
of inflation does take considerable time for the countries in this 
sample, these pieces of evidence imply that at any point in time 
(other than the long run) the rate of inflation may not be a com­
pletely rest-of-the-world determined characteristic for a small open 
economy.
B. On the Convergence of Rates 
of Inflation
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In a world of completely integrated markets, price arbitrage 
will prevent prices for the same commodity from differing greatly, 
holding other things constant. If prices and price levels are 
equated across national boundaries and over time then rates of 
Inflation would also not differ significantly. Completely integrated 
markets exist when tradeable commodities represent an important part 
of the production of a nation and therefore affect all markets 
through the demand for all commodities. The fact that Brazil is the 
largest supplier of coffee in the world is not, however, sufficient 
evidence that its markets are completely integrated.
As described in the previous section, the proposition that 
rates of inflation will converge to a "world" rate is consistent with 
the monetary approach to balance of payments theory. The integrated 
markets hypothesis (see Genberg, 1976 and Swoboda, 1977) also agrees 
with the convergence of rates of inflation. The inflation conver­
gence proposition implies that, in an analysis of average rates of 
inflation, observed variation across countries should not be signifi­
cantly different than observed variation in inflation (over time) 
within countries. One way of testing for the convergence of inflation 
rates is by comparing the dispersion across countries of average 
yearly rates of inflation, averaged over some period of time, relative 
to the average of within country dispersion of yearly rates of 
inflation, over the same period."* This is simply an analysis of
Ill
variance but a statistical technique which makes use of several 
assumptions.
1. Some Theoretical Considerations
The following develops a representation of the world which 
would permit inflationary processes of a type which could validly be 
compared In an analysis of variance. Consider a world on a parti­
cular monetary standard, say a U.S. dollar standard, such as 
prevailed from the time of the Bretton Woods Agreement [1944] to 
approximately the third quarter of 1971 when the dollar could not 
longer be exchanged for gold by foreign central banks. During this 
time most countries did not deviate greatly from a fixed parity of 
their currency with the dollar. Occasionally, a number of countries 
devalued their currency with the acceptance of the other parties in 
the agreement. The Bretton Woods Agreement, along with the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, promoted a situation 
of free trade and reasonably stable exchange rates.
Under a system such as this, markets for goods could become 
well integrated worldwide. In effect, under these circumstances, the 
law of one price could be expected to prevail. That is, any tendency 
for one price in one part of the world to differ (in efficiency 
units**) from that price in the rest of the world would be eliminated 
by arbitrage. Given little barriers to free trade, any arbitrage 
required to reduce price differences could be carried out. If prices 
are equated both across countries and every time period, then rates 
of inflation would not differ. But as Whitman (1975) points out, the
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law of one price Is an assumption about an empirical issue. The law 
Implies a quick and direct elimination of price differences and 
differences In rates of Inflation, as well as a high degree of 
substitutability of traded commodities.
The world economy described above would have a single average 
level of prices and rate of inflation. Data on any one country could 
be considered as a single sample from a population (represented by the 
world). The analysis of variance (F-test) described earlier could 
then be applied^ to test the validity of the assumption. The F-test 
compares the extent to which country (sample) average rates of 
inflation differ from the world (population) average rate of
g
inflation relative to the extent to which a country's observations 
differ from that country's average rate of inflation, for all 
countries (samples). The test also presumes that the variance of 
the rate of inflation of one country does not significantly differ 
from the variance for other countries.
Of course, a violation of the conditions of this system would 
show up as greater variation across countries than within countries. 
The most obvious violation would be any one of many forms of trade 
restrictions. By imposing tariffs, quotas or exchange controls, a 
country can, in effect, partially close its economy to the rest of the 
world. The price level of the country closed by trade barriers would 
then deviate from the world average. Moreover, if the imposition of 
these barriers varies from period to period as to their level and/or 
market placement, then the domestic rate of inflation would also 
deviate from the world rate of inflation. The relationship of the
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domestic price level of a small country and the price level of the
rest of the world can be depicted algebraically using the following
9
expression of purchasing-power-parity :
Pd o e d Pw(1" T) (14)
where P^ is the domestic price level of a particular country, e  ^is
an index^ of the rate of exchange of the domestic currency unit for
a unit of world currency, P^ is the rest-of-the-world price level,
and T is a measure of trade impediments as a proportion of the world
price level. If e^ = 1, a constant exchange rate through time, and
T *» 0, then P = P , even in the short run.* e w’
Taking expected values^ of equation (14) and assuming e^
12and T are constant over time, I obtain
E(Pd) = e^(l - T) E(Pw) (15)
where "E" is the mathematical expectations operator. If e^ = 1 and
T = 0, then the average domestic price level will equal the average 
world price level. Under these same conditions, the variances of the' 
price levels will be equal, i.e.,
VAR(Pd) = (ep2 (1 - T)2 VAR(Pw) (16)
with el = 1 and T = 0, VAR(P,) = VAR(P ). However, if T j5 0 then the d d w
average price levels can differ even if e^ = 1 , and so will their 
respective variances. That is, the existence of (constant) tariffs, 
for example, will drive a wedge between the domestic price level and 
that prevailing in the rest of the world.
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I obtain a similar relationship for rates of Inflation by 
computing the rate of change of equation (14):
Sd - e ’ + V ? (14’>
where a circumflex, represents a percentage change.
The relationship between mean rates of Inflation and the 
variance of these rates is:
E(fd) - E(ep + E(f*w) - E(t) (15')
VAR(§d) = VAR(ep + VAR(^) + VAR(x) (16')
If e' and T are constants (t not necessarily zero), then the d
average rates of inflation, over time, will be equal and so will 
their variances, E(^d) = E($w) and VAR($d) = VAR(?w).^ But from a 
period of transition from one level of trade impediments, say —  
not necessarily zero— to another, say the domestic rate of 
inflation, ?d> would differ from that prevailing in the rest of the
A A A
world, P, - P = T. Nevertheless, this difference would be washed ’ d w *
out over longer periods assuming that the average change in trade
restrictions nets to zero (and e' = 0), E(P ) E(§.) = E(t) =0.d w d
Another source of potential divergence of price levels and 
rates of inflation is non-fixity of exchange rates. If intercountry 
trade is free of restriction, then purchasing-power-parity suggests 
that
(17)
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If is constant, then by taking expected values and variances, I 
obtain:
E(Pd) - e^ E(Pw) (18)
and
VAR(Pd) « (e')2 VAR(Pw) (19)
With the exchange rate index set to unity, the average domestic price 
level and its variance are equal to the average world price level and 
its variance, respectively. This also holds instantaneously not 
merely for longer than one time period.
Furthermore, I derive a similar relationship for rates of 
inflation by taking percentage changes of equation (17):
= + (17,)
By taking expected values and, for mathematical simplicity, 
assuming ed and Pw are uncorrelated,^ I obtain:
E(Pd) = E(e') + E(Pw) (18')
and
VAR (P.) = VAR(e') + VAR(P ) (19')d a w
If e’ is constant— the exchange rate appreciates/depreciates at the d
same rate each period, then the average exchange-rate-adjusted 
domestic rate of inflation will equal the average world rate of 
inflation and similarly for the respective variances, E(Pd) - e =
E(P ) and VAR(P.) - VAR(P. - e ) - VAR(P ) where e « E(e!) is the
w CL a W  u
constant rate of exchange rate adjustment.
Even if e^ is not constant but on average the rate of
appreciation/depreciation is zero, then average rates of Inflation 
15will not differ. Thus, adjusting for exchange rates and assuming 
no trade impediments, domestic and rest-of-the-world rates of 
inflation should converge, equalize on average over some time period. 
However, at any point in time (or during the short run) if purchas­
ing power parity does not hold, say because an (series of) exchange 
rate adjustment(s) is not one of equilibrium then the average 
adjusted domestic rate of inflation will differ from the average 
rate of inflation in the rest of the world.
2. Empirical Results
As alluded to earlier, an analysis of variance is a useful way 
of testing the validity of the convergence proposition. Over the 
sample period, 1947-1976, the exchange rate of most of these countries 
increased, that is, these currencies devalued. Only three currencies 
remained constant: El Salvador 2.5 colones/$; Guatemala 1.0 quetzal/$
Honduras 2.0 lempiras/$. Other countries adjusted their exchange rate 
repeatedly: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay. Still
others adjusted their exchange rate only intermittently with long 
periods between adjustments: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Nicar­
agua. Mexico, for example, kept its exchange rate at 12.5 pesos per 
dollar for the period 1955 to 1975. Thus, in this regard, differences 
in inflation rates should be significant across Latin America.
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The analysis of variance was performed in a number of ways. 
First, the average rate of inflation was calculated as the 
(uncorrected) first logarithmic difference of the Consumer Price 
Index for each country, with 1970 ** 1.00. The test was applied for 
several periods: 1947-1976, 1956-1975, and 1956-1971. The first
period covers the entire availability of data on country CPI's. The
second period refers to a period over which sufficient data was
available to generate a world price index (see Appendix B ). The 
last period refers to a time frame approximately covering the dollar 
standard throughout the world. The test was applied to the entire 
sample of countries, including the United States. In addition, the 
test was applied to the subgroup of countries which had an average 
rate of Inflation of 7% per annum or less for the corresponding 
periods. The F-statistics are listed in Table 22.
The results are Interesting in a number of respects. First,
we indicated in the second column 2 of Table 22, the average rates 
of inflation do differ across this broad sample of countries. This, 
in itself, is not surprising since during these periods most of these 
countries did not maintain a constant exchange rate.
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, for the subgroup of 
low-inflation countries— Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the U.S.— there was no 
significant difference in average rates of inflation for the periods 
1947-1976 and 1956-1975. These countries were on a fixed exchange 
rate system, although Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico did have
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TABLE 22
F-TEST FOR CONVERGENCE OF RATES OF INFLATION
p±t i ln CPIit " ln CPIit-i
Hq : a Pj ° P , that average unadjusted rates of
are equal.
Time Period Across Countries 
including U.S. 
F(16,n2)
Across Low-Inflation^ 
Countries including U.S. 
F( 8 ,m3)
1947 - 1976 134.24* 1.49
1956 - 1975 127.50* 1.38
1956 - 1971 161.42* 4.53*
* reject null hypothesis at a = 0.05.
1. Low-Inflation countries: Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela and the United States, had 
less than 7% inflation as measured by the growth in their unadjus­
ted consumer price index.
2. Degrees of freedom of denominator: for 1947-1976 = 261, for 1956- 
‘1975 = 323, for 1956-1971 =255.
3. Degrees of freedom of denominator: for 1947-1976 = 261, for 1956- 
1975 = 171, for 1956-1971 =133.
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several devaluations each In the early part of the longer period.
The latter part of each of these periods was marked by higher rates 
of Inflation worldwide and higher variability of Inflation rates.^
However, for the period 1956-1971, the group of low-lnflation 
countries does exhibit significantly different rates of inflation. 
During this period only four of the countries had an exchange rate 
adjustment: Costa Rica devalued its colon by 18% In 1961, Ecuador
devalued its sucre by 20% in 1961 and again by 39% In 1970,
Nicaragua devalued its cordoba by 3% In 1958, and Venezuela devalued 
its bolivar by 38% in 1964 but revalued by 2% in 1971. All of these 
adjustments were accounted for in the periods 1947-1976 and 1956- 
1975 plus several other exchange rate adjustments.
The degree to which these adjustments were responsible for 
the apparent difference in average rates of inflation, for this 
subgroup, is not clear. One possible reason could be that the 
exchange rates and their adjustments do not reflect a complete nor 
equilibrium adjustment. Another explanation could be that the 
variation within countries for the longer periods, inclusive of the 
period 1972-1976, was relatively greater than that for 1956-1971.' 
Hence, with the same variation across low-inflation countries in 
1956-1971 and the longer periods, the F-ratio would be insignificant 
for the longer periods but not 1956-1971. The variation across 
low-inflation countries for 1956-1975 (and 1947-1976) is smaller 
than the respective variation for 1956-1971. However, the variation 
within these countries for the longer periods is larger than the
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17respective variation for the period 1956-1971. Hence the decrease, 
over time, in the dispersion of average inflation rates across these 
low-inflation countries could explain the appearance of significant 
inter-country‘dispersion for the period 1956-1971. ~
1 attempted to correct for changes in the exchange rate of all 
currencies by applying a similar F-test to average rates of inflation 
adjusted for devaluations (and/or revaluations). I first converted 
the domestic CPI for each country to dollar equivalents by dividing 
the domestic CPI by the ratio of the contemporaneous exchange rate to 
the exchange rate that prevailed in the base year, 1970. This 
procedure left the price index with a base 1970 =1.00. I then 
computed the first logarithmic difference and therefore the adjusted 
rate of inflation was simply the difference between the rate of growth 
of the domestic CPI and the rate of exchange rate adjustment. The 
F-statistics for the analysis of variance of these data are listed in 
Table 23.
These statistics indicate that differences in the average 
adjusted rates of inflation across all countries are not significant. 
This, of course, is the expected result for a world monetary system 
in the long run which the averages over sixteen and twenty years 
represent. Also of interest is the observation that the F-ratios 
rise as the analysis covers less of the most recent and volatile price 
period, 1972-1976. As alluded to earlier, in moving from the longest 
period, 1947-1976, to the shortest period, 1957-1971, the variation 
across countries rose while the variation within countries fell (see 
footnote 17).
121
TABLE 23
F-TEST FOR CONVERGENCE OF RATES OF INFLATION 
ADJUSTED FOR EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES
Plt 5 ^ 11970 CPIit/XRit
Hq : P' - P j - P ’, that average exchange-rate-adjusted rates
of Inflation are equal.
Time Period Across Countries Across Low-Inflation2
including U.S. Countries including U.S.
F(16,n2) F(8,m3)
1947 - 1976 0.08 0.29
1956 - 1975 0.24 0.66
1956 - 1971 0.36 1.24
1. Low-inflation countries: Costa Rica Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela and the United States, had 
less than 7% inflation as measured by the growth in their unadjus­
ted consumer price index.
2. Degrees of freedom of denominator: for 1947-1976 = 493, for 1956- 
1975 » 323, for 1956 - 1971 = 255.
3. Degrees of freedom of denominator: for 1947-1976 = 261, for 1956- 
1975 = 171, for 1956-1971 - 133.
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An additional F-test, for the convergence of Inflation rates, 
was applied to screen out the effects of exchange rate adjustments.
For this test I computed the average rate of Inflation for all 
countries for only those years during which they maintained a fixed 
exchange rate, using the domestic CPI and excluding the rate of 
inflation for the year in which the new exchange rate prevailed.
The mean and variance of the rate of inflation for each country is 
listed in Tabled, along with the number of years for which these 
statistics apply. As indicated at the bottom of Table 24, the 
difference in average rates of inflation across countries is signi­
ficant at the 5% level. The calculation of this last F-statistic 
was 4) minated by the long periods for which several countries 
maintained a fixed exchange rate: Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and of course the U.S. This 
is clearly not consistent with the convergence proposition. Since 
the country averages do not refer to precisely the same periods, the 
inference is that the convergence proposition is not a stable 
relationship across time periods and across countries. That is, the 
previous tests (Tables 22 and 23) compare average rates of inflation 
across countries over the same time periods. This latest test, 
however, compares averages across countries over time bounds which 
overlap but are not completely subsets.
For the most part the results presented in Tables 22 and 23 
represent evidence that for long periods of time of sixteen to 
twenty years, average rates of inflation in Latin America and the 
U.S. as a whole do not differ greatly. Table 24, however, does
TABLE 24
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AVERAGE RATE OF INFLATION AND VARIANCE 
FOR PERIODS OF FIXED EXCHANGE RATES
pit h i„ cpi±t - m  cpilt_i; cpiil970 = 1.00.
A A A
Hq S Pi * Pj “ P , that average unadjusted rates of inflation 
are equal.
Country Mean
(%)
. Variance 
<%2)
Number of
Observations
(T±)
Argentina 20.30 246. 9
Bolivia 5.67 12. 12
Brazil 10.56 72. 7
Chile 18.37 37. 9
Colombia 10.79 83. 6
Costa Rica 2.56 3. 11
Ecuador 2.87 10. 18
El Salvador 4.73 42. 30
Guatemala 3.22 23. 30
Honduras 2.97 11. 30
Mexico 5.64 26. 20
Nicaragua 3.76 34. 18
Paraguay 5.68 38. 16
Peru 9.57 18. 11
Uruguay 12.63 18. 5
Venezuela 2.94 24. 23
United States 3.61 12. 30
7T a
P 5 P± /-T = 5.54; T = ET± = 285.
F(16,285) = 10.11, significant at a = 0.05.
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suggest that care should be taken when considering different time 
periods for each country as a methods of comparison.
Additional F-tests were performed to determine If convergence 
held over shorter periods of time. These tests were performed In ; r 
several different ways. First, the average dispersion within i 
countries for several sub-periods was compared to the average dis­
persion within countries over the full periods 1956-1971 and 1956- 
1975. These periods were disaggregated into three year and five 
year sub-periods. The test results are presented in Table 25.
These results indicate in nearly every case that the dispersion of 
inflation rates over time within countries was generally constant. 
That is, the average dispersion of inflation within countries for 
a sub-period, say 1966-1970, was not greater than the dispersion 
within countries for the full period 1956-1975. Thus, in the shorter 
run (3 and 5 years) within country variation is equal to its longer 
run counterpart (16 to 20 years).
However, when comparing the variation across countries for 
a sub-period with the variation across countries for the full period, 
a significant difference generally exists. That is, the dispersion 
in average rates of inflation from the group average _for a sub-.-, 
period, say 1966-1970, was greater than that for the full period 
1956-1975. Thus even after adjusting for exchange rate changes, 
short run (3 to 5 years) differences in rates of inflation still 
exist across this group of countries.
The F-statistics listed in Table 26, when combined with the 
statistics in Tables 23 and 25, yield some implications for rational
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TABLE 25
F-TEST COMPARING VARIATION IN AVERAGE RATES OF INFLATION 
WITHIN COUNTRIES, ADJUSTED FOR EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES
Time Period
Mean Variation 
WITHIN 
Countries
<%2)
Compared to 
Variation 
WITHIN 
Countries 
for
1956 - 197l1 
F(48,256)3
Compared to 
Variation 
WITHIN 
Countries 
for 
1956 - 19752
F(48,320)3
1956 - 1958 2254.74 4.11* 3.68*
1959 - 1961 88.01 0.16 0.14
1962 - 1964 319.54 0.58 0.52
1965 - 1967 292.21 0.53 0.48
1968 - 1970 81.81 0.15 0.13
F(80,256)3 F(80,320)3
1956 - 1960 141.63 0.26 0.23
1961 - 1965 299.00 0.54 0.49
1966 - 1970 147.73 0.27 0.24
1971 - 1975 737.38 1.34* 1.20
* statistically significant at a = 0.05.
1. Variation within countries for 1956-1971 = 549.00(%2).
2. Variation within countries for 1956-1975 = 611.81(%^).
3. Degrees of freedom.
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TABLE 26
F-TEST COMPARING VARIATION IN AVERAGE RATES OF INFLATION 
ACROSS COUNTRIES, ADJUSTED FOR EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES
Time Period
Mean Variation 
ACROSS 
Countries
Compared to 
Variation 
ACROSS 
Countries 
for 1 
1956 - 1971
Compared to 
Variation 
ACROSS 
Countries 
for „ 
1956 - 1975
(%2) F(16,16)3 F(16,16)3
1956 - 1958 381.75 30.64* 52.38*
1959 - 1961 107.55 8.63* 14.76*
1962 - 1964 21.53 1.73 2.95*
1965 - 1967 83.00 6.66* 11.39*
1968 - 1970 57.31 4.60* 7.86*
1956 - 1960 142.29 11.42* 19.52*
1961 - 1965 16.66 1.34 2.28+
1966 - 1970 19.22 1.54 2.64*
1971 - 1975 54.41 4.37* 7.47*
fstatistically significant at a = 0.10.
* statistically significant at a = 0.05.
2
1. Variation across countries for 1956-1971 ** 12.46(% ).
2
2. Variation across countries for 1956-1975 ** 7.29(% ).
3. Degrees of freedom.
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expectations models of expected price formation. I Infer from the 
results of Table 23 that residents of countries In this sample will 
do well In forecasting the long-term average domestic rate of 
Inflation by using a weighted average of the rates that prevail In 
other Latin American countries and the U.S.— adjusting for any future 
exchange rate changes. I infer from Table 25 that residents 'will do 
well In forecasting short-term intra-country variability of 
Inflation by using the long-run counterpart. However, I infer from 
Table 26 that long-term dispersion of rates of inflation across 
countries is not a good predictor of short-term intercountry dis­
persion. That is, short-term forecasts of domestic rates of 
inflation based on some weighted short-term average of inflation in 
other Latin American countries and the U.S. will be less precise 
(greater variation) than the long-term forecasts based on a long-term 
average. Therefore, rational agents should base their short-term 
forecasts on neither long-term convergence nor short-term dispersion 
that only accounts for exchange rate adjustments but ignores other 
differences, say in real per capita income growth. The inflation 
convergence proposition therefore can be accepted as a long-run 
phenomenon but one which does not necessarily hold for short periods - 
of time.
C. The Relationship between Small-Country 
and World Inflation
According to the purchasing-power-parity principle and the 
integrated markets hypothesis, no difference should exist between
rates of inflation experienced by a small country and that prevailing 
in the rest of the world (see Section B of this chapter). Moreover, 
the adjustment of the rate of inflation in a small country to an 
external rate Impulse should be rapid under these conditions. That 
is, within the current period, percentage point Increases in the rate 
of inflation for the rest of the world should be (nearly) completely 
reflected in the inflation rate of a small country.
The relationship between the rate of inflation external to 
a small country and its own domestic rate can be represented as a 
derivative of a variant of the purchasing-power-parity relationship. 
Suppose the price level of a small country can be represented as:
pdt = At eit p«  <20)
where is a shift parameter which could drive a wedge between the 
domestic, P(jt» and world, price levels, e.g., trade impediments,
and e  ^ is ah index of the exchange rate. By taking the first 
logarithmic derivative of equation (20), I obtain
V -  + 4i t  + U :  * <«•’>
where a circumflex represents a percentage change.
The validity of this relationship can be tested via regression 
analysis in several forms, e.g.,
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where P ^  Is the domestic rate of Inflation adjusted by the rate of 
exchange rate change, and ufc and v are serially uncorrelated 
random normal varlates with zero means and constant variances. In 
effect, equation (22) estimates a similar relationship to equation 
(21) except that (22) restricts the coefficient b in (21) to be 
unity. If there are no exchange rate changes during the sample 
period, then equations (21) and (22) are formally equivalent, once 
we drop from equation (21). Under this condition (S^ t = 0, for 
all t) the relationship to be estimated is
?dt = a + C *wt + ut <21’>
Before proceeding with the discussion of the values I expect 
the coefficients of regressions of the form of equation (21') to 
obtain, indeed before presenting the empirical results, one impor­
tant disclaimer should be made here. Namely, the rather naive 
nature of the purchasing power relationship as presented above is 
one which is implicit in much of the literature on the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments. Its simplicity lies in the 
fact that no allowance for adjustment over time is permitted. That 
is, as postulated above, price levels and rates of inflation are 
equated instantaneously. On a theoretical level, that no lags in 
adjustment exist is a heavy burden for most macroeconomic relation­
ships to bear. Nevertheless, researchers have been content to make 
the empirical assumption that no lags exist. It is partly my aim 
to demonstrate that the naive representation of PPP is made on shaky 
empirical grounds, at least for Latin America.
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1. The Intercept
The ordinary least squares regression Intercept estimate
a “ E(P,^) - c E(P ,.), where E( ) Indicates a mean value and a at wt -
tilda, ~, represents a point estimate. Over long periods of time 
we expect the average rate of Inflation throughout the world to be 
equalized, say for 16 to 20 year periods (see Section B.2 above).
If, on average, c is not different from unity, the regression 
intercept should be zero, i.e.,
E(a) - E(fdt) - E(c) Etf^) (23)
That is, with E(£) = 1 and E($dt) = E(Pwfc) the intercept term will 
equal zero, E(a) = 0.
Several factors might cause differences between rates of 
inflation to prevail resulting in the intercept being different 
than zero. First, any one of a number of impediments to free trade 
will generally allow a small country to experience a rate of 
inflation different than the rest of the world. As alluded to in 
the previous section, (B.l), if the imposition of trade restrictions 
changes from time to time and the changes themselves change, i.e., 
are not a constant change, then the expected domestic rate of 
inflation will differ from that for the rest of the world, even if 
the exchange rate remains fixed.
Second, if the exchange rate changes in a non-constant 
fashion, then differences in rates of inflation will be observed.
This effect is all the more likely when exchange rate changes are
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a matter of policy rather than the result of free market deter­
mination. For example, in the face of persistent balance of payments 
deficits under.a fixed exchange rate regime a devaluation may be in 
order. If the extent of the adjustment is geared toward rectifying 
the current problem, can we expect the adjustment to prevent future 
(say, the next five years) disequallbria or even merely soften them? 
If the adjustment is made with the future clearly in mind, the 
currency might be undervalued in the short-run by over-depreciating 
the currency. This might have short-run advantages (some of which are 
strictly political), but no gain may be obtained in the future vis- 
a-vis balanced international payments or moderation of Inflation. 
However, this policy will temporarily cause the domestic rate of 
inflation to diverge from the rate of inflation prevailing in the 
rest of the world.
Finally, the constant term in the regression (21') could be 
different from zero, even in the long run, if the coefficient of 
adjustment, c, were not unity. In the short-run the two factors 
mentioned above, trade impediments and exchange rate adjustments, 
would prevent quick and complete arbitrage from equalizing rates of 
inflation throughout the world. For example, by imposing heavy 
tariffs on imports and imposing exchange controls, a small country 
can, in effect, close itself to the rest of the world. Over time, 
as individuals compete for an artificially limited supply of goods, 
upward pressure would be exerted on domestic prices causing 
residents to seek less expensive substitutes. Unless these barriers 
are continually rivised, a leakage of expenditure will occur. Until
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this occurs, a divergence In rates of Inflation will exist. The 
leakage will reduce the difference in rates of Inflation. The 
question is how long will the process of convergence take— that is, 
reflected in the regression coefficient c.
2. The Slope— the Inflation Convergence 
Coefficient
That c is different than unity implies that goods markets 
between a small country and the rest of the world are not highly 
integrated. That is, when c is different than unity, arbitrage has 
not quickly and directly eliminated differences in prices and rates 
of inflation— the "law" of one price is violated. An obvious way of 
viewing this is by comparing the markets less developed nations are 
likely to deal in relative to those of the industrialized nations 
that dominate world trade— e.g., Germany, Japan, and the United 
States. If the respective goods markets are integrated, then the 
less developed nations might provide the industrialized nations with 
the necessary raw materials for manufactured goods, for example.
These goods would then be exported to the less developed nations. 
However, if demand for these manufactured goods is small, then the ■ 
scope for arbitrage to operate to eliminate differences in rates of 
inflation is limited. Minimally, some time would be required for 
the small sphere of influence to exert itself sufficiently to cause 
inflation rates to converge. Only fortuitiously would rates of 
inflation be equalized. Thus, even though markets are integrated 
in the sense that one party is supplying the raw materials and
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demanding the finished products of the other party which is demanding 
the raw materials, the transmission of Increases in the rate of 
inflation may not be complete unless the respective markets are 
highly integrated, at least in the short-run. That is, these markets 
must be significant enough in magnitude to quickly influence the 
general level of prices.
Another factor which could cause the adjustment to be 
incomplete, i.e., c different than unity, would be differences in the 
rate of technological innovation. A small country receiving impulses 
to its price level and domestic rate of inflation through a balance 
of payments surplus might be able to sustain the increased aggregate 
demand because of higher productivity— real per capita income growth. 
Indeed, the monetary approach to balance of payments theory predicts 
a surplus on the international accounts of those countries which grow, 
in real terms, faster than the rest of the world (see, e.g., Swoboda, 
1977, p. 22).
Tests of the expected relationship between the rate of 
inflation experienced by a small country and'that prevailing in the 
rest of the world were made. Regressions of the form of equations 
(2 1) and (2 2), repeated here for convenience, were performed for the 
16 Latin American countries:
Pdt - * + b edt + c rwt + “t . <21>
?dt - a + c + \ <22)
The rate of inflation for the small country, in equation (21), was 
simply the first logarithmic difference of the domestic Consumer
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Price Index. For specification (22) the rate of growth of the 
domestic CPI was adjusted for exchange rate changes. Two measures 
of the rate of inflation in the rest of the world were used. T^he 
first was simply the first logarithmic difference in the Consumer 
Price Index for the United States. The second measure was the 
first logarithmic difference of a weighted average of the CPI, con­
verted to dollar equivalent, for the countries in the sample,
18excluding the country being studied, plus the United States. The
regressions were performed for the periods 1956-1975 and 1956-1971.
The former period refers to the period over which sufficient data
was available for the construction of the rest of the world indices.
The latter period refers to that period of time during which the
world was on the dollar standard. During these two periods, only
four countries did not adjust their currency in relation to the
dollar: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.
In Tables 27.A and 27.B I present results for specification
(2 1), with the uncorrected domestic rate of inflation as the
dependent variable, covering the periods 1956-1975 and 1956-1971,
2 1respectively. In general the corrected R 's for the regressions with 
the rest of the world inflation rate as the independent variable are - 
greater than those for the regressions with the U.S. rate of
inflation. Also the regressions for the longer period have higher
2 19corrected R 's.
In general, the performance of this specification is poor.
In only eight of the sixteen cases does the set of explanatory
variables account for a majority of the variation in the uncorrected
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SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS1 FOR INTEGRATED
MARKETS HYPOTHESIS, 1956-1975
A A A
Country Constant K
A
P
US
A
P
W
2
R SER DW
Argentina 0 .0 2 2 '
(0.062)
0.218'
(0.044)
0.304*
(0.073)
0.278*
(0.114)
0.049+
(1.536)
0.191+
(0.652)
0.491
0.494
0.164
0.193
1.73
2.24
Bolivia 0.040
(0.075)
0.087
(0.058)
0.251*
(0.053)
0.243*
(0.054)
2.330+
(1.670)
0.557+
(0.533)
0.581
0.495
0.106
0 . 1 1 0
2.18
2.24
Brazil 0.246'
(0.053)
0.208'
(0.043)
0.348*
(0.103)
0.377*
(0.103)
-1.321
(0.968)
-0.255
(0.307)
0.451
0.415
0.106
0 . 1 1 0
1 . 0 0
1.00
Chile -0. 012
(0.081)
0.044
(0.086)
0.460*
(0.096)
0.410*
(0.149)
7.409*
(2.517)
4.821*+
(2.506)
0.830
0.789
0 . 2 1 2
0.235
1.63
1.57
Colombia 0.079’
(0.027)
0.093
(0 .0 2 0)
-0.031
(0.076)
-0.030
(0.072)
1.263*+
(0.597)
0.458*
(0.179)
0.118
0.196
0.069
0.066
1.77
2.08
Costa Rica -0.024
(0 .0 1 0)
0 . 0 0 2
(0.007)
0.316*
(0.104)
0.346*
(0.087).
1.861*
(0.258)
0.598*
(0.068)
0.831
0.875
0.027 - 
0.023
1.77
1.67
Ecuador -0.009
(0 .0 1 2)
0.017
(0 .0 1 0)
-0.064
(0.085)
0.018
(0.092)
1.800*
(0.264)
0.548*
(0.091)
0.701
0.644
0.030
0.033
0.64
1 . 2 1
2
El Salvador -0.032’
(0.013)
-0.013
(0.006)
1.634*
(0.290)
0.590*
(0.061)
0.597
0.820
0.041
0 . 0 2 2
1.62
2.76
(continued)
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Country Constant *d
A
P
US
A
P
W
2
R SER DW
2
Guatemala -0.032'
(0 .0 1 0)
-0 . 0 1 0
(0.007)
1.596*
(0.227)
0.524*
(0.062)
0.703
0.772
0.029
0 . 0 2 2
1.20
1.82
Honduras^ -0.007
(0.009)
0.006
(0.007)
.0.894*
(0.215)
0.283*
(0.067)
0.430
0.434
0.033
0.037
1.41
1.67
Mexico^ 0.0003
(0 .0 1 1)
0.024'
(0.008)
1.609*
(0.245)
0.518*
(0.073)
0.671
0.707
0.030
0.027
0.97
1.79
Nicaragua -0.033
(0.018)
-0.004
(0.015)
1.217+
(1.700)
1.141*
(1.881)
1.634*+
(0.415)
0.447*
(0.145)
0.419
0.288
0.048
0.053
1.06
1.35
Paraguay 0.033
(0.024)
0.045'
(0.018)
0.301*
(0.125)
0.287*
(0 .1 2 1)
0 .8 6 6*
(0.535)
0.282
(0.165)
0.208
0 . 2 2 1
0.060
0.060
1.46
1 .68
Peru 0.062'
(0.016)
0.070'
(0 .0 1 0)
0.080
(0.090)
0.048
(0.080)
0.840**
0.342**
(0.098)
0.194
0.372
0.040
0.036
1.66
1.77
Uruguay 0.176'
(0.082)
0.226’
(0*067)
0.241
(0.133)
0 . 2 2 2
(0.135)
3.124**
(1.729)
1 .0 2 1**
(0.555)
0.226
0.230
0.198
0.197
1.54 ' 
1.41
Venezuela -0.004
(0.009)
0.007
(0.006)
0.042
(0.073)
0.016
(0.063)
0.789**
(0 .2 0 1) 0.274*
(0.054)
0.414
0.550
0.023
0 . 0 2 0
1.57
1.72
A *
P .  = the domestic rate of inflation; P = the U.S. rate of inflation;»ot _ US
P = the rest-of-the-world rate of inflation; e^  = the rate of exchange •
v rate adjustment .
' - significantly different from zero at a=0.05, two-tailed test •
*. " " " " " " , one-tailed test *
f not " " " " " " » two-tailed test •
1. Standard error of coefficient in parenthesis* 2. No exchange rate changes
during this period •
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SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS1 FOR INTEGRATED
MARKETS HYPOTHESIS, 1956-1971
Country Constant
A
■i
A
PUS
A
Pw
R2 SER DW
Argentina 0.293'
(0.080)
0.290'
(0.068)
0 . 2 0 0
(0.194)
0.278
(0.190)
-3.338+
(2.380)
-3.273
(1.903)
0.008
0.134
0.144
0.140
1.96
2.04
Bolivia 0.098
(0.099)
0.099
(0.095)
0.250
(0.054)
0.250*
(0.054)
0.208+ 
(3.207)
0.130+
(2.550)
0.567
0.567
0.192
0.192
2.36
2.36
Brazil 0.318*
(0.072)
0.311'
(0.058)
0.292*
(0.113)
0.346*
(0 .1 0 1)
-3.529*
(1.912)
-3.507*
(1.628)
0.456
0.515
0 . 1 1 0
0.104
0.89
0.84
Chile 0.267'
(0.053)
0.260'
(0.049)
-0.078
(0.126)
-0.080
(0.136)
-0.374+ 
(1.628)
-0.049
(1.430)
-0.113
-0.118
0.098
0.099
1.18
1.20
Columbia 0.108'
(0.036)
0.117'
(0.034)
-0.014
(0.079)
-0.006
(0.080)
-0.255f
(1.175)
-0.524+
(0.943)
-0.146
0.084
0.071
0.070
2.24
2.22
Costa Rica 0.006
(0.007)
0.076
(0.087)
0.543+
(0.225)
0.205 0.013 1.46 .:
0.006
(0.007)
0.083
(0.086)
0.450*
(0.180)
0 . 2 2 2 0.013 1.38 .
Ecuador 0.009
(0.014)
0.013
(0.014)
0 . 0 1 1
'(0.084)
0.031
(0.085)
0.850+
(0.489)
0.556+
(0.394)
0 . 0 1 0
0.036
0.028
0.023
0.74
0.89
2
El Salvador -0.0008
(Q.012)
-0.004
(0 .0 1 1)
0.239+
(0.391)
0.288
-0.044
-0.087
0.024
0.023
\ • v
2.96
2.97
Ccontinued}
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Country Constant
M
ed
■ A
P
US
A
P
W
R2 SER DW
2
Guatemala -0.006
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.005)
• .
0.389*
(0.173)
0.320*
(0.137)
0.153
0.168
0 . 0 1 1
0 . 0 1 0
2.08
1 . 8 8
2
Honduras 0.008
(0 .0 1 1)
0.006
(0 .0 1 0)
0.188
(0.353)
0.228
(0.280)
-0.131
-0 . 101
0 . 0 2 2
0 . 0 2 1
1.08
1.06
Mexico2 0.02 A 
(0 .0 1 2) 
0.023 
(0 .0 1 1)
0.555+
(0.404)
0.496+
(0.315)
-0.017
0.019
0.025
0.024
1.51
1.48
Nicaragua -0.013
(0.016)
-0.014
(0.015)
1.501+
(1.158)
0.552
(0.424)
0.603+
(0.531)
0.552+
(0.424)
0.065
0.090
0.032
0.032
0 . 6 8
0.67
Paraguay 0.076’
(0.027)
0.077’
(0.026)
0.259*
(0.107)
0.261*
(0.106)
-1.025
(0.865)
-0.890
(0.681)
0.328
0.342
0.051
0.050
1.74
1.69
Peru 0.878'
(0.019)
0.864'
(0.018)
0.030
(0.088)
0.032
(0.089)
-0.159f 
(0.621)
-0.090
(0.501)
0.138
-0.140
0.038
0.038
1.82
1.83
Uruguay 0 . 2 0 1
(0.113)
0 . 2 2 1
(0.107)
0.224
(0.148)
0.218
(0.148)
1.522+
(3.416)
0.687+
(2.772)
0.028
0.018
0.208
0.209
1.33
1.30
Venezuela 0.008
(0 .0 1 2)
0 . 0 1 0
(0 .0 1 1)
0.025
(0.073)
0.015
(0.071)
0.245+
(0.377)
A
0.156
(0.297)
-0.113
-0.126
0 . 0 2 2
0 . 0 2 2
1.71
1 . 6 8
P,. = the domestic rate of inflation; P = the U.S. rate of inflation; *dt us ^
P = the rest-of-the-world rate of‘.inflation; el - the rate of exchange w d rate adjustment
' significantly different from zero at a=0.05, two-tailed test*
* " " " " " " , one-tailed test-
t not •' " » unity " " , two-tailed test*
1. Standard error of coefficient in parenthesis • 2. No exchange rate
during this period•
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_2
domestic rate of Inflation, I.e., R > 0.510: Bolivia, Chile, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela.
In terms of the expected values of the coefficients, the 
results are equally poor. The coefficient for the rate of exchange 
rate adjustment is expected to be unity. Yet in only one case of 
the twelve for which this is a relevant variable, Nicaragua, is the 
coefficient not significantly different from unity in a statistical 
sense. Moreover, in that one case the coefficient is not signifi­
cantly different from zero. In the seven cases for which a 
statistically significant coefficient was obtained, the coefficient 
for the exchange rate adjustment variable was less than 0.500.
The constant term should prove insignificant if markets are 
sufficiently well integrated. Considering the four variants 
presented in Tables 27.A and 27.B, we see that for eleven of the 
sixteen cases the constant term is statistically different from zero 
using a two-tailed test at a level of significance of 5%. Only 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela do not have a 
significant constant term. The most interesting aspect of this ... - 
result is the variety of countries for which we obtain this result. 
These include countries with: no exchange rate adjustment— El'' -
Salvador and Guatemala; infrequent exchange rate adjustment— Costa 
Rica and Paraguay; and frequent exchange rate adjustment— Brazil and' 
Chile.
The results for the coefficient of adjustment of the domestic 
rate of inflation to the world rate, c, are very different for the 
two periods, implying a lack of stability in the relationship between
140
the rates of Inflation. For the longer period, 1956-1975, seven
cases have an adjustment coefficient which is statistically
significant and which is not significantly different from unity:
Chile (4.8); Colombia (1.3); Honduras (0.9); Nicaragua (1.6); Peru j
(0.8); Uruguay (1.0); and Venezuela (0.8). However, in only one. ..
2case of these seven is the corrected R greater than 0.5: Costa
Rica (0.789). Moreover, these results pertain to regressions with
the U.S. rate of inflation as the independent variable— the
2specification with the lower corrected R .
While the adjustment coefficient for the regressions over the
longer period are generally statistically significant— even in those
cases when c is different from unity, the coefficient for the shorter
period, 1956-1971, is generally not significantly different from
zero. Indeed, in only one case is the coefficient both different
from zero and not different from unity: Costa Rica (0.5). In this
2
lone case the corrected R dropped to 0.205 (from 0.789 for the longer 
period).
The results for regressions of specification (22), Tables
27.C and 27.D, using the domestic rate of inflation adjusted for
exchange rate changes as the dependent variable, are worse than
those for specification (21). For the period 1956-1975, only two
cases of the twelve which had exchange rate adjustments had a 
2
corrected R greater than 0.4: Argentina (0.48) and Nicaragua
(0.415). For the period 1956-1971, only two cases have a positive 
2
corrected R . Even though this specification does not explain much 
of the variation in the adjusted domestic rate of inflation, in only
TABLE 27.C 141
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FOR-INTEGRATED
MARKETS HYPOTHESIS, 1956-1975
- a + c £ . dt wt
Country Constant £us w R2 SER DW
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Nicaragua
0.234 . 
(0.152) 
0.237' 
(0.078)
-0.292
(0.246)
-0.149
(0.190)
0.022
(0.071)
0.037
(0.053)
0.065
(0.071)
0.157
(0.110)
-0.035
(0.086)
-0.031
(0.065)
-0.014
(0.019)
- 0.0002
(0.013)
7*0.028
(0.035)
-0.013
(0.025)
-0.032
(0.017)
7-0.004
(0.015)
-5.4251 
(3.502)
6.842'
(5.666)
0.512'
(1.642)
-2.221*
(3.014)
0.726'
(1.995)
1.165*
(0.432)
1.577*
(0.818)
1.631*
(0.403)
-3.148*
1.484'
(1.824)
0.037'
(0.523)
-3.619
(1.782)
0.324'
(0.625)
0.413*
(0.129)
0.621*
(0.242)
0.446*
(0.140)
0.014
0.481
-0.034
-0.079
- 0.112
-0.114
-0.085
0.090
- 0.110
-OvlOl
0.204
0.289
0.073
0.181
0-415
0.285
0.403 1.69
0.293 1.80
0.653 1.60
0.667 1.66
0.189 2.45
0.190 2.44
0.347 2.56
0.318 2.69
0.230 2.44
-0.230 2.46
0.050 2.59
0.047 2.50
0.089 2.59
0.089 2.30
0.046 1.08
0.051 1.36
(continued)
TABLE 27.C (cont'd)
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Country Constant
A
P
US
A
P
W
R2 SER DW
Paraguay -0.013
(0.037)
0.013
(0.029)
1.565*
(0.855)
0.436+
(0.274)
0.058
0 . 0 2 0
0.098
0 . 1 0 0
1.63
1.77
Peru 0.023
(0.039)
0.038
(0.030)
0.799+
(0.909)
0 . 2 0 0
(0.288)
-0.072
-0.089
0.105
0.106
2.33
2.37
Uruguay -0.029
(0.123)
0 . 0 1 2
(0.094)
1.810+
(2.838)
0.350+
(0.908)
-0.093
-0.109
0.327
0.329
2.62
2.37
Venezuela -0.036
(0.028)
-0.013
(0 .0 2 2)
1.319*+
(0.640)
0.357
(0.207)
0.096
0.040
0.074
0.076
2.24
2.15
P'<jt = domestic rate of inflation adjusted for exchange rate changes;
P = U.S. rate of inflation; P = the rest-of-the-world rate ofus - w
inflation.
' significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, two-tailed test.
* significantly different from zero at a - 0.05, one-tailed test,
f not significantly different from unity at a = 0.05, two-tailed test.
1. Standard error of coefficient in parenthesis.
2. No exchange rate changes were made for El Salvador, Guatemala, Hond­
uras and Mexico during this period. - ■ -
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TABLE 27.D
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS1 FOR INTEGRATED
MARKETS HYPOTHESIS, 1956-19712
Country Constant Pus
A
P
W
R2 SER DW
Argentina 0.145
(0.104)
0 .2 1 1 '
(0.091)
-2.685+
(3.480)
-4.600+
(2.616)
-0 . 1 1 1
0.006
0 . 2 1 2
0.196
2.75
2.59
Bolivia -0.310
(0.358)
-0.217
(0.355)
8.509+
(11.955)
4.073+
(9.732)
-0.113
-0.140
0.729
0.737
1.55
1.59
Brazil 0.024
(0.105)
0.116
(0.099)
0.261+
(3.507)
-3.015+
(2.983)
-0.153
-0.075
0.214
0.206
2.47
2.22
Chile 0.087
(0 .1 2 0)
0.172
(0 .1 1 0)
-1.971+ 
(4.008)
-4.430+
(3.070)
-0.134
-0.004
0.244
0.230
2.45
2.18
Colombia 0 .022
(0.124)
0.073
(0.116)
-2.128+
(4.128)
-3.414+
(3.192)
-0.133
-0.066
0.253
0.246
2.47
2.41
Costa Rica -0 . 0 2 1
(0.019)
-0.022
(0.019)
1 .2 2 2*+
(0.649)
1.040*+
(0.514)
0.079
0.108
0.040
0.039
2.24
2.28
Ecuador 0.028
(0.045)
0.018
(0.044)
-1 .1 2 2+
(1.505)
-0.621+
(1 .2 2 0)
-0 . 1 1 0
-0.133
0.092
0.093
2.53
2.53
Nicaragua -0 . 012
(0.015)
-0.014
(0.015)
0.609+
(0.516)
0.568+
(0.407)
-0.049
-0 . 012
0.031
0.031
0.83
0.76
(continued)
TABLE 27.D (cont'd)
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Country •Constant
A
P
US
A
P
W
R2 SER DW
Paraguay 0.007
(0.052)
0.014
(0.051)
0.515+
(1.737)
0 .2 0 2+
(1.396)
-0.147
-0.152
0.106
0.106
1.77
1.80
Peru 0.039
(0.058)
0.062
(0.055)
0.072+
(1.918)
-0.684f
(1.527)
-0.154
-0.138
0.117
0.116
2.40
2.41
Uruguay -0.052
(0.174)
0 . 0 2 1
(0.171)
2.693+
(5.804)
-0.114+
(4.724)
-0.137
0 . 0 0 0
0.354
0.356
2.56
2.57
Venezuela -0.038
(0.041)
-0.009
(0.042)
1.358+
(1.362)
1.191+
(1.132)
-0.078
-0.152
0.083
0.086
2.25
2 . 1 1
P' = domestic rate of inflation adjusted for exchange rate changes;
a
P = the U.S. rate of inflation: P = the rest-of-the-world rate ofus w
inflation.
' significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, two-tailed test.
* significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, one-tailed test, 
t not significantly different from unity at a = 0.05, one-tailed test.
1. Standard error of coefficient in parenthesis. .
2. No exchange rate changes were made for El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Mexico during this period.
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one Instance is the constant term significantly different from zero: 
Argentina.
In terms of our expectations for the adjustment coefficient, :
c, the results are generally poor, for both periods,- using — .
specification (22). The coefficient is statistically significantly
different from zero and not significantly different from unity in
five cases for the period 1956-1975: Costa Rica (1.2); Ecuador
(1.6); Nicaragua (1.6); Paraguay (1.6); and Venezuela (1.3). For
the period 1956-1971, only Costa Rica (1.2) has a significant
coefficient which is not different from unity. Moreover, only for
2
the case of Nicaragua is the corrected R greater than 0.4.
On the basis of these results, the integrated markets hypo­
thesis for Latin American countries as a whole can be rejected. In 
an attempt to shed some light on possible other avenues through 
which differences in rates of inflation might show themselves, in the 
short run, regressions were performed using the same basic speci­
fications as in (2 1) and (2 2) but augmented with a proxy for growth 
in aggregate demand not the result of higher prices. The measures 
used were the growth in real per capita gross domestic product and the 
difference between that growth rate and the growth in U.S. real per 
capita as well as the differential per capita growth rate of the 
small country and the rest of the world. That is, I ran regressions 
of the following form:
h t  = a + b adt + c ?wt + f h t  + udt (24)
and
where y^fc is real per capita income growth in the small country 
(j=d) and the rest of the world (j=w).
I use the real per capita income variables to proxy growth 
in the supply of the produce of a country and the differential with i 
respect to the rest of the world. These growth rates will affect 
the growth in the respective demand for real cash balances. Holding 
world real income growth and all nominal money supply growth constant, 
the higher is the real per capita income growth of a small country 
the lower will be the domestic rate of inflation.
I also ran regressions (24) and (25) using the growth in the 
level of real GDP as well as four additional regressions with the 
exchange-rate-adjusted rate of inflation as the dependent variable 
and no exchange rate term on the right-hand side.
In Tables 28.A and 28.B I present results for the specifi­
cation with the unadjusted domestic rate of inflation as the 
dependent variable, Table 28.A for the longer period. The regression
equations listed represent the best equation for each country as '
2
indicated by the corrected R . As can be seen in these two tables,
the constant is significant in seven of the sixteen'cases, the
exchange rate change coefficient is significant in only six of the
twelve cases, and the adjustment coefficient is statistically
different from zero and not different from unity for only Colombia
(1.6), Costa Rica (0.6), Ecuador (1.0), and Nicaragua (1.3); of these
2
only Costa Rica has a corrected R smaller than 0.60.
TABLE 28.A
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ALTERNATIVE TESTS OF THE
■a
INTEGRATED MARKETS HYPOTHESIS, 1956-1975
'dt a + b e' + c P . + d y dt wt 1 1
Country Constant us w yd"yw R2 SER DW
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
2
El Salvador
0.193'
(0.043)
0.008
(0.028)
0.213'
(0.039)
0.030
(0.088)
0.074'
(0.014)
-0.005
(0.007)
- 0.011
(0.011)
-0.009
(0.008)
0.259*
(0.063)
0.130*
(0.025)
0.322*
(0.074)
0.403*
(0.106)
0.403*
(0.087)
1.363+
(0.948)
7.321*
(2.488)
1.640*
(0.280)
1.288+
(0.995)
3.000*
(0.555)
1.692*'
(0.337)
-1.326
(1.120)
0.568* 0.344*
(0.066) (0.184)
0.244
(0.190)
0.586* -0.242
(0.062) (0.284)
-1.270
(0.514)
-1.008*
(0.112)
-2.455*
(0.592)
-1.398*
(0.287)
0.596 0.142 1.23 
0.908 0.080 1.03 
0.719 0.076 2.17 
0.834 0.209 1.76 
0.571 0.470 1.35 
0.891 0.022 1.55 
0.781 0.029 0.75 
0.827 0.022 2.60
(continued)
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TABLE 28.A (cont'd)
Country Constant *d Pus Pw
A
yd R2 SER DW
2
Guatemala -0.016
(0.009)
0.535*
(0.063)
0.257
(0 .2 2 1)
0.789 0.023 1.95
Honduras2 0.005
(0.006)
0.567*
(0.077)
-0.347*
(0.159)
0.511 0.023 1.91
Mexico2 0.025
(0.014)
0.513*
(0.077)
-0.050 ' 
(0.352)
0.707 0.027 1.81
Nicaragua -0.014
(0.018)
1.272
(1.197)
1.262*+
(0 .2 0 2)
0.111
(0.176)
0.708 0.033 1.17
Paraguay 0.034
(0 .0 2 0)
0.327*
(0.127)
0.219
(0.175)
0.733
(0.694)
0.226 0.059 1.65
Peru 0.083'
(0 .0 1 2)
0.338*
(0.092)
-0.464
(0.287)
0.444 0.034 1.55
Uruguay 0.080
(0.091)
6.179
(1.849)
-3.110*
(1.156)
0.352 0.181 1.27
Venezuela 0.013
(0.007)
0.271*
(0.051)
-0.257
(0.168)
0.603 0.019 1.62
P, = domestic rate of inflation; P = the U.S. rate of inflation; P = the rest-of-the-world rate of Cl  ^ us  ^ w
inflation; e^  = the rate of exchange rate adjustment; = the domestic rate of real per capita income growth
A
yw = the rest-of-the-world rate of real per capita income growth;
' significantly different from zero at a ° 0.05, two-tailed test; * one-tailed test; t not significantly 
different from unity at ct 0.05, two-tailed test.
1. Standard error of coefficient in parenthesis. 2. fto exchange rate changes during this period.
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TABLE 28.B
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS1 FOR ALTERNATIVE TESTS OF THE
INTEGRATED MARKETS HYPOTHESIS, 1956 - 1971
Country Constant ,}k
Pus Pw yd
A A
yd“yw R2 SER Dff
Argentina 0.342'
(0.070)
0.205
(0.181)
-3.533*
(1.771)
-1.226*
(0.695)
0.255 0.130 1.46
Bolivia 0.058'
(0.014)
0.145*
(0.009)
0.039
(0.446)
-0.942*
(0.039)
0.991 0.027 1.64
Brazil 0.234'
(0.061)
0.302*
(0.086)
0.863’*’
(1.999)
-2.366* 0.684 0.084 1.93
Chile 0.278
(0.024)
-2.403*
(0.875)
0.512
(0.369)
0 . 222 0.080 1.65
Colombia 0.069’
(0.013)
1.566*+
(0.433)
-1.370*
(0.262)
0.610 0.040 2.07
Costa Rica 0.008
(0.006)
0.582*+
(0.239)
-0.115
(0.127)
0.208 0.013 1.50
Ecuador 0 . 0 1 2
(0.006)
0.976*+
(0.188)
-0.118
(0.131)
0.648 0.017 1.08
2
El Salvador 0.006
(0.014)
0 . 2 0 0
(0.312)
-0.369
(0.301)
0.026 0.023 2.89
M
■e.
VO
(continued)
TABLE 28.B (cont'd)
Country Constant
a
6d Pus Pw
a
yd
A  A
yd"yw R2 SER DW
2Guatemala -0.007
(0.006)
0.328*
(0.145)
0.030
(0.115)
0.172 0 . 0 1 1 1.92
Honduras2 0.005
(0.006)
0.399*
(0.184)
-0.167
(0.169)
0.106 0.019 1.65
Mexico2 0.024
(0 .0 1 2)
0.430f
(0.411)
0.279
(0.023)
0.087 0.024 1.39
Nicaragua -0.013
(0.008)
1.552
(0.927)
0.783*+
(0.234)
0.080
(0.127)
0.404 0.025 1.35
Paraguay 0.089'
(0.028)
0.261*
(0.104)
-1.448
(0.897)
0.525
(0.392)
0.367 0.049 2.07
Peru 0.089'
(0.015)
-0.108
(0.490)
-0.604*
(0.213)
0.291 0.030 2.09
Uruguay 0.109
(0.133)
4.871+
(3.848)
-3.006*
(1.625)
0.094 0 .2Q0 1 . 1 0
Venezuela 0 . 0 1 0
(0.005)
0.079
(0.055)
0.196
(0.151)
-0.264*
(0.079)
0.365 0.016 1.07
P, = domestic rate of inflation; P h the U.S. rate of inflation; P 5 the rest-of-the-world rate of d us w
inflation; e^ =the rate of exchange rate adjustment; = the domestic rate of real per capita income growth; 
yw = the rest-of-the-world rate of real per capita income growth.
' significantly different from zero at a n 0.05, two-tailed test; * one-tailed test, t not significantly o 
different from unity at a ** 0.05, two-tailed test.
1. Standard error of coefficient in parenthesis. 2. No exchange rate changes during this period.
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The coefficient on the variants of the real income growth 
variables was significantly different from zero in none of the cases. 
The expected value for the coefficient is less than zero, i.e., we 
expect the coefficient to have a negative value. The countries for 
which the coefficient for real per capita GDP growth was significant 
are: Costa Rica (0.3) and Venezuela (-0.3). The countries for
which the coefficient on the difference in real per capita GDP growth 
was significant are: Argentina (-1.3); Bolivia (-1.0); Brazil
(-2.5); Colombia (-1.4); Honduras (-0.3); Peru (-0.6); and Uruguay 
(-3.1). Even though the results are not exceptional, they do 
represent an improvement over the simple approach to the relationship 
between rates of inflation.
However, when we compare the results of the regressions using 
the exchange-rate-change-adjusted domestic rate of inflation as the 
dependent variable to those for the unadjusted rate of inflation, the 
former results are generally worse in a number of respects. First, 
in only three cases is the adjustment coefficient, c, both signifi­
cantly different from zero and not different from one: Nicaragua 
(1.3); Paraguay (1.4); and Venezuela (1.2). Second, in only five of 
the twelve cases is the coefficient on the income growth variable 
significant. Moreover, in none of these five cases is the coefficient 
negative.
Overall, the results imply that the integrated markets 
hypothesis does not hold strongly for the sixteen Latin American 
countries. That is, in the short run the degree to which increases 
in the rate of inflation external to these small countries was
TABLE 28.C
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS1 FOR ALTERNATIVE TESTS OF THE
INTEGRATED MARKETS HYPOTHESIS, 1956-19752
Country Constant Pus Pw
A
yd
<>*1
< 
S>s R2 SER DW
Argentina 0 .2 1 2 ’ -3.062* 0.814 0.490 0.299 1.85
(0.091) (0.728) (1.462)
Bolivia -0.214 1.647+ 9.111* 0.186 0.596 2.28
(0.227) (5.713) (4.251)
Brazil -0.0 1 2 2.755+ -1.996 0.003 0.184 2.56
(0.073) (2.266) (1.428)
Chile 0.134 -3.273 0.693 0.101 0.325 2.55
(0.123) (1.979) (1.538)
Colombia -0.116 -0.650+ 6.228* 0.119 0.211 2.72
(0.088) (1.943) (2.966)
Costa Rica -0.015 0.382* 0.783* 0.464 0.042 2.39
(0.014) (0.016) (0.333)
Ecuador -0.030 0.373 1.320* 0.426 0.076 2.37
(0.023) (0.228) (0.489)
(continued)
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TABLE 28.C (cont'd)
Country Constant Pus
A
P
W
A
yd
A A
yd"yw R2 SER DW
Nicaragua -0.014 1.264*+ 0.104 0.722 0.032 1.22
(0.009) (0.196) (0.167)
Paraguay -0.006 1.441*+ 0.325 0.369 0.081 1.91
(0.023) (0.561) (0.445)
Peru 0.003 0.850+ 0.614 -0.044 0.106 2.44
(0.046) (0.926) (0.910)
Uruguay 0.063 -0.140f 5.027* 0.109 0.304 2.50
(0.123) (2.818) (2.563)
Venezuela -0.006 1.197*1' -1.071 0.224 0.070 2.26
(0.032) (0.614) (0.638)
P' = domestic rate of inflation adjusted for exchange rate changes; P = the U.S. rate of Inflation
a Q a US
Pw = the rest-of-the-world rate of inflation; y^  = the domestic rate of real per capita income
growth; yw = the rest-of-the-world rate of real per capita income growth.
’ significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, two-tailed test.
* significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, one-tailed test, 
t not significantly different from unity at a = 0.05, two-tailed test.
1. Standard error of coefficient in parenthesis.
2. No exchange rate changes were made for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico during this 
period.
TABLE 28.D
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION RESULTS1 FOR ALTERNATIVE TESTS OF THE
INTEGRATED MARKETS HYPOTHESIS, 1956-19712
P'  “ a  +  c P ^ + d v  
dt wt
Country Constant Pus
A
P
W
A A A
yd yd"yw R2 SER DW
Argentina 0.229' -4.769 -0.527 0.073 0.201 2.53
(0 .1 0 1) (2.710) (1.048)
Bolivia -0.180 1.452+ 9.576* 0.147 0.661 2.30
(0.332) (11.417) (4.800)
Brazil 0.014 5.035+ -3.530 0.025 0.204 2.42
(0 .1 0 1) (4.534) (2.291)
Chile 0.154 -4.340+ 0.614 0.004 0.238 2.09
(0.127) (3.185) (1.893)
Colombia -0.005 -5.714* 8.636* 0.292 0.208 3.00
(0.103) (2.843) (3.362)
Costa Rica -0 . 0 2 1 0.644+ 0.667* 0.316 0.035 1.72
(0.017) (0.507) (0.335)
Ecuador -0.026 -0.244f 2.287* 0.256 0.078 2.24
(0.044) (1.325) (0.905)
(continued) 154
TABLE 28.D (cont'd)
Country Constant ►d
>
c CO Pw *d ^d“^ w R2 SER DW
Nicaragua -0 . 0 1 2 0.792*+ 0.054 0.373 0.024 1.55
(0.008) (0.228) (0.157)
Paraguay -0.018 1.929*+ 0.383 0.245 0.086 1.82
(0.027) (0.884) (0.496)
Peru 0.051 -0.567+ 0.355 -0.128 0.1 2 0 2.46
(0.066) (1.618) (1.073)
Uruguay 0 . 1 0 2 -1.918+ 5.627* 0 . 1 0 0 0.326 2.60
(0.163) (4.431) (2.937)
Venezuela 0.004 0.751+ -1.153 0.088 0.079 2.26
(0.048) (1.360) (0.752)
A  A
P'^ = domestic rate of inflation adjusted for exchange rate changes; Pyg = the U.S. rate of
inflation; Pw = the rest-of-the-world rate of inflation; = the domestic rate of real per capita
income growth; y = the rest-of-the-world rate of real per capita income growth, w
' significantly different from zero at a => 0.05, two-tailed test.
* significantly different from zero at a = 0.05, one-tailed test, 
t not significantly different from unity at a = 0.05, two-tailed test.
1. Standard error of coefficient in parenthesis.
2. No exchange rate changes were made for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico during this 
period.
transmitted Is not great. Thus, although rates of Inflation do 
converge In the long run because this convergence may not be 
completed within; one period and the strength of the relationship of 
world and small country Inflation rates may not.be great, we should 
be careful when using the domestic rate of inflation as an exogenous 
determinant of the balance of payments— Implicitly (or explicitly) 
assuming a priori that the domestic rate of inflation is not influ­
enced by the same factors which affect the flow of international 
reserve assets.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V
1. For a more detailed discussion of the monetary approach, 
see Chapter III. Of course, the original theoretical arguments are 
expounded hy Johnson(1958)'and Mundell (1968,1971).
2. See Burger (1971) and Cagan (1965).
3. See Cagan (1956) and Friedman, and Schwartz (1963), as well
as other studies on Latin American countries: Deaver (1970), Diz
(1970), Harberger (1963), and Vogel (1974).
4. See Swoboda (1974) for a discussion of the distribution of 
reserves under a fixed exchange rate regime. Also, see Genberg and 
Swoboda (1977) and Heller (1976) for a discussion of worldwide 
inflation as determined by world money growth.
5. See Gandolfi and Lothian (1977) for a different approach to
testing for convergence. See also Stigler and Kindahl (1971) for 
still another approach as applied to industrial prices with the U.S.
6 . Although difficult to measure, the quality of products
should not be different when comparing their prices. Therefore, I am
assuming either that the products, the average price level of which
I am comparing, are equivalent in quality terms or that the prices
used to construct price levels have been adjusted for quality differ­
ences .
7. One additional necessary assumption is that the price level 
and the rate of inflation are generated as normal random processes. 
This allows the cross-country variation be represented as the sum of 
squared normal variates, i.e., as a distribution— similarly for 
the average dispersion within countries— thus yielding an F-statistic 
as the ratio of two variables.
8 . The hypothesis, tested by the F-ratio suggested in the text, 
is that average rates of inflation do not differ, significantly, 
across Latin American countries and the U.S. That price levels and 
their rates of change are not the same at every point in time for a 
single country is well-known. That is, the rates of inflation 
experienced by a country exhibits some variability. The historical 
movements of inflation in one country may or may not run counter to 
the movements of inflation in another country. Therefore, if we hold 
the average (across country) variation (within country) of the rate
of the inflation fixed, then any additional variation in average rates 
of inflation across countries will not represent the historical 
variability of inflation. In this regard, the analysis of. variance 
suggested in the text tests for divergence across countries taking the 
historical movement in inflation as a datum.
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9. See Swoboda (1977), p. 17.
10. Care must be taken in measuring and interpreting e^ . If 
we are comparing prices measured in currency values then the appro­
priate exchange rate is simply the spot exchange rate measured in 
domestic currency units (per world currency unit). If however, we 
are comparing price levels measured as indices with some base, say 
1970 “ 1.00, then P^ is the ratio of current cost of some basket of 
goods in domestic currency units relative to base year costs in 
comestic currency units. Similarly, Pw is the ratio of current cost 
in world currency units to base year cost in world currency units. 
Therefore, e^ should be the ratio of the current spot exchange rate 
to the spot exchange rate prevailing in the base year. Thus, for the 
base year: e^ = 1 .0 0 .
11. The term "expected" value refers to the mathematical 
expectation, mean of a series, not the value which individuals anti­
cipate will occur.
12. If e' and T are not constant, but are uncorrelated withd
P , then the E(P^ ) = E(e^ ) ~ E(t) + E(Pw). If their expected values
are zero, i.e., depreciations are later offset by appreciations and
import restrictions are later offset by import subsidies (generally
unlikely), then E(P ) = E(P ). This will not necessarily be true ofe w
the variances of the respective price levels.
13. Note that if T ^ 0 and T and P are uncorrelated, then:
VAR(P,) = VAR(P ) + VAR(t). Thus, even if E(t) = 0 if VAR(t) ^ 0, a w
the domestic variance of inflation will be greater than the world 
variance of inflation.
A A
14. That el and P are uncorrelated is an assumption whichd w
might be questioned. However, the relationship between rest-of-the- 
world and the rate of exchange rate adjustment would imply either a 
flexible exchange rate regime or that the monetary authorities react 
to domestic inflation relative to world inflation in setting the 
price of their currency not balance of payments disequilibrium. The 
second alternative would present a serious problem if balance of 
payments disequilibrium simultaneously represented an equivalent 
difference in price levels. The relationship between differences in
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rates of inflation and balance of payments is an issue to which I 
speak in the next chapter.
15. This is not necessarily true for the variances. For 
example, suppose a country depreciates by x % half the time and
appreciates by x% the other half. Then E(e^) ■= l/2x - l/2x «=• 0, but
VAR(Sp = 1/2 (x) 2 + l/2 (-x) 2 - x2 f 0 .
16. For the periods 1947-1976, 1956-1975, and 1956-1971, the 
average rate of inflation and the variance of inflation, both 
averaged across countries, were (after exchange rate adjustments):
All Countries Low-Inflation Countries
E(P)(%) VAR(P)(%2) E(P)(%) VAR(P)(%2)
1947-1976 2.73 548.0 2.80 538.9
1956-1975 2.29 576.0 2.80 441.1
1956-1971 1.15 517.0 1.61 218.9
whereas, for the subperiods 1966-1970, 1971--1975, and 1973-1975:
All Countries Low-Inflation Countries
E(P)(%) VAR(P)(%2) E(P)(%) VAR(P)(%2)
1966-1970 3.44 139.0 1.82 251.9
1971-1975 5.81 694.0 8.45 384.4
1973-1975 7.94 1033.7 11.72 287.8
The low-inflation countries were chosen on the basis of their respec­
tive nominal (uncorrected for exchange rate adjustment) domestic rate 
of inflation.
17. The variation across countries in average inflation rates
for 1947-1976, 1956-1975, and 1956-1971 are 0.717(%2), 1.527(%2),
2
and 2.133(% ), respectively for low-inflation countries. The varia­
tion within countries in the average rate of inflation for the same 
periods are 60.63(%2), 49.62(%2), and 24.63(%2), respectively. This 
is consistent with the results on dispersion presented by Salant 
(1977) for 21 OECD countries (see pp. 169-72).
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18. See Appendix ® for a discussion of the method of con­
struction of the world price Index and the validity of such an 
index.
19. This Is the case because the variation In the rate of 
inflation within countries was generally greater for" the longer ; 
periods. Hence, more "real" points of movement could be fitted.
For the shorter period, it was harder to fit a relationship with the 
relatively little variation in the dependent variable. See footnote
17.
CHAPTER VI
THE DYNAMICS OF INFLATION: PART II— IS THE
DOMESTIC RATE OF INFLATION EXOGENOUS?
In the last chapter, I tested the proposition that a strong 
relationship exists between the rate of inflation experienced by a 
small open economy and the rate of inflation external to it through 
a variant of the purchasing power parity principle. I showed that 
the variation in average rates of inflation across Latin America 
and the United States was not significantly different from the 
average variation of inflation within these countries. In effect, 
the domestic rate of inflation tended to converge to the average rate 
prevailing in the rest of the world— on average, over periods of 
sixteen and twenty years— once I accounted for the underlying 
variability in each country’s rate of inflation.
However, I also showed that the correspondence between 
internal (domestic) and external rates of inflation was weak as a 
short run proposition. That is, generally only a minority of the 
variation in domestic rates of inflation was explained by measures 
of external inflation, whether using the U.S. rate of consumer price 
inflation or using a nominal-income-weighted average of U.S. and 
other Latin American countries' rates of consumer price inflation.
In light of that evidence for the sample of Latin American 
countries, it seems valid to ask: to what extent is it appropriate
to treat the domestic rate of inflation as an exogenously determined
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variable and aa an exogenous determinant of the balance of payments?
In order to answer this question fully, the analytical framework must 
be explicit. The model should Include a discussion of the concepts 1 
of causality and exogeneity as well as the overall point of references 
from which to view the behavior to be explained. That is, are we . 
analyzing the relationships among economic aggregates of a single 
country per se or only as a small part of a larger world system? I 
now turn to these points.
A. The Framework
The basic issue I seek to analyze is the treatment of the rate 
of inflation experienced by a small country as an exogenous variable 
in a monetary model of the balance of payments. In developing the 
analysis, it is important to distinguish several characteristics of 
the model.
1. Causality
The discussion of causality, within an economic context, has 
its roots in the works of Koopmans (1950) and Simon (1953).^ These 
ideas have been generalized by Sims (1972b, 1975, 1977) to incorporate 
the definition propounded by Granger (1969). The concept of causality 
or causal ordering may imply something about the meaning of relation­
ships in a model; for example, are they (relationships) behavioral or 
structural? But the term causality itself merely reflects a property 
of the logical organization of a model in terms of the interaction of 
variables.
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2Specifically, consider a space of possible outcomes, S^ , 
which represents the set of n-tuples of economic events which are of 
interest; for example: the domestic rate of inflation; the world
rate of inflation; monetary conditions domestically and abroad; 
exchange rate regimes; the balance of payments; etc.- Suppose further 
that a number of restrictions can be placed upon set S^ . For 
simplicity, suppose restrictions R^ and yield meaningful economic 
outcomes. For example, restriction R^ might refer to events occurring 
under a fixed exchange rate regime. R^ could be expressed algebrai­
cally as the subset of S^ for which the rate of change of the domes­
tic currency price of a reserve currency is zero, or the subset
occurring when exchange rate adjustments result from autonomous
3
domestic government policy action. Restriction R£ could, for example, 
refer to economic events occurring for countries which have highly 
integrated markets for commodities with the rest of the world. R£ 
could be expressed simply as the assumption that purchasing power 
parity holds or that the parity principle holds for certain commodi­
ties, e.g., tradeables or factors or securities or monies.
The combination of these two restrictions results in a set of
events which is a subset of all relevant outcomes, S , i.e.,* n ’
R^CL S^ . Furthermore, consider two functions, and T^ , which 
map into spaces X and Y, respectively. Spaces X and Y represent 
the realizations of two characteristics of the economic system such 
as, for example, the domestic rate of inflation and the balance of 
payments. That is, ) = x and Ty(SQ) = Y.
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Given a model characterized by R ,^ R2 » and Y, a causal
4
ordering from X to Y is defined if and only if realizations Y are 
generated from only one subset of outcomes, say R^ , and.realizations * 
X can be generated from the subset of outcomes R^ or R^fN That
is, X is causally prior to Y if and only if
TyCR^ - Y
and
W  - Vh n V
For example, if the fixity of exchange rates (R^ ) is suf­
ficient to generate balance of payments positions (Y) and the 
integrated markets hypothesis (R2) does not affect such positions, 
nor does R2 affect the domestic rate of inflation (X) but variations 
in the domestic rate of inflation are not necessarily determined by 
the fixity of exchange rates, then the domestic rate of inflation 
causes the balance of payments. In other words, the conditions for
causality are restrictions on a set of dynamic relations which help
to identify that model.
Thus, continuing the example, in a small country monetary 
model of the balance of payments under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
where demanders and suppliers of money treat the price level (and 
rate of inflation) as given in determining the quantity of money, both 
demand and supply relationships should exhibit a causal ordering from 
inflation to money and therefore to the balance of payments via the
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hoarding function. Clearly, a crucial assumption is that both the 
residents of a small country and the monetary authorities behave as 
if the rate of inflation is out of their control or, more Btrictly, '■ 
that they do not try to affect the time path of the rate of inflation 
by adjusting their holdings of cash. I will return to this point 
later cn. Suffice it to say, any attempt by the monetary authorities 
to control inflation through, for example, changes in the growth rate 
of the money supply— whether successful or otherwise, would generally 
invalidate the causal ordering from inflation to money under the 
assumptions given. This point is implicit in the traditional 
assumption that no attempt at sterilizing monetary inflows is made 
by the central bank.
2. Exogeneity
The concept of exogeneity is a statistical one. The definition 
of causality used here implies that some variables in a model are 
exogenous. Suppose we have the following model:
a| y + a| x = u (i)
b^ y + b^ x = v (ii)
where denotes the convolution operation defined as
00
c*Z = E c(s) z(t-s)
s=-°°
To avoid the existence of unstable operators, c's, which in the 
presence of causality requirements implies explosive z's, assume
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c(s) = 0 for b < 0 and normalize by setting"* a^(0) = 13
The definition of causality given above results If b^(s) “ 0, 
for all s, with u(r) and v(s) mutually uncorrelated, for all r and 
s. x is exogenous in the first relationship (i), if x(r) and u(s) are 
are uncorrelated for all r and s. Exogeneity is implied by the 
definition of causality inasmuch as the second relationship (1 1) is 
between x and v only and no relationship exists between v and u.
Thus, x is determined outside relationship (i).
However, exogeneity does not necessarily imply causality.
That is, that x is exogenous in a realtlonship such as (i) does not 
imply that x causes y since relation (ii) need not exist— in which 
case we would have to pretend to have some a priori theory to tell 
us whether x or y was the dependent variable, or u and v could be 
correlated. In other words, causality and exogeneity are not 
equivalent. However, by placing additional restrictions on the set 
of outcomes, f\ I^ , equivalence can be obtained, e.g., if y(r) 
and v(s) are uncorrelated for all r and s.
Perhaps an example will clarify these ideas. First, I let
A
F equal the rate of change of official reserve assets holdings, i.e., 
a proportion of the official settlements balance of payments. Second, 
I let P be the domestic rate of inflation measured as the rate of 
change of the domestic consumer price index. Further, I postulate 
the following relationships:
a*F + b*P = u (iii)
c*P = v (iv)
where denotes convolution and u and v are (vectors of) random 
variables. By working with only one-sided distributed lags, no 
future values, and normalizing a and c to be equal to unity at time n 
t, I rearrange terms to obtain:
00 oo
F(t) - I a(8) F(t-s) - E b(r) P(t-r) + u (v)
s*=l r= 0
00
P(t) ® - Z c(s) P(t-s) + v (vi)
S=1
A A
For P to be exogenous in this model, I restrict P(r) and u(s) 
to be uncorrelated for all r and s. But if v and u are correlated,
A A
then P cannot be said to cause F; indeed, the problem of simultaneity 
exists. That is, without the restriction of zero correlation between
A A
u and v, the "unknown" determinants of P influence F in two ways—
through £ and through v— thereby confounding the issue of causality.
On the other hand, if I begin by restricting u and v to be a
6 Acovariance-stationary process, then P will be a causal-exogenous
A
determinant of F. In this case the unspecified factors which
A A A
influence P will influence F only through the determination of P, 
whereas no feedback exists from F to P.
The assumptions made to this point are all testable hypotheses. 
Hypothesis tests of this nature were applied in the context of dif­
ferent models, most notably by Sargent (1973, 1976a) and Sims (1977b). 
The direction of causality in the aggregate money-income relationship 
was first tested by Sims. His results suggest, for post-World War II
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U.S. data, money causes Income. Using data for the U.K., Williams 
et al. (1976) found evidence of bi-directional causality. This 
points out the model revision necessary when the basic assumptions 
are violated. That is, Williams et al. postulate essentially the 
same model as Sims. But if policy differences exist between these 
bodies of data then the structure of the model should also change.
This is the principle propounded by Lucas (1970, 1976) which Wallace
(1976) calls a non-invariance argument. The policy differences in the 
Sims vs. Williams et al. example might be the difference between the 
reserve currency status of the U.S. and the small-country status of 
the U.K.
In any case, the example I drew earlier would be susceptible 
to tests of hypotheses regarding correlations among u, v and #. 
Moreover, the effects of policy changes would also be discernible when 
comparing countries with different policy regimes, specifically 
different exchange rate regimes.
3. A Monetary Model
The perspective of the econometric model I propose to analyze 
is of a small open economy. I want to test the validity of the 
assumption that the rate of inflation experienced by such a nation is 
independent of the factors which determine the balance of payments. 
That is, from the point of view of the small country, is the rate of 
inflation an exogenous determinant of other variables? The analysis 
is confined to models of a single country although it is applied to 
sixteen Latin American countries. The model therefore treats
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each country as a single observable entity. The focus of the simple 
model described In Chapter m  has been on the balance of payments and 
treats the rate of inflation as giveniat every point in time. My 
focus is to explore the possibility of treating the rate of inflation 
of a small country as endogenous— as it would be ina world model.
The discussion of the existence of a causal ordering and the 
conditions for exogeneity indicates that a model by definition 
incorporates, explicitly or implicitly, statements regarding these 
characteristics. Hence, a test for causality (and exogeneity) is 
really a test for possible specification error in the proposed model.
In the inflation/balance-of-payments example described above, the 
specification that a small country has a rate of inflation which is 
determined in the rest of the world is questionable for the Latin 
American countries studied here. A weak link was found to exist 
between small country and rest-of-the-world inflation. Thus, calling 
into question the specification of the small-country rate of inflation 
as exogenously determined and therefore so also questioning the 
treatment of the domestic rate of inflation as an exogenous determinant 
of the balance of payments.
I would like to formulate a general model which begins with a
' 9specification of the demand for real cash balances as a stable 
function of real income and an opportunity cost measure of holding 
cash. A money supply is also specified as having a proportional 
relationship to high powered money. An equilibrium condition equates 
nominal money supply to demand. In addition, I postulate several 
relationships regarding the formation of inflationary expectations.
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The model can be expressed In general dynamic terms, from which a 
special case Is shown to conform to the simple model analyzed in an 
earlier chapter.
& + a* y + a^ i + aj£ P + a^
A
N = U 1
(26)
b* M* + b* h + b*(0(e + R) + (1- 0)DH) = U 2 (27)
PEW + c*
AW . A
P + c* e = U3
(28)
PEw + f!
/V
u4
(29)
gf p + g* I?E = u5
(30)
+ k* M8 = u 6 (31)
The variables are defined as follows:
M = nominal narrow money stock; d = demanded; s = supplied; 
y E real gross domestic product;
i E nominal interest rate;
P E price level;
h E money multiplier = M/H;
H E nominal high powered money = F + DH = eR + DH;
R E foreign reserves in reserve currency units = F/e;
DH = domestic component of high powered money;
e S exchange rate of domestic currency units for reserve
currency;
N E population;
0 E ratio of foreign reserves to high powered money-*—
171
where a circumflex indicates a percentage growth rate, the "W"
subscript indicates a rest-of-the-world aggregate, an "E" superscript
indicates an expectational variable, indicates convolution, and
the u .18 are random variates.
J
Equation (26) is a representation of the demand for real cash 
balances allowing for distributed lags in the relationship. Equation 
(27) represents the supply of money as a proportion of high powered 
money which has been decomposed into its foreign and domestic compon­
ents. The relationship between the expected domestic rate of inflation 
and its determinants is described in (28). Equation (29) postulates 
a rational inflation-expectations formation relationship for the rest 
of the world. Equation (30) postulates the adjustment of expected 
domestic inflation to actual domestic inflation. Finally, equation 
(31) represents equilibrium in the money market which is usually 
simplified^ with setting Ug = 0 , k^(0) = k2 (0) = 1 , and k^(r) = 
k2 (r) = 0 for r ^ 0: simply, = M8.
These equations can be greatly simplified to conform to what 
I have called the "simple" model. First, let the operators a^ (r) and 
b^  (r) be zero for r ^ 0 and all i, j. Next, let e = 0. Also, let
/* /s£ /vJJ a
P = P = P^ = P^ . Assuming a^ = b^ = 1, the model then reduces to
A^ A A A A
M = - a2 y - a3 i - a^ P - a5 N + u^
S” = - b2 h - b3 0F - b3(l - 0)DH + u2
With k^ = k2 = 1 and Ug = 0 , = MS, then:
0F = B0 + y + B2 i + B3 P + P4 h + 35(1" 0)DH + u
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A
where 3q » n at/b3 assuming N = n Is a constant; 3^ = /b^ i ^  "
a3/b3; 33 ■ a4 ^ 3 » &4 “ “b2^b3; 5^ " “1; and u “ u^2 “ ul ^ b3*
Ordinary least =squares cannot be performed on this equation
A A A
If y or 1 or P are correlated with u3 (even assuming they are
uncorrelated with u^ ) because such a correlation would yield the 
problem of simultaneity. In economic terms, a correlation between,
A
for example, P and i8 a correlation between unexplained money 
supply growth and inflation. Barro (1977) provides evidence for the 
U.S. that a negative correlation holds for unanticipated money 
growth and the price level and hence the rate of inflation. That 
is, unanticipated money growth is associated with a lower price level, 
yielding a lower rate of inflation than would exist if monetary growth 
were fully anticipated. Thus, OLS is likely to be an inappropriate
method of estimation, unless other assumptions can be employed. More
importantly for my concern, the existence of a statistically signi­
ficant correlation between the rate of inflation and a random variable,
e.g., unanticipated money growth, would invalidate the treatment of
12the rate of inflation as an exogenous variable.
This criticism of the simple model is equally valid in 
open- and closed-economy models because the main ingredient of this 
criticism is the relationship between unanticipated (and anti­
cipated) money growth and inflation whatever the source. In the 
framework of a model for a small open economy, the simple model 
postulates immediate equalization of domestic inflation to rest-of- 
the-world inflation. The world rate is related to unanticipated and 
anticipated world money growth, incorporated in equation (29) above
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as: = u^ . Clearly, both components of world money
growth will influence the distribution of reserves throughout the 
world. The official reserve position of a non-reserve currency 
country must therefore be affected in that way. Hence, the factors 
which affect the balance of payments of a small open economy, e.g., 
unanticipated and anticipated world money growth, will also affect 
the rate of inflation experienced by that country. Therefore, on 
these grounds, the domestic rate of inflation should not be treated 
as an exogenous variable even if we believe the domestic rate of 
inflation is equivalent to the rate of inflation prevailing in the 
rest of the world.
B. Empirical Analysis
I am not concerned with estimating the model presented in the 
previous section. Rather, I wish only to demonstrate the use of a 
recently developed statistical technique in testing the hypothesis 
that the rate of inflation is an exogenous determinant of the balance 
of payments of a small open economy. In addition, I also present 
tests, using the same technique, which are directed at other hypo­
theses.
1. The Technique
The technique applied here to test for exogeneity is based on
the incremental prediction criterion suggested by Granger and Newbold
(1977) as a useful statistical test for causality. As Granger defines 
13causality, we can say a series X causes another series Y if we can
better predict current Y by using the information contained in past Y
and past X than by only using past Y to predict current Y. This,
Granger suggests, can be Judged by the relative efficiency of
14prediction errors conditional upon the information sets. That is,
suppose we perform two regressions of the following form:
\  ■ { 0 + S 1 ' + £  \-i + “t <32)
and
Y - 6n + 6- t + Zn p Y. . + • Zm y, X + v (33)t 0 1 i=i i t“ j=1 j t-j t
The first equation describes how past Y is used to predict
current Y with the help of a linear trend. Whereas the second
regression equation demonstrates the prediction of current Y from the
information sets of past Y and past X. If the explained sum of
squares from regression (33) is relatively greater than the explained
sum of squares from regression (32), then X is said to cause Y. This
is a simple F-test of the hypothesis that all the y. coefficients
15are not significantly different from zero, as a group.
Granger's definition of causality is not universally accepted 
as valid. Zellner (1978) believes the definition is overly restric­
tive in two general respects. The two conditions set out in Granger 
and Newbold (1977)— that only stochastic processes can be studied in 
discussions of causality and that causality Implies temporal ordering- 
are restrictions which Zellner suggests are not incorporated in 
definitions of causality used in the philosophical, statistical and
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earlier econometric literatures. In addition, Zellner is critical 
of the statistical requirements of the test. For example, Granger's 
suggested criterion for testing causality Is based on the existence 
of an unbiased least squares predictor from finite sets of data. Both 
Granger and Zellner point out that such predictors may not exist in 
some cases. The critical discussion of Zellner lacks only one 
important ingredient: an alternative test procedure for causality.
Moreover, Pierce and Haugh (1977) and Schwert (1978) point out that 
the Granger technique is still very useful as a statistical tool in 
shedding light on empirical associations and specifically on the 
question of exogeneity.
Another critical feature of the Granger test is that the 
results depend on the existence of disturbance terms which are free 
of serial correlation. This can easily be tested in large samples 
by using the "h" statistic developed by Durbin (1970) which has a 
"normal" asymtotic distribution. An alternative method, to insure 
serially uncorrelated disturbance terms, would be to reduce series Y 
and X in equation (33) to white noise: identically and independently
distributed serially uncorrelated normal variates with zero means and 
unit variances.
Pierce and Haugh (1977) demonstrate that such prewhitened 
series will yield the same causality results as for the measured 
variables'*'*’— if in fact causality exists between the variables. The 
prewhitened series can be obtained as the residuals from the 
estimation of autoregressive-integrated moving average processes 
(ARIMA), using Box-Jenkins (1976) techniques, for the two series
separately. The residual series can then he analyzed using the 
Granger technique as Pierce (1977) has done. The whitened series can 
also be cross-correlated, at different lags, and analyzed using the 
"S" statistic developed;by Haugh (1976) to check for interdependence 
between the two series.
Schwert (1978), in his Appendix B, has shown that the Pierce
method— using the Granger technique to analyze two whitened series—
and the Haugh method differ in the power of the tests: the regression
method is more powerful for tests on individual coefficients, whereas
the cross-correlation method is more powerful for tests on groups of
coefficients. In effect, the regression F-test is more likely to
reject the hypothesis that no relationship exists than Haugh's test.
However, the cross-correlation procedure has low (vis-a-vis other
17procedures) power against specific alternative hypotheses, i.e., 
when the alternative hypothesis has some theoretical content such as 
the direction of causality is from X to Y rather than simply having 
the alternative hypothesis that causality exists.
I have chosen to stick with the Granger technique primarily 
because of Its ease of application. In addition, since I have very 
specific economically meaningful alternative hypotheses, the Granger 
technique retains its usefulness. Moreover, the tests I will under­
take involve the first difference of natural-log-transformed data
18which, in part, is a minor attempt at whitening the series. With 
these caveats in mind, I will proceed to the empirical analyses.
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2. Is the Domestic Rate of Inflation 
Exogenous?
Recalling the earlier discussion, a model such as the following 
will yield an exogenous rate of Inflation and show causality from the 
domestic rate of Inflation to the balance of payments:
a*F + b*P = u (34)
c*P “ v (35)
if u(r) and v(s) are mutually uncorrelated (for all r and s) random
A A
variates, where F is the rate of growth of foreign reserves, and P 
is the domestic rate of inflation.
Thus, by performing the two corresponding regressions suggested 
by the Granger technique:
V'o*'!1* £ 61 Vl + “t (36)
K ■ 5o+ 6 + £ h K-i * K-i+ \ <37>
I can test the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between 
F and P against the alternative that P causes F. That is, if I reject 
the hypothesis that the Yj's are, as a group, not different from zero,
A A
then the test results imply causality from P to F and, from model
A
(34) and (35), P is said to he exogenous.
I have applied the Granger test for this set of hypotheses in 
several ways. First, I used two measures for the official settlements
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balance of payments. Both measures have been used In previous tests 
of the monetary approach to the balance of payments. The first
A
measure Is 6 .^ F , where 0^  “ F./H Is the ratio of foreign'reserves t t t t t
A
to high powered money and F is the logarithmic first difference of 
foreign reserves. The second measure of the balance of payments is
A
simply F .
Secondly, I also tested for the existence of reverse causality,
i.e., from the balance of payments to the rate of inflation. The 
existence of such causality would not only invalidate the treatment of 
the domestic rate of inflation as an exogenous variable, it would also 
suggest that price arbitrage was not operating effectively for the 
particular country and period of analysis. In the reverse causation 
tests, I also used both measures of the balance of payments described 
above.
Third, I assumed that the lag structures, denoted by n and m, 
cf the two series had a finite length of at least three years. I used 
a three year lag structure because I expect the monetary adjustments 
implicit in the model to be made within the course of a cycle. For my 
purposes, I treated the events of each phase of the cycle as being 
broadly similar in the movements of the underlying economic data. Thus, 
rational adjustments might well be expected to be completed within each 
phase of a cycle. I.made the empirical assumption that such phases were, on 
averagej three years in length. I also allowed the lag on the variable 
tested for exogeneity'to be six years. Unfortunately, because of data
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limitations, using very long lags to make an empirical statement 
regarding lag structure was not possible.
The Granger causality test results for the null hypothesis 
that the domestic rate of inflation (P) does not cause the balance of
✓V
payments versus the alternative that P causes the balance of payments 
are reported in Table 29.A for the F measure and in Table 29.B 
for the F measure of the balance of payments. Test results for the 
reverse direction of causation are reported in Tables 29.C and 29.D.
The results of the causality tests, presented in Tables 29.A 
through 29.D, may be summarized as follows:
a) A significant uni-directional causal influence from the 
domestic rate of inflation to the respective balance of payments 
exists for Argentina, Guatemala and Paraguay at the 5% level of 
significance; Nicaragua also exhibits a similar causal relationship 
but only at the 1 0% level of significance.
b) A significant uni-directional causal influence from the 
balance of payments to the respective domestic rate of inflation 
exists for Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela at the 5% level of signifi­
cance. Colombia also exhibits a similar causal relationship, but only 
at the 1 0% level of significance.
c) A significant bi-directional causal relationship between 
the domestic rate of inflation and the respective balance of payments 
exists for Bolivia, Chile and Mexico at the 5% or 10% levels of 
significance.
d) Generally, the incremental explanation for current Y due to 
past X is offset after three years for both directions of causation.
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TABLE 29.A
TEST OF CAUSALITY FROM INFLATION TO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
n m
Y “ 6 + 6.t + I 8 . Y. . + .Z. y. X. t o 1 ±=1 1 t-1 3=1 3
Annual data t ■ 1953,...,1976
H : y. m 0, j * 1, ..., ms X does not cause Y.
o j
Y *» “ the balance of payments scaled by high-powered
money.
Xfc ■ £ ** the domestic rate of inflation.
n=3=maximum lag on dependent variable.
Country
m=6
F(6,13)
m=3
F(3,16)
Argentina 1.45 6.69**
Bolivia 0.38 0.46
Brazil 1.77 1.29
Chile 0.54 1.23
Colombia 0.18 0.30
Costa Rica 0.91 0.95
Ecuador 0.27 0.65
El Salvador 0.43 0.63
Guatemala 2.44+ 3.63*
Honduras 0 . 8 8 1. 8 8
Mexico 2.69+ 3.25+
Nicaragua 0.93 1.56
Paraguay 6.35** 1.85
Peru 0.74 1.39
Uruguay 0.39 0.40
Venezuela 0.42 0.07
t Reject null hypothesis at a = 0.10;
* " " " "a - 0.05;
** " " " " a - 0 .0 1 .
11 One less residual degree of freedom.
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TABLE 29.B
TEST OF CAUSALITY FROM INFLATION TO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Ffc)
n m
H : o
8o+ V  + +. Bi V i + ^  i . i  h -51=1
Annual data t = 1953,...,1976.
Yj = 0, j = 1,..., m: X does not cause Y.
Y = F = the rate of growth of foreign reserves. 
Xf = P = the domestic rate of inflation. 
n=3=maxium lag on dependent variable
m=6 m=3
Country F(6,13) F(3,16)
Argentina 1.74 3.75*
Bolivia 1.39 2.63+
Brazil 0.40 0.29
Chile 2.94+ 6.74**
Colombia 0.26 0 .10
Costa Rica 0.95 0.98
Ecuador 0 . 1 1 0.23
El Salvador 0.56 0 . 8 8
Guatemala 1.91 2.34
Honduras
Mexico
0.95 1.60
1.27 1. 48
Nicaragua 1.58 2.81+
Paraguay 0 . 6 8 0.52
Peru ^ 0.56 1.27
Uruguay 0.53 0.42
Venezuela 0.91 0.28
t Reject null hypothesis at a = 0.10.
* " " " " a = 0.05.
** " " " " a = 0 .0 1 .
1 One less residual degree of freedom.
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TABLE 29.C
TEST OF CAUSALITY FROM BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (0.F.) TO INFLATION 
n m
H : o
Y = 6 + S.t + E Y . + I y X_ .t o 1 . . i t- 1 . , j t-1i=»l j=l J J
Annual data t ** 1953,...,1976.
the domestic rate of inflation.
money.
n = 3 = maximum lag on dependent variable.
“ Of i
Y__ = P mt t
Xt
= 0^ F,
m= 6 m=3
Country F(6,13) F(3,16)
Argentina 0.28 0.58
Bolivia 1 . 1 0 1.31
Brazil 0.24 0.37
Chile 0.87 1.13
Colombia 2.39t 0 . 8 6
Costa Rica 1.06 1 .12
Ecuador 10.49** 12.82**
El Salvador 0.09 0.38
Guatemala 0.40 0.85
Honduras
Mexico
1.14 1.01
2.07 1.60
Nicaragua 0.70 1.62
Paraguay 0.33 0. 1 2
Peru ^ 0.64 0.56
Uruguay 2.34+ 3.41*
Venezuela 2.95* 5.81**
+ Reject null hypothesis at a = 0.10;
* " " " " a =* 0.05;
** " " " " a » 0 .0 1 .
1. One less residual degree of freedom.
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TABLE 29.D
TEST OF CAUSALITY FROM BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (Ffc) TO INFLATION
n m
Y - 6 + 6 t + I g Y + I y X
C ° 1 1 - 1 1 t-i j- 1 j t_J
Annual data t - 1953,...,1976.
H# : Yj " 0, j n 1,..., m: X does not cause Y.
Y. = P. = the domestic rate of Inflation, t t
Xt - Ft = the rate of growth of foreign reserves, 
n = 3 = maximum lag on dependent variable
Country
m=6
F(6,13)
m=3
F(3,16)
Argentina 0.24 0.49
Bolivia 3.38* 3.54*
Brazil 0.58 1 . 1 2
Chile 1.32 2.54f
Colombia 2.40i 1.30
Costa Rica 1.34 1.41
Ecuador 8.57** 8 .2 0**
El Salvador 0.16 0.16
Guatemala 0.48 0.48
Honduras 0.91 1.18
Mexico-^ - 4.14* 1.69
Nicaragua 0.64 1.40
Paraguay 0.11 0.17
Peru ^ 0.96 1.09
Uruguay 4.36* 5.81**
Venezuela 2.53t 3.06t
t Reject null hypothesis at a = 0.10.
* " " " a = 0.05.
** " " " " a = 0.01.
1. One less residual degree of freedom.
Paraguay is the only exception for which significant causation, from 
inflation to the balance of payments, appears over six years but not 
over three years. Mexico is the only exception for which significant 
causation, from the balance of payments to inflation, appears over 
six years but not. over three years.
If we put our faith in the instantaneous price arbitrage 
version of the monetary approach to the balance of payments, the
results of Tables 29.A through 29.D are striking pieces of counter­
evidence. Indeed, that version of the monetary approach suggests 
that price levels and rates of inflation equalize so rapidly that 
non-reserve currency country residents must passively adjust their 
nominal stocks of money and thereby the official stock of international
reserves to world conditions, i.e., the domestic rate of inflation
causes the balance of payments.
The evidence from these tests is at variance with the simple 
model's prediction in several respects. First, only three countries 
exhibit clear indications of causality in the direction predicted. 
Second, the lag structure reflected in the significance of the 
F-statistics varies across the three countries— the model predicts 
quick and continued influence. Third, the simple model is best suited 
for countries operating under a fixed exchange rate regime— yet, of 
the three countries which have an exogenous rate of inflation, only 
Guatemala maintained an unchanged fixed exchange rate. Finally, 
evidence that a mechanism similar to specie-flow, wherein reserves 
move first when international monetary disequilibrium occurs and then
price levels adjust, exists in seven cases— including those countries 
where bi-directional causality exists.
An interesting feature of these test results is the cross­
country comparisons they afford. Indeed, the policy regimes of these 
countries differ in several respects, as discussed in earlier ' 
chapters. For clarity let’s compare the three cases for which uni­
directional causality from inflation to the balance of payments 
exists: Argentina, Guatemala, and Paraguay. As mentioned earlier,
only Guatemala had not changed its exchange rate during the period. 
Paraguay had devalued frequently prior to 1960, but from that time to 
1976 it maintained a fixed rate of 126 guaranies per U.S. dollar.
Argentina, at the other extreme, has devalued often and has even
19changed its currency unit. Whereas the real per capita income 
growth rates of these three countries are not statistically signifi­
cantly different, the nominal monetary and price level growth rates 
differ significantly: Guatemala had lower and less variable inflation
and monetary expansion than did Paraguay, which had lower and less 
variable inflation and monetary expansion than did Argentina, over the 
same time period (see Chapter II). Guatemala had a fast speed of 
money demand adjustment— indicative of an open economy— whereas 
Paraguay had a moderate speed and Argentina’s was very slow (see
Chapter IV). For each of these countries, the simple monetary model
_2
performed poorly— low R 's, insignificant coefficients, many with the 
incorrect sign (see Chapter III).
The lack of other similar characteristics among countries 
which exhibit common causality patterns Is indicative of a need to
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specify a balance of payments model for theBe countries as distinct
models. The one common underlying result for all 16 countries is the
lack of rapid convergence of the domestic rate to an external rate
(see Chapter V). Another disappointing aspect of the test results is
the lack of any statistically significant relationship, in either
direction, between the domestic rate of inflation and the balance of
payments measures for Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and
Peru. Again, few similarities among these five countries exist that
20
would permit me to draw a conclusion from this particular result —  
or lack thereof.
2. Direct Tests of the Influence of the United States 
on Inflation in Latin American Countries
I attempted to test, more directly than by the simple purchasing 
power regressions of Chapter V, the hypothesis that the rates of 
inflation experienced by Latin American countries were not influenced 
by the U.S. I applied the Granger technique to test hypotheses 
regarding U.S. influence in two ways. First, I tested the null hypo­
thesis that the U.S. rate of inflation did not cause the inflation rate 
in each Latin American country. This was, in effect, an extension of 
the naive tests of the purchasing power parity principle. It may be 
recalled that those test results indicated a weak relationship existed 
between U.S. and Latin American rates of inflation on a year-to-year 
basis, and that those tests did not allow for lags in the adjustment 
of small-country to rest-of-the-world inflation. The test of causality 
conducted here allows, in effect, for lags in adjustment for the 
purchasing power relationship.
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I performed the test using the following regressions:
t (38)
and
(39)
where P' is the rate of Inflation of the small country adjusted for 
exchange rate changes, and Pus is the U.S. rate of inflation. I
have listed the results of this test in Table 30.
Significant causality, from U.S. inflation to the rate 
prevailing in the non-reserve currency country exists in only three 
cases, at the 5% level of significance: Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico. Paraguay and Peru have significant F-statistics at the 10% 
level. That the rates of inflation of only a handful of countries 
have been significantly influenced by the U.S. rate of inflation is 
consistent with the earlier naive purchasing power parity results 
(see Chapter V). However, the lack of evidence of causal influence 
emanating from the U.S., demonstrated in Table 30, suggests that 
price level arbitrage between Latin America and the United States was 
not great in the variety of cases which this sample represents. It 
is interesting to note that the three countries for which the 
evidence is most clear, in favor of the PPP relationship with lagged 
adjustment, are three most developed countries in the sample.
I also tested the hypothesis that domestic credit expansion 
on the part of the U.S. monetary authorities had no direct influence 
on the rates of inflation of Latin American countries. Inasmuch as
TABLE 30
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TEST OF CAUSALITY FROM U.S. INFLATION AND U.S. DOMESTIC 
CREDIT EXPANSION TO SMALL COUNTRY INFLATION
m m
Tt o
«o8 + 6. + E i’-B 
1 i- 1 ‘x Yt-i + ^  yj xt-j
V  U - 0 J ■ i 1, ..., m; X does not cause Y
Annual Data t *• 1953..... 1976
Country
Yt
Xt
F(3,16)
1
- p;
- p 2 ust
F(2,18)
Yt
Xt
F(3,16)
- n 1
3- DH „ ust
F(2,18)
Argentina 6.03** 6.17** 2.75 2.28+
Bolivia 0.71 0.05 0 . 6 8 0.77
Brazil 11.53** 0.18 2.91+ 1 . 6 8
Chile 0.60 1.56 6.65** 3.39+
Colombia 1.18 1 .11 1 . 6 8 0.31
Costa Rica 0.64 0.40 0.51 0 . 8 6
Ecuador 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.17
El Salvador 0.99 1.88 2.15 1.50
Guatemala 0.69 1.85 6.35** 4.34**
Honduras 0 . 6 8 0.59 2.17 1.23
Mexico 4.11* 1.50 9.76** 7.47**
Nicaragua 1.10 1.34 6.03** 5.39*
Paraguay 2 .68+ 0.39 2.95+ 2.37
Peru 1.83 3.14+ 0.25 0.51
Uruguay 1.37 0.80 0.29 0 .10
Venezuela 1.63 1.78 0.19 0.41
t Reject null hypothesis at a *■ 0.10;
* Reject null hypothesis at a =* 0.05;
** Reject null hypothesis at u “ 0.01.
*The domestic rate of inflation adjusted for exchange rate 
changes, except El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
2
The U.S. rate of inflation.
3
The rate of growth of the domestic component of the U.S. 
high-powered money stock.
the U.S. dollar was the reserve currency to which these small coun­
tries tied their currency during the period of analysis, U.S. 
domestic credit expansion represented growth in the world money 
supply. World money growth could affect the rate of inflation 
experienced by a small country in either or both of two ways. First, 
if expectations are rational— knowing the model used to generate 
inflation, i.e., knowing that the long-run rate of inflation a small 
country will experience converges to the world rate of inflation and 
knowing that the latter rate is determined by world money growth, 
then the expected rate of small country inflation will be determined 
by the world rate of money growth, with exchange rates fixed. If 
the actual rate of inflation is equal to the expected rate, then the 
influence of world money growth on small-country inflation is 
complete. Second, the growth of the world money stock will be 
distributed according to the shares of each country in the world 
stock. Thus, a small country will receive a monetary impulse as the 
U.S. monetary authorities expand domestic credit. The new monetary 
impulse will affect the small-country price level, and its rate of 
inflation if the impulses are continued. In this direct way, the 
rate of inflation of a small country can be influenced by the U.S.
I have listed the results of causality tests of the hypothesis 
that U.S. domestic credit expansion did not cause the non-reserve 
currency countries' rates of inflation in Table 30. A significant 
causal relationship exists for Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Nicaragua 
at the 5% level of significance. Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay have 
significant F-statistics at the 10% level.
The results of Tables 29.A-D and Table 30 are to some degree 
consistent. First, Argentina and Paraguay show evidence of influ­
ences which suggest a price level arbitrage cum rational expectations 
adjustment. That is, for these two countries, the domestic rate of 
inflation was shown to be exogenous and influenced by the U.S. rates 
of Inflation and domestic credit expansion. Second, Ecuador, Uruguay 
and Venezuela show no evidence of exogenous rates of inflation vis- 
a-vis their balance of payments and the results reported in Table 30 
suggest that neither U.S. inflation nor U.S. domestic credit 
expansion significantly influenced the rates of inflation of those 
three countries. It should be recalled, however, that both Uruguay 
and Venezuela frequently contracted their domestic credit (see Chap­
ter II). Finally, the significant bi-directional causality between 
the rate of inflation and the balance of payments for Mexico is 
consistent with significant influences of U.S. inflation and domestic 
credit expansion on Mexican inflation. As indicated in Tables 29.A 
and 29.B, the Mexican rate of inflation caused its balance of payments 
— evidence of arbitrage operating. From Table 30, we note that the 
U.S. rate of inflation was a causative factor of the Mexican rate—  
consistent with the price arbitrage mechanism of the transmission 
on inflation. As indicated in Tables 29.C and 29.D, the Mexican 
balance of payments caused the rate of inflation there— evidence of 
significant specie-flow. From Table 30, we also note that the U.S. 
rate of domestic credit expansion was a causative factor of the rate 
of Inflation in Mexico— consistent with the specie-flow mechanism 
of inflation transmission.
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3. Tests of the Influence of Domestic Monetary Policy 
on Inflation In Latin American Countries
The final batteryof causality tests which I conducted were 
aimed at detecting the direction of influence between the rate of 
inflation and the rates of growth of various monetary aggregates for 
each country. The effective operation of price level arbitrage will 
show up in the existence of uni-directional causality from the 
domestic rate of Inflation to rates of domestic monetary growth.
This influence may present itself in two ways. First, if inflationary 
expectations are formed rationally, then the expected rate of 
inflation of a small country will be related to rest-of-the-world 
monetary growth. As expectations are translated into actual 
inflation, monetary aggregates of the small country will passively 
adjust. If arbitrage is operating quickly, then the translation of 
expected to actual will be likewise quick and inflation will cause 
money growth. Second, even without an assumption of rational expec-. 
tations, if price levels are equated rapidly,.then monetary aggregates 
will not affect domestic inflation; rather, monetary aggregates will 
adjust in response to the equilization of rates of inflation.
If, on the other hand, price level arbitrage is not rapid, 
then domestic monetary growth will affect the domestic rate of infla­
tion. That is, if the domestic rate of inflation is not equated to 
the rate prevailing in the rest of the world then by increasing the 
growth in the money supply upward pressure on domestic inflation will 
appear. Until the difference between domestic inflation and rest-of-
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the-world Inflation is eliminated, domestic monetary growth will 
appear to influence the domestic rate of inflation.
1 conducted causality tests, using the Granger technique, to 
test the above hypotheses using three definitions of monetary growth. 
The first measure I used was the rate of change of the nominal narrow
A
money stock, i.e., Ml. The second measure I used was the rate of
A
change of the nominal high powered money stock (H). The third 
measure I used was the rate of domestic credit expansion, i.e., the 
rate of change of the domestic component of high powered money (DH). 
The test results are listed in Tables 31 through 33 for the three 
measures of monetary growth.
A A
The results for Ml and H are nearly equivalent. The results 
for domestic credit expansion are generally inconclusive, which 
might have more to do with the residual nature of the definition of 
DH— high powered money minus foreign reserves— than a lack of
A
causation in either direction. Measurement error in DH when it is 
used as the independent variable will tend to bias downward the 
regression coefficients thereby making DH appear not to be exogenous 
— in the tests using regressions of the rate of inflation on past 
values of itself and domestic credit expansion. When DH is used as 
the dependent variable and its lagged values as predetermined 
variables and DH is measured with error, the standard errors of the 
coefficients are biased upward as well as the coefficient estimates 
being biased downward— both effects tend to reduce the significance 
of the F-statistics used to test for causality. I will therefore 
only describe the results for the tests using Ml and H.
TABLE 31
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN INFLATION AND MONETARY GROWTH
in m
Y f " 6o +  61 * +  1 Y «- 4 +  1 * 4 ‘ 4t o 1 1 t-i Am  ^ 'j - t-j
V  Yj - ° J - 1, m:
j-1
X does not cause Y
Annual Data t - 1953, . 1 9 7 6
Country
Yt
Xt
F(3,16)
A 1
- Ml
t
- V
F(2,18)
Yt
Xt
F(3,16)
5 2 
" Pt
- Mlt 1
F(2,18)
Argentina 0.81 1.29 1.63 2.47
Bolivia 5.91** 4.61* 5.51** 8.16**
Brazil 3. lOt 4.60* 3.42* 5.13*
Chile 0.95 1.78 5.71** 10.33**
Colombia 2 . 1 0 0.77 1 . 6 6 2.42
Costa Rica 1.98 0.26 1.87 1.49
Ecuador 1.51 0.36 3.02t 4.53*
El Salvador 3.78* 2.43 3.86* 3.79*
Guateraale 3.21t 4.26* 0.81 2.09
Honduras 0.42 0.56 3.21t 5.25*
Mexico 1.75 1.43 3.71* 1.86
Nicaragua 0 . 8 8 1.48 4.39* 6.84**
Paraguay 1.63 3.74* 0.27 0.57
Peru 1.76 1.50 0 ,12 0.23
Uruguay 1.70 7.02** 2.47t 5.14*
Venezuela 1.64 1.60 5.18* 5.84*
t Reject null hypothesis at a * 0.10;
* Reject null hypothesis at a » 0.05;
** Reject null hypothesis at a ■» 0.01.
^Growth rate of nominal narrow money stock.
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2
Growth rate of domestic price level.
TABLE .32
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN INFLATION AND 
HIGH POWERED MONEY GROWTH
m m
Y.  “ 6 + 6, t + E £5. Yfc . + : E K  *t o 1 lml i t-i t-j
Ho! Yj - 0 j - 1, , m: X does not cause Y 
Annual Data t ” 1953. .... 1976
Country
Yt
Xt
F(3,16)
-«t2
■ ft2
F(2,18)
Yt
Xt
F(3,16)
-V
F(2,18)
Argentina 1.61 1.97 2.04 0.72
Bolivia 2.75t 2.27 4.77 6.96**
Brazil 1.79 2.70t 6.96** 9.76**
Chile 1 . 0 0 3.41+ 14.42** 22.72**
Colombia 0.36 0.29 0.98 0.59
Costa Rica 2.60t 1 .68 1.60 2.77+
Ecuador 0.76 0.79 3.83* 6.09**
El Salvador 4.26* 3.05 1.56 0.69
Guatemala 5.30** 5.10* 1.80 2.53
Honduras 0.24 0.22 3.00 3.52+
Mexi co 1.45 0.35 5.89** 8.36**
Nicaragua 0.66 0.92 2.44 4.29*
Paraguay 2.41 3.77* 0.15 0.05
Peru 3.12f 2.29 0 .12 0.03
Uruguay 1.25 7.30** 3.52* 7.51**
Venezuela 0.03 0 . 1 0 6.62** 6.97**
t Reject null hypothesis at o «* 0.10;
* Reject null hypothesis at a *« 0,05;
** Reject null hypothesis at a ■ 0,01.
Growth rate of high powered money.
2
Growth rate of domestic price level.
TABLE .33
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN INFLATION AND 
DOMESTIC CREDIT EXPANSION
m m
Tt
m 6 + 6.  £ + o 1 1 ei Yt-i+ E V xt.ji-1 1 c 1 j-1 J c J
V - 0 j - 1 , . m:  X does not cause Y
Annual Data t -  1953, . . . »  1976
Country
Yt -
Xt "
F(3,16)
V
n2
F(2,18)
Yt
Xt
F(3,16)
■V
* 1 
“ DHtA
F(2,18)
Argentina 0 . 1 0 0.06 2.78+ 3.15+
Bolivia 3.05+ 0.64 0.49 0.72
Brazil 0.24 0.31 0.65 1.17
Chile 0.64 0 . 6 6 4.13* 6.91**
Colombia 0.34 0.09 1.92 0.06
Costa Rica 0.71 0.83 0.73 0.67
Ecuador 0.78 1.72 2 . 2 1 1.86
El Salvador 0 . 6 8 0.40 1.98 0.39
Guatemala 0.67 0.52 0.16 0.30
Honduras 4.13* 1.35 4.64* 5.23*
Mexico 2.82+ 1.77 0.80 0.63
Nicaragua 1.75 1.33 0.55 0.52
Paraguay 7.04** 2.92 0.03 0.28
Peru 1.03 0.24 1.24 1.85
Uruguay 0.09 0.17 0.29 0.40
Venezuela 0.18 0.19 0.82 0.14
+ Reject null hypothesii3 at a = 0 .1 0 ;
* Reject null hypothesis at a “ 0,05;
** Reject null hypothesis at a “ 0.01.
^Growth rate o£ domestic component of high powered money.
Growth rate of domestic price level.
196
A significant unl-directional causal relationship from the 
domestic rate of inflation to both measures of domestic monetary 
growth exists for Guatemala and Paraguay. In addition, El Salvador
A
exhibits a similar pattern for H only while exhibiting a bi- "
A
directional relationship for Ml. The results for Guatemala and
Paraguay are consistent with the test results from the analysis of
the relationship between the domestic rate of inflation and the
balance of payments (Tables 29.A-D). Those earlier results indicated
that a significant uni-directional causal relationship from inflation 
to the balance of payments— indicative of price level arbitrage and 
implying an exogenous inflation rate vis-a-vis the balance of 
payments— exists for Guatemala and Paraguay. The results presented 
in Tables 31 and 32 confirm that conclusion. These latter results 
suggest that the domestic rates of inflation of these two countries 
are exogenous vis-a-vis their respective domestic monetary growth 
rates.
A significant uni-directional causal Influence from both 
measures of monetary growth to the domestic rate of inflation exists 
for Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela. This 
result suggests that these countries were able to operate a monetary 
policy which was not completely dependent upon the rest of the world. 
Interestingly enough, of these six countries, only Chile has had a 
serious inflation problem— over 30% per annum rate of inflation on 
average. Moreover, with the exception of Chile, these countries have 
either not changed their exchange rate during the period of analysis—
197
Honduras and Mexico— or have adjusted their exchange rate infrequently 
22and at moderate rates.
The results for Ecuador and Venezuela from Tabled 31 and 32
conform to the results of the tests concerning the balance of
payments and Inflation rates of these countries, Tables 29.A-D. In
the earlier test, Ecuador and Venezuela were shown to have significant
specie-flow. Those results also showed that the domestic rates of
inflation for those two countries could not he treated as an exogenous
determinant of the balance of payments. Thus, the results for
Ecuador and Venezuela, from Tables 31 and 32, confirm the result that
their respective domestic rates of inflation are endogenous with
23respect to monetary policy.
The results for Chile and Mexico from Tables 31 and 32 are 
partly consistent with earlier tests. Previous tests indicated that 
there exists bi-directional causality between the balances of 
payments and the respective rates of inflation for these two countries 
(Tables 29.A-d), and the growth in U.S. domestic credit was a 
significant determinant of the rate of inflation, whereas the U.S. 
rate of inflation was important only in the case of Mexico— and only 
for the three year lag structure. While these earlier tests results 
suggest that Chile and Mexico could not operate a completely 
independent monetary policy, when coupled with the direct tests of 
the influence of domestic monetary policy, the combined results 
suggest that some policy freedom was exercized and therefore the 
domestic rate of inflation cannot be considered a purely exogenous 
variable.
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Significant bi-directional causality between the domestic 
narrow money growth rate and the respective domestic rate of inflation 
exists for Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador and Uruguay. However, when 
using the growth in high powered money to reflect monetary policy, 
only Uruguay exhibits bi-directional causality at the 5% level of 
significance. Bolivia and Brqzil show a much stronger relationship 
from H growth to domestic inflation than the other way around.
The results for Bolivia and Uruguay from Tables 31 and 32
would be consistent with the existence of bi-directional causality
between the domestic rate of inflation and the balance of payments
(for Bolivia, see Tables 29.A-D) or a specie-flow mechanism
operating (for Uruguay, see Tables 29.A-D), if the central banks of
24those countries were conducting a central bank reaction policy.
That is, a central bank may act to validate or negate an anticipated 
rise in the price level by creating or destroying domestic credit, 
respectively. So, for example, in the face of a rise in the world 
rate of inflation (with sluggish arbitrage), the central bank might 
increase its rate of growth of domestic credit and the domestic rate 
of inflation will rise. If the rate of domestic monetary growth is 
still lower than world money growth, reserves will flow into the small 
country. In this way, monetary policy would appear to affect the 
rate of inflation, and foreign reserve changes and the domestic rate 
of inflation would appear to simultaneously affect each other until 
an equilibrium in the movement of reserves prevailed.
C. Conclusions
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The main issue I sought to resolve by the empirical tests, 
utilized in this1chapter was the treatment of the rate of inflation 
experienced by a small open economy as an exogenous determinant of the 
respective balance of payments. For the sample of Latin American 
countries for the period from 1953 to 1976, the results from applying 
the Granger technique for causality tests indicate that the rates of 
inflation for Argentina, Guatemala and Paraguay can be validly 
treated as exogenous variables in models for their respective balance 
of payments. Weak evidence along the same lines was shown to exist 
for Nicaragua.
However, evidence of an endogenous rate of inflation with 
respect to the balance of payments was shown to exist for Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela. The lack of any clear 
cut results from these tests for the remaining five countries is a 
disappointment.
I conducted tests concerning the importance of domestic 
monetary policy in determining the domestic rate of inflation. In 
only two cases, for which the tests proved conclusive, there was 
evidence that domestic monetary policy was unimportant: Guatamala and
Paraguay. This result is consistent with the initial set of tests. 
Moreover, the test results regarding monetary policy were generally 
consistent with the results regarding the exogeneity of the domestic 
rate of inflation vis-a-vis the balance of payments.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI
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1. I do not mean to imply that questions of causality in 
general have not been discussed prior to Koopmans and Simon. I have 
cited only those references with which I am familiar and from which 
I believe the recent development of causality tests in economics 
derive.
2. Some of the notation and most of the following ideas draw 
heavily on the work of Sims (1972b), with the singular exception of 
the examples used.
3. A question should he raised here as to the supposition that 
adjustments of the exchange rate under a Bretton Woods type system are 
autonomous. The expression in the text only suggests that the exchange 
rate does not adjust continually (as needed) in response to disequili- 
bratlng impulses within the workings of the markets for currencies.
Such a flexible exchange rate would result in outcomes circumscribed by 
the complement of space R^ .
4. See Sims (1972b), p. 36.
5. See Sims (1972b), p. 31. In other words the distributed
lags are all one-sided; that is, they do not involve future values.
6. That is, the correlation between u(r) and v(s) is zero for 
all r and s.
7. Once I drop the infinite lag structure.
8. See also Ciccolo (1978), Haugh (1976), Mehra (1977, 1978),
Sims (1972a), Sargent (1973, 1976a), and Williams et al. (1976). None
of these authors has applied the causality tests in the same context 
analyzed below.
9. By stability of the money demand function I mean a relation­
ship among variables which demonstrates consistent marginal effects of 
changes in variables across time or economic conditions. For example, 
real income is expected to influence real money holdings in a positive 
fashion. This was borne out for Latin America in Chapter III, above.
10. Interestingly enough, most empirical tests of the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments do not specify the demand for real 
cash balances in per capita terms. See Chapter III.
11. I could also allow for partial adjustment of money demand 
to money supply as follows (assuming P and N fixed). I begin with k*
= k* MS = Ug. Let k^(r) = 0 for r $ 0 and k^(0) = X. Further,
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let k2 (4) ■ 0 for r f 0,1, k2 (0) “ -1, and k2 (l) = (1 - X). Then
+ (1 - XjM^t-l) - ug = MS(t). Except for not using the 
appropriate adjustment of real cash balances demanded to real supply, 
this specification replicates the partial adjustment model analyzed in 
Chapter IV.
12. This leaves aside the more obvious criticism of the 
influence of anticipated money growth on the price level through 
changes in the money multiplier and domestic credit expansion/contrac- 
tion. See Darby (forthcoming) for a theoretical discussion of the 
inappropriateness of treating domestic credit as an exogenous variable.
13. See Zellner (1978) for a critical discussion of the Granger 
concept of causality.
14. See Granger (1969), p. 427.
15. The F-statistic would be the explained sum of squares from 
regression (33) minus the explained sum of squares from regression 
(32) divided by the change, in degrees of freedom, in this case, m.
This adjusted difference in explained variation is then divided by the 
unexplained mean square from regression (33). Thus, the test is 
analogous to the specification analysis of constraining the coeffici­
ents of some variables in a regression to take on specific values, in 
this case, zero.
16. See Pierce and Haugh (1977), pp. 269-72. I should also put 
in the proviso that both series are measured without error (see 
Schwert, 1978, pp. 36-37).
17. See Schwert (1978), p. 35.
18. Prewhitening a series using Box-Jenkins methods is a time 
consuming process and one which is not easily practiced. Moreover, if 
the ARIMA process required to reduce series to white noise involves 
second differences and moving averages of even small orders, valuable 
degrees of freedom are lost in addition to the observations lost due to 
the distributed lag structure. Unfortunately, the annual data I have 
encompasses a short-time horizon, therefore making ARIMA estimation 
impractical.
19. Since 1976 Argentina’s exchange rate has sky-rocketed from 
275 new pesos per dollar to a rate approaching 1000 new pesos per dol­
lar.
20. While the criticisms of the Granger causality test raised 
earlier may be brought to mind, the fact that the economic characteris­
tics of these five countries are generally disparate suggests that 
statistical problems such as serial correlation or measurement error
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may not be the only problems. Indeed, policies aimed at offsetting 
foreign Influences might be important.
21. As it was shown in Chapter V.
22. I use the limit for exchange rate adjustments of 20% (or 
less). Ecuador did, however, devalue its sucre approximately 40% in 
1970.
23. This should be qualified to indicate the short run nature 
of this conclusion. The short-run in this case is at most three 
years.
24. As alluded to earlier (see Chapter II), the central bank 
of Uruguay attempted to sterilize inflows of reserves through domes­
tic credit destruction.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary
The main question I sought to answer In this dissertation was 
empirical in nature. Namely, is the assumption of instantaneous 
price arbitrage and a corollary assumption, that the rate of inflation 
experienced by a small open economy is an exogenous determinant of 
the official settlements balance of payments, an appropriate specifi­
cation of the monetary model of balance of payments theory for Latin 
American countries? The answer to this question can be expressed in 
the main as:
1) instantaneous price argitrage is not a good short-run 
empirical assumption for these countries;
2) purchasing power parity, without due allowance for lags in 
adjustment, is similarly inappropriate;
3) the domestic rate of inflation is only strictly exogenous 
in three cases: Argentina, Guatemala, and Paraguay.
The work on this dissertation proceeded along three lines. 
First, a description of the macroeconomic experiences of the sixteen 
Latin American countries was outlined and compared to the United 
States. In this connection, a number of policy questions— derived 
from the models of Lucas and Barro— were answered. This discussion 
shed light on the interaction of political and economic phenomena for
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a sample of countries over which these attributes differed. The 
analysis also pointed up the importance of variability in economic 
aggregates as explanatory factors.
Second, two previously used single equation models were tested. 
The first being the reduced form equation expressing the balance of 
payments as a function of the domestic rate of inflation, real income 
growth, the percentage change in the money multiplier, and domestic 
credit expansion/contraction. This model was shown to be inefficient 
and subject to several points of criticism. On the other hand, a 
single equation relating the level of real cash balances per capita to 
the level of real per capita income and a number of (imperfect) 
measures of opportunity cost was shown to be useful even for countries 
with such diverse monetary experiences as Chile and Costa Rica. Since 
the money demand estimation was effective in picking up a stable 
relationship, I concluded that the failure of the simple (single 
equation) monetary model of the balance of payments was not due to 
instability on the demand side of the money market.
Finally, as an alternative explanation of the failure of the 
simple monetary model, I proceeded to demonstrate the sluggishness of 
price arbitrage and the inappropriateness of assuming that the 
domestic rate of inflation is an exogenous determinant of the balance 
of payments.
These results are important for future research in several 
respects. First, they clearly demonstrate how a desire for simplicity 
can obfuscate the basic thrust of a model. A monetary approach to
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balance of payments analysis need not utilize a price arbitrage 
assumption. The specification and Implementation of the monetary 
model are greatly-facilitated by such assumptions as Is ease of 
(theoretical) prediction. However, whether the balance of payments 
is truly a monetary phenomenon is not dependent upon instantaneous 
arbitrage of price levels nor even simply some prices, e.g., trade- 
ables.
Second, these results suggest that the data used in empirical
analysis should and can be the final judge of the specification of a
model. That is, theoretical considerations allow us to rule out or 
incorporate certain behavioral, institutional, definitional, and 
equilibrium conditions. Prior beliefs regarding observable phenomena 
should only be incorporated so long as they can be generally expected 
to be true. For example, we have reliable estimates of the real per 
capita income elasticity of demand for real cash balances per capita. 
From these estimates, we notice that such elasticities are approxi­
mately unity for developed economies. However, we have a priori 
reason to suppose that the per capita income elasticity of demand for 
real cash balances per capita is unity only in the long run, when 
velocity is constant. Thus, restricting the estimation of a money 
demand function to reflect a unitary per capita income elasticity 
could involve a specification error. Why not simply let the data 
decide?
Finally, the use of causality tests as developed by Granger
and innovated by Sims were shown to be useful in a variety of contexts
especially as a form of tests for possible specification error.
206
Specifically, I demonstrated that the empirical issue of short-run 
monetary independence can be answered by using the incremental 
prediction criterion of Granger; and that this test procedure is 
useful in the analysis of the dynamics of inflation.
Conclusions
The general conclusions drawn from this study are that price 
arbitrage was not completed within three years for these countries 
and that the rate of Inflation could not be considered as an exogenous 
variable which explains the balance of payments of Latin American 
countries. This latter conclusion is a contradiction of the most 
simple formulation of the monetary approach to the balance of payments. 
The simple model considers a small (non-reserve currency) country open 
to trade with an additional assumption of instantaneous price arbi­
trage.
These general conclusions can be made more specific to reflect 
the circumstances of each country. However, I believe it would be 
illustrative to analyze the results in terms of groups and clearly 
connect the results of each level of analysis. Consider grouping the 
countries according to exchange rate regime. El Salvador, Guatamala, 
and Honduras each maintained a constant fixed exchange rate with the 
U.S. dollar. A second group would be those countries which operated 
under a fixed exchange rate regime but which intermittently adjusted 
the value of its currency: Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. The third group would consist of those
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countries which frequently adjusted Its exchange rate but were not 
operating a truly freely-floating regime: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay. ~
This grouping is interesting in several respects.. First, I 
noticed that each of the countries in the first group, completely 
fixed exchange rate, had lower average rates of growth in money income, 
the price level, and monetary aggregates than did each of the coun­
tries in the second group. Each country in the third group, those 
countries which adjusted their exchange rate frequently, experienced 
higher average growth rates in these variables than each of the 
countries with a less flexible or rigid exchange rate regime. Vari­
ability in the rates of growth in money income, the price level, and 
monetary aggregates showed the same pattern.
A second aspect of the results when grouped by rigidity of 
exchange rate is that those countries with a fixed exchange rate or 
even those which revised its exchange rate intermittently were not 
likely to adjust more rapidly to short-run monetary disequilibrium.
That is, the speed of adjustment of actual to desired real cash 
balances has been suggested as a possible indicator of how open an 
economy is and therefore how susceptible it is to foreign impulses. 
Whether or not this is true, the estimates of the speed of adjustment 
do not conform to the notion that fixed exchange rate countries are 
susceptible. Both El Salvador and Honduras have very slow speeds of 
monetary adjustment (indicative of closed economies, i.e., insulated 
from the rest of the world) and each has maintained a fixed exchange 
rate with the dollar. In fact, the estimates for the speed of
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adjustment Indicate a greater similarity between El Salvador and 
Honduras and, for example, Argentina and Chile, than El Salvador and 
Honduras share with Guatemala, another fixed exchange rate country.
Third, it has often been the case that the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) principle has been used in theoretical arguments to ■ 
suggest that a small country cannot escape the influence of inflation 
in the rest of the world. Unfortunately, the principle was never 
really meant to apply instantaneously. How long it takes for the 
relationship to fully reflect the adjustment to differences in 
inflation rates is an empirical question. I demonstrated that for 
Latin America one year is not a sufficient time interval. In terms 
of grouping according to exchange rate regime, there does not exist 
any discernible pattern in the performance of the tests. That is, 
neither fixed-exchange-rate countries nor variable-exchange-rate 
countries exhibit a stable PPP relationship which conforms to my 
expectations. This, again, is only disturbing insofar as such a 
simple theoretical proposition as instantaneous PPP cannot validly be 
used in empirically testing economic models for Latin American 
countries. It remains to be shown that more elaborate models of PPP 
are useful. In this connection I also incorporated real per capita 
income growth as an explanatory variable in the PPP relation. Only the 
results for Colombia and Ecuador are encouraging; neither country 
maintained a fixed exchange rate.
Finally, by using Granger type tests for causality. I allowed 
for lags in adjustment of inflation in Latin American Countries to U.S. 
inflation, as well as other avenues of transmission. This test again
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showed no particular pattern in terms of the exchange rate group­
ing. Only the rates of inflation in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico 
were caused by the U.S. rate of inflation. The F statistics for 
the fixed exchange rate countries were very low indicating almost 
no relationship for those countries and the U.S. Interestingly, 
the affect of U.S. domestic credit expansion on rates of inflation 
was significant for a greater number of countries, only one of 
which was operating a fixed rate: Guatemala.
I would like to depart from the exchange rate regime grouping 
to explicitly outline the results of the causality tests. Uni­
directional causality from the domestic rate of inflation to the 
balance of payments exists for Argentina, Guatemala, and Paraguay. 
Uni-directional causality from the balance of payments to the 
domestic rate of inflation exists for Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezu­
ela. Bi-directional causality exists for Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico. 
Moreover, I noticed that those countries with slow to moderate 
speeds of real monetary adjustment exhibited uni-directional 
causality from domestic monetary growth to inflation: Chile,
Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Whereas those 
countries with moderate to fast speeds of adjustment exhibited bi­
directional causality.
This suggests that those countries with slow to moderate 
speeds of adjustment will have a pattern of causality of
A A A
M P -*• F
Here M is nominal money supply, P is the price level, F is foreign
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Here M Is nominal money supply, P is the price level, F is foreign 
reserves, a circumflex indicates a rate of change, and the direction 
of the arrow indicates the direction of causality. That is, slower 
adjustment to monetary impulses leads to adjustments in the domestic 
price level initially, and only later the difference between world 
and domestic rates of inflation is resolved via specie-flow. Whereas, 
the faster adjusting countries exhibit a pattern such as:
A
P
Thus, bi-directional causality might also show up between M and P
Sh A
and, therefore, P and F. That i,s, growth in world money which shows 
up as foreign reserve impulses is translated into monetary and price 
level growth. The faster monetary adjusting countries have mone­
tary impulses feedback to the price level and, as the domestic price 
level differs from the rest of the world in the short run, the 
inflation impulses then feedback to foreign reserve changes. Except 
for Guatemala— fast speed of adjustment and causality from inflation 
to balance of payments only— and Chile— slow speed of adjustment and 
bi-directional causality— the results of the causality tests conform 
to the notions described above.
A Digression on Harberger
In his lecture, "A Primer on Inflation," Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking (November 1978), Arnold Harberger discusses
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several points which are relevant to the work done for this dis­
sertation in that his analysis is directed toward the concepts of 
the transmission of inflation, the notion of a "world" inflation, 
and, indirectly, monetary independence, as well as analyzing nearly 
all of the countries I studied. He also studies other less- 
developed-countries and analyzes the issue of the role of deficit 
financing as a causative factor for chronic and acute cases of 
inflation, which I do not discuss.
Harberger suggests that it is reasonable to analyze a group 
of countries which has a "normal" rate of inflation as a unit, 
whereas those countries which have experienced chronic inflation (at 
least 2 0% inflation per annum on average over an extended period), 
or acute inflation (at least 80% inflation per aiinum on average for 
thiae years or more), should be treated as separate units of 
observation. Presumably hyperinflationary cases (at least 50% per 
month) would also be treated as separate units although Harberger 
does not discuss such cases. In order to support his assertion, 
Harberger lists inflation rates for a group of 16 developed countries 
for several contiguous periods and the corresponding rates for 28 
less developed countries. Harberger points out that the percentage 
point spread for 80% of each group is small for each time period and 
that the spread in inflation rates increases for the period 1972 to 
1976. These statistics lead him to conclude that a "world inflation" 
is a valid notion.
Although the results of the analysis conducted in my study of 
Latin America in the main indicate that most of those countries
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should be treated as a single unit of observation, the concept of 
a common inflationary tendency is not one I would reject. I do, 
however, object to the presentation of the statistics made by 
Hargerger for a number of statistical and conceptual reasons.
First, unless the exchange rate for each country was never 
changed or only changed insignificantly (by less than 5%) during the 
periods on analysis, the cross-country comparisons implicit in the 
tables presented by Harberger are difficult to accept. Because the 
inverse of the price level represents the purchasing power of a 
currency, the rate of inflation is the absolute value of the rate 
of change of the purchasing power of that currency. In other words, 
the rate of inflation represents the depreciation of a currency in 
its own units. How does this depreciation compare to the purchasing 
power the currency has elsewhere in the world? Clearly, the answer 
to this question depends on the original and final purchasing powers 
of that currency over other currencies, i.e., the exchange rate at 
each point in time. By adjusting the rate of inflation for exchange 
rate changes we effectively measure the rates of inflation in terms 
of the depreciation of the purchasing power of a reserve currency, 
e.g., the U.S. dollar.
The need to adjust for exchange rate changes is not only true 
for most of the less-developed countries which both Harberger and I 
analyze— Costa.Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, and Venezuela— but this is also true of many developed 
countries, notably Canada, which experimented with floating exchange 
rates several times. The question then remains, would the average
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annual rates of Inflation adjusted for exchange rate changes exhibit 
greater disparity than shown in the Harberger lecture. Whatever the 
answer, once having adjusted for exchange rate changes, the rates of - 
inflation would reflect the rate of depreciation on a common unit of 
currency.
A second question concerns the appropriate benchmark against 
which to compare the range of rates of inflation. Should we compare 
the range of inflation rates of the less developed countries to the 
range for developed countries? According to the tables Harberger 
presents, the dispersion in inflation rates across the less-developed 
countries (as measured by the range) is twice the dispersion across 
the developed countries. Is this difference significant in a statis­
tical sense? It seems to me that the variability over time in 
average rates of inflation is important in drawing cross-country 
comparisons inasmuch as the within-country variability offers a 
measure of the norm for each country. In my analysis of Latin 
Airierican countries, the dispersion across countries in exchange-rate- 
adjusted inflation relative to the average (across countries) dis­
persion within countries was not significant over long periods of time. 
However, over three and five year periods, the relative dispersion 
across countries was significant.
Finally, while the main thrust of the Harberger lecture is 
directed toward average rates of inflation, the important considera­
tion of variability in inflation rates within countries has not been 
touched upon. Its importance lies in the relation between the 
unpredictability of prices, as measured by the variance of standard
deviation of inflation, for example, and the variability in the 
growth in nominal income as in the Lucas model. My results seem to 
Indicate that greater variability in inflation was associated 
positively with greater variability in the growth'in nominal demand.
In this manner I believe utilizing a model which focuses on 
the individual country as the unit of observation is more useful 
than one which links countries and attempts to uncover regularities 
therein.
APPENDIX A
SOURCES AND NOTES ON ANNUAL DATA FOR 
LATIN AMERICA, 1947-1976
The annual data I collected are from secondary sources.
Although presumably more data are available through the publications 
of each Individual country, the data would have to be adjusted to 
fit the mold of some theoretical constructs. This has been done by 
the sources from which I obtained the data.
Specifically, I obtained most of the data for all countries 
from the monthly publication of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) entitled International Financial Statistics (IFS). For most 
countries I was able to extract data of consistent reliability 
throughout the entire period. I also obtained data, mostly on 
income, from two publications of the United Nations: Economic Survey
of Latin America (ESLA), and Yearbook of National Accounts (YNA).
The two U.N. publications frequently had data for years for which I 
had figures from IFS which made checks on compatibility very easy.
One additional source requires specific mentions. Data on 
Chile are available in the sources noted above generally only from 
1955 and for monetary data from 1960. James R. Lothian of CITIBANK, 
New York, informed me of a very fine study of the Chilean economy 
performed by Rolf Luders (1968). In his unpublished University of 
Chicago doctoral dissertation, "A Monetary History of Chile, 1925- 
1958," Luders presents a very interesting analysis of the Chilean
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economy in the "Chicago" tradition, analyzing monetary trends and 
how they relate to the inflationary experiences of Chile from 1925.
In the study, Luders provides tables of data which he obtained, in 
part, from the publications of the Chilean central bank and general 
statistics office. These tables were invaluable in providing data 
on Chile which I would otherwise have not obtained.
General Notes
The data base which I use to analyze several issues in the 
text contains annual data only. For many variables quarterly (in 
some cases, monthly) data are available. Unfortunately, for some 
series, most notably nominal and real income, only annual data are 
available for all countries. For many countries only annual data 
are available for other series, e.g., central government budget 
data. To compound this problem, series which are likely to be useful 
as interpolators, using Friedman's (1S62) method, are not available 
on a quarterly basis for the entire period. For example, I con­
sidered using an index of industrial production to interpolate real 
income. For nearly all countries quarterly data on industrial' 
production was only available for a small part of the sample period—  
frequently less than ten years. I therefore abandoned the notion of 
using quarterly data.
The monetary and inflationary experiences of some of these 
Latin American nations can be summed up in noting that they 
experienced one (and sometimes more than one) currency reform. That
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Is, the basic unit of economic accounting was revised. This neces­
sitated changing the published units of data for years prior to each 
reform Into the currency unit that existed in the last year of 
collected data, 1976. For example, the nominal stock of money 
(defined below) for Chile was-3278.7 million new pesos at the end of 
1975. At the end of 1964 the money stock was 1100 million escudos, 
where 1000 escudos = 1 new peso. Hence, the money stock at the end 
of 1964 was 1.1 million new pesos compared to approximately 3.3 
billion new pesos only eleven years later— a three-thousandfold 
increase.
Data in index form, e.g., price levels, frequently are reported 
in different bases over a long period. I converted all indices to a 
1970 base for convenience. I used the mean of the ratio of the series 
in 1970 base to the series in a different base as the conversion 
factor. I used a similar mean-of-the-ratio method to splice any 
series which had a break in the series and for real income when the 
base year changed.
Finally, all data on the U.S. were taken from IFS. Although 
other sources are readily available, the quality of data on the U.S. 
does not seem to differ dramatically by source. Thus, by using IFS 
data, the definitions of variables would be conformable as between 
the U.S. and Latin America.
Definition of Variables
As noted earlier, I obtained most of the data from IFS, specifi­
cally for: 1970-1976 from the July 1977 issue; 1952-1969 from the
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May 1977 Issue; 1947-1951 from various monthly issues. The use of 
other sources will be noted for the specific country where applicable, 
by variable. .
I will proceed by describing the variables of the real sector 
and then proceed to monetary variables. After the description for 
each variable I will note any deviations from this definition for each 
country, additional sources used, and any specific problems in 
obtaining the series. All series are denominated in millions of the 
1976 domestic currency unit, except index numbers.
1. The Real Sector
A. National Income. Three series were available:
1) Gross National Product (Y„) is the current expenditure onN
final goods and services produced domestically, line 99a IFS.
2) Gross Domestic Product (Y^ ) is gross national product plus 
net factor payments abroad, line 99b IFS.
3) Gross Domestic Product in 1970 prices (y) is gross domestic 
product deflated by an implicit price index, line 99b.p IFS. The
implicit price index was not directly available from the IFS; only by
using the ratio, Y^/y, can the index be derived.
Argentina Data on nominal and real income were obtained
from YNA for the period 1947-1951. Real GDP 
was converted from 1950 prices and nominal GDP
was converted from an index of GDP in current
prices.
Bolivia No data available from the listed sources prior
to 1950.
Brazil Data on real GDP for 1947-1963 were estimated
from ELSA, 1953. Data were available in 1950
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Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Paraguay
U.S. dollars and converted using exchange 
rates given there.
Data for 1947-1955 were estimated from Luders, 
Table 41, p. 337, which had real GDP in 1947 
prices.
Data on real GDP for 1947-1953 were estimated 
from ESLA, 1953. Data were in 1950 U.S. 
dollars, and converted using exchange rates 
given there.
Nominal income data were not available for 1947-
1949. Real income data for 1950-1959 were esti­
mated by first interpolating an implicit price 
index for GDP using the consumer price index and 
then deflating nominal income.
Nominal income data were not available for 
1947-1949. Real income data for 1950-1964 were 
estimated in a similar fashion used for Costa 
Rica.
Data for 1947-1951 were estimated from ESLA,
1953. Data were available in 1950 U.S. dollars, 
and converted using exchange rates given there.
Data for 1947-1949 were estimated from ESLA,
1953. Data were available in 1950 U.S. dollars, 
and converted using exchange rates given there.
Nominal income data for 1947 was estimated from 
ESLA, 1953. Real income data for 1947-1951 were 
estimated by first interpolating a GDP implicit 
price index from the consumer price index and 
then deflating nominal income.
Data for 1947-1951 on real GDP were estimated 
from nominal GDP data using the consumer price 
index to interpolate a GDP deflator and then 
deflating nominal income.
Data on real GDP for 1947-1951 were estimated 
from nominal income using the consumer price index 
to interpolate the GDP implicit price index and 
then deflating nominal income.
Data on real GDP for 1947-1951 were estimated 
using a method similar to that used for Nicaragua.
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Peru All data taken from IFS.
Uruguay Data on nominal and real GDP for 1947-1954 were
not available.
Venezuela r Data for 1947-1951 were estimated from ESLA,
1953. Data were available In 1950 U.S. dollars 
and converted using exchange rates given there.
U.S. - All data taken from IFS.
B. Consumer Price Index. This is an index of retail prices 
in metropolitan areas. For most of these countries the general index 
for the capital city was used with 1970 = 100. All index values are 
annual averages, line 64, IFS.
Argentina a general index for Buenos Aires.
Bolivia a general index for La Paz.
Brazil a general index for Guanabora— the county which
includes Rio de Janeiro.
Chile a general index for Santiago. Data for 1947-1955
were taken from Luders (1968) and converted from 
a 1947 base, Table 39, pp. 333-34.
Colombia an index for laborers in Bogota.
Costa Rica a general index for metropolitan San Jose.
Ecuador an index for middle and low income workers in
Quito
El Salvador a general index for San Salvador.
Guatemala a general index for Guatemala City.
Honduras a general index for Tegucigalpa.
Mexico a general index for Mexico City.
Nicaragua a general index for Managua.
Paraguay an index for workers' households in Asuncion.
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Peru a general index for metropolitan Lima.
Uruguay a general index for montevideo.
Venezuela a general index for metropolitan Caracas.
U.S. an index for city wage earners and clerical
workers.
C. Central Government Budgets. Two series were collected:
a) Central government expenditure (G) are current and capital 
account expenditures of the central government for the calendar 
government for the calendar year, line 82, IFS.
b) Central government deficit (d), line 80, IFS.
Argentina No data available for 1947-1969.
Bolivia No data available for 1947-1958.
Chile No data available for 1947-1953.
Costa Rica No data available for 1947-1969.
Ecuador No data available for 1947.
Guatemala No data available for 1947-1957.
Mexico No data available for 1947-1965.
Paraguay No data available for 1947-1957.
Uruguay No data available for 1947-1964.
D. International Transactions.
1) Exports (EX) are total current account exports, f.o.b.^ 
line 70.d, IFS.
2) Imports (IM) are total current account imports, f.o.b., 
line 71.vd, IFS.
Chile No data available for 1947-1959.
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E. Balance of Payments. Balance of payments (B) was measured 
as the official settlements balance, line 79..d, IFS. The data 
published in IFS were in millions of dollars. The data were converted 
to domestic currency units using the average exchange rate for the 
period. In general, this form of estimation is not desirable because 
of the inaccuracy of applying an average rate for all transactions 
which sometimes differed from those of foreign trade transactions.
Chile No data available for 1947-1959.
2. The Monetary Sector
A. Currency held by the public outside of commercial banks 
(CP), excluding currency at the Treasury and Central Bank, line 14a, 
IFS.
Chile Data for 1947-1960 were obtained from Luders,
Table 13, p. 304.
B. Demand deposits of the public at commercial banks, the 
Treasury and the Central bank (DD), line 24, IFS.
Chile Data for 1947-1960 were obtained from Luders,
Table 13, p. 304.
U.S. No deposits of the public are held by the
Treasury or the Federal Reserve Banks.
C. Commercial bank reserves held (at the central bank) 
against demand deposits (BR), line 20, IFS.
Chile Data for 1947-1960 were obtained from Luders, 
Table 12, pp. 301-02.
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D. High Powered Money. High powered money (MH) Is defined 
as total currency In circulation plus commercial bank reserves plus 
deposits of the public at the central bank and Treasury, line 14,
IFS.
Chile - Data for 1947-1960 were-obtained from Luders,
Table 12, pp. 301-02.
U.S. No deposits of the public are held by the Treasury
or the Federal Reserve Banks.
E. Narrow Money Stock. Narrow money stock (Ml) is defined 
as currency held by the public outside commercial banks (CP) plus 
demand deposits of the public at commercial banks, the Treasury and 
the Central Bank (DD), line 34, IFS.
Chile Data for 1947-1960 were obtained from Luders,
Table 13, p. 303.
F. Nominal Market Exchange Rate. Nominal market exchange rate 
rate (e) is the market exchange rate in domestic currency units per 
U.S. dollar, line ae, IFS.
Chile Data for 1947-1960 were obtained from Luders,
Table 43, pp. 340-41.
G. Official International Reserve Assets. Official inter­
national reserve assets (F) are the gross holdings of gold, foreign 
exchange and special drawing rights held by the central bank, line
l.a.d + ld.d + l.b.d, IFS. The IFS reports these data in dollars at 
the end of period. The exchange rate of domestic currency units
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(DCU) per dollar was used to convert the foreign reserve figures to 
DCU's.
Chile Data for 1947-1960 were obtained from Luders,
Table 3, pp. 21-22.
H. Data on the Central Bank Discount Rate were the only fig-— 
ures for interest rates. Since these rates do not represent market 
rates, they were not useful as measures of the opportunity cost of 
holding money.
I did obtain data for the U.S. for the full period from IFS 
on two market interest rate series:
1) The short-term interest rate (i ) is the yield on new
8
three-month (U.S.) Treasury bills in percent per annum, line 60c,
IFS.
2) The long-term interest rate (i ) is the average of yields
1j
on all fully taxed federal government bonds maturing or callable in 
ten years or more, line 61, IFS.
APPENDIX B
THE CONSTRUCTION OF WORLD PRICE INDICES 
FOR LATIN AMERICA, 1955-1975
One of the basic assumptions of the simplest expression of 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments concerns the 
treatment of the rate of inflation experienced by a small open 
economy. In the Introduction and Chapter III, I discussed this 
assumption in terms of the single equation model. In Chapter V,
I tested the proposition that rates of inflation converge. Indeed, 
the results of my test led me to conclude that over long periods of 
time, between 16 and 20 years, rates of inflation across Latin 
America do converge. On the other hand, I presented results which 
indicate that differences in rates of inflation exist, over three 
and five year periods, across the same countries.
It therefore is important to ask whether there are common 
elements to rates of inflation across countries. If I can isolate 
a common factor across Latin American price levels, then I can also 
use that factor to construct an index of prices— and inflation—  
which would be representative of the prices of those countries. The 
technique of principal component analysis is useful in isolating 
common elements of several variables and can be used in this 
regard.^ "
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1. Principal Component Analysis
The specific principal components that I wish to isolate can 
be described in the following (less than general) way. I have a 
matrix of T observations on K variables which I hope to describe 
simply as a linear function of a few variables. Ideally, I want to 
determine one variable which will represent the underlying movements 
of the K variables. In my case, I want to determine if a combination 
of the price levels of the sixteen Latin American countries and the 
United States, K = 17, can be represented by a single index for the 
period 1955-1975, T = 21.
If all 17 price levels moved in exact proportionality then
one principal component would suffice to describe the movement of
all the price levels. That is, I let P be the T X K matrix of price
levels, p be the T*1 vector single principle component and a be
the K x 1 vector of wieghts for each country commonly called factor
loadings which in combination with p would yield P = p a*. Where
the price level for, say, Argentina, at time t, would be P =
t f Ai\
Pt aAR*
If movements of price levels were not completely proportional, 
then more than one component would be necessary to characterize the 
matrix P. That is, the principal components would be a TxR matrix 
and the factor loadings would be an R x K matrix, where R is the num­
ber of components. The price level for Argentina at time t would be 
described as
Pt,AR Pt,l’al,AR + Pt,2*a2,AR + •** + Pt,R,aR,AR
in
If the factor loadings are the same for each country then,
whatever value the principal component index, p , takes on fort,r
each year, I can construct an index from the price levels of each of
the countries to represent the movements in the price levels of the
group as a whole. That is, by applying a different weight to each
observation of a country's price level and combining that with a
similarly weighted price for all other countries, a "world" price
3
index could be constructed.
Second, third or higher order principal components would 
indicate the degree of association between country price levels not 
explained by the first. Such additional components would be useful 
in isolating the possible existence of common elements across a sub­
group of countries as indicated by the similarity of factor load-
4 4ings.
2. The Empirical Analysis
I conducted the principal components analysis for the Consumer 
Price Index of all countries and the rate of change of the CPI for 
the period 1956-1975. For the levels and rates of change, I also 
conducted analyses for data adjusted for changes in the exchange 
rate.
I present the factor loadings and cumulative fraction of 
explained variation for the unadjusted and adjusted CPI's in Tables 
B.l and B.2, respectively. I allowed for the possibility of four 
components. In comparing the results in Table B.l with those in 
B.2, I note that the first principal component for the unadjusted
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CPI's explains more of the variation across countries and 
time (0.914) than all four components for the adjusted CPI's (0.882). 
A characteristic of principal component analysis in that the tech­
nique is sensitive to scale and origin of the variables."*
However, the difference in factor loadings, as between 
unadjusted and adjusted price levels, suggests that to explain the 
variation in the movements of price levels of these countries during 
this period more threads need to be women when we try to account for 
exchange rate changes than are needed for nominal price levels. 
Interestingly enough, the countries which have first loading factors 
that are most different from the U.S. when no adjustments are made 
are those which did not experience any exchange rate changes during 
the period.
I present the factor loadings and cumulative fraction of 
explained variation for the unadjusted and adjusted rates of change 
of country CPI's in Tables B.3 and B.4, respectively. I also 
allowed for four principal components. In comparing Tables B.3 and
B.4, I note that less variation is explained, with a given number 
of principal components, with exchange rate-adjusted rates of infla­
tion than without adjustments. However, the difference in cumulative 
explained variation between unadjusted and adjusted rates of change 
is not as great as the corresponding comparison for price levels.
A major difference between the price level and the rate of 
change analyses is that there is much greater similarity in factor 
loadings for price levels than for rates of change, irrespective of
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TABLE B.l 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS: 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 1955-1975 
UNADJUSTED FOR EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES
Factor Loadings
Country ®1 ,K a2 ,K a3,K 84»K
Argentina 0.991 0.029 0.023 0.061
Bolivia 0.928 -0.344 0.038 -0 . 0 2 2
Brazil 0.984 0.138 0.027 0.081
Chile 0.981 0.154 0.076 0 . 0 0 2
Colombia 0.987 -0.087 -0.045 0 . 1 0 2
Costa Rica 0.983 -0 . 1 1 0 0.054 -0.034
Ecuador 0.995 -0.005 0.036 0.062
El Salvador* 0 . 8 8 8 0.309 -0.274 -0.194
Guatemala* 0.874 0.417 0.171 -0.094
Honduras* 0.982 -0.039 -0.106 0.108
Mexico 0.972 -0.198 0 . 0 0 2 -0.097
Nicaragua 0.946 0.178 -0.168 0.191
Paraguay 0.841 -0.530 0.029 -0.017
Peru 0.993 -0.047 -0.006 0.062
Uruguay 0.944 0.270 0.128 -0.013
Venezuela 0.953 -0.187 -0.084 -0.182
United States 0.992 0.041 0.092 -0.051
Cumulative Fraction 
of Variance Explained 
by Component 0.914 0.968 0.979 0.989
These countries maintained an unchanging exchange rate vis-a-vis
the U.S. dollar, for the period 1956-1975,
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TABLE -B.2 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 1955-1975 
ADJUSTED FOR EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES
Factor Loadings
Country al,K S2,K a3,K a4,K
Argentina 0 . 8 6 6 0.456 0.048 0.057
Bolivia 0.942 0.244 -0.082 -0.118
Brazil 0.788 -0.217 -0.026 0 . 2 1 1
Chile 0.105 0.750 0.133 0.277
Colombia -0.186 -0.272 0.382 0.842
Costa Rica 0 . 6 8 6 -0.490 0.125 -0.263
Ecuador 0.480 -0.231 -0.649 0.193
El Salvador* 0.869 -0.317 0 . 1 1 0 -0.039
Guatemala* 0.854 -0.347 0.333 -0.132
Honduras* 0.989 -0 . 0 0 1 -0.047 0.057
Mexico* 0.958 0.182 0.015 -0.147
Nicaragua 0.932 -0.284 -0.063 0 . 1 2 1
Paraguay 0.863 0.421 -0.115 -0.071
Peru 0.930 0.144 -0.033 0.134
Uruguay 0.486 0 . 1 1 0 0.722 0.076
Venezuela -0.648 0.027 0.468 -0.400
United States 0.979 -0.008 0.134 -0.133
Cumulative Fraction
of Variance Explained 0.616
by Component
0.721 0.810 0.882
These countries maintained an unchanging exchange rate vis-a-vis the
U.S. dollar, for the period 1956-1975.
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TABLE B.3 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
RATE OF CHANGE OF CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 1955-1975, 
UNADJUSTED FOR EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES
Factor Loadings
Country ®1,K ®2,K a3,K a4,K
Argentina 0.131 0.566 0.447 0.142
Bolivia 0.867 -0.239 0.024 0.143
Brazil -0.319 0.483 -0.578 0.482
Chile 0.232 -0.150 -0.055 0.743
Colombia -0.182 -0.008 -0.489 0.447
Costa Rica -0,409 -0.662 -0.297 -0.025
Ecuador -0.782 -0.070 -0.305 -0.332
El Salvador* -0.519 -0.225 0.432 0.549
Guatemala* -0.403 -0.605 0.123 0.079
Honduras* -0.874 0.153 -0.166 0.227
Mexico* 0.006 -0.402 0.579 0.137
Nicaragua -0.912 0.116 -0.034 -0.0003
Paraguay 0 . 8 8 6 -0.007 -0.066 -0.023
Peru -0.281 0.614 0.397 -0.162
Uruguay -0.420 0.510 0.254 -0.316
Venezuela -0.322 0.035 0.716 0.419
United States -0.412 -0.680 0.239 -0.343
Cumulative Fraction
of Variance Explained 0.299
by Component
0.463 0.599 0.713
These countries maintained an unchanging exchange rate vis-a-vis the
U.S. dollar, for the period 1956-1975,
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TABLE B.,4 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
RATE OF CHANGE OF CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, 1955-1975, 
ADJUSTED FOR EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES -7
Factor Loadings
Country al,K a2,K a3,K % K
Argentina 0.714 0.365 0.219 0.118
Bolivia -0.418 0.785 -0.114 0.271
Brazil 0.321 -0.372 -0.180 0.193
Chile 0.757 -0.207 0 . 2 2 2 0.026
Colombia 0.133 -0.184 0.709 -0.304
Costa Rica -0.386 -0.364 0.134 0.255
Ecuador -0.103 0.140 -0.169 -0.267
El Salvador* -0.560 -0.621 0.297 -0.272
Guatemala* -0.435 -0.513 0.428 0.353
Honduras* -0.695 0.268 0.433 -0.231
Mexico* -0.354 -0.440 -0.473 0.067
Nicaragua -0.728 0.357 0.355 0.023
Paraguay -0.334 0.793 -0.322 0.170
Peru 0.345 0.324 0.375 0.357
Uruguay 0.352 0 . 2 1 0 0.641 0.408
Venezuela 0.132 -0.399 -0.410 0.459
United States -0.433 -0.213 0.093 0.764
Cumulative Fraction
of Variance Explained 0.220
by Component
0.405 0.542 0.643
These countries maintained an unchanging exchange rate vis-a-vis the
U.S. dollar, for the period 1956-1975.
adjustments. This difference Implies that the construction of a 
"world" Index would be more appropriate for price levels than for 
rates of inflation. Fortunately, by constructing a "world" index of 
prices, a corresponding rate of inflation can be derived.
3. The World Price Levels
I constructed price indices for each country in the sample, 
except the U.S. These indices are weighted averages of the consumer 
price index for all countries except the country for which the index 
is applied. In other words, I constructed rest-of-the-world price 
levels for the 16 Latin American countries. The indices are listed 
in Table B.5.
The rest-of-the world price levels were constructed using the
share in nominal rest-of-the-world income as the weight applied to
exchange-rate adjusted country CPI's. That is, I let P . represent
*-» 3
the unadjusted CPI in time t for country j. The adjusted CPI is 
then
P' = P • e /e
*t,j *t,j 1970,j t,j
where fe is the domestic currency price of the U.S. dollar for
t> j
country j at time t. I obtained the weight for each country by 
first deriving the level of "world" income in U.S. dollar. I let 
Y . be nominal gross domestic product for country j at time t in
c »j
j'8 domestic currency units. I let
TABLE Bi5
REST OF THE WORLD PRICE INDICES, 1970 - 1.00
Year WPCAR WPCBO WPCBR WPCCH WPCCO WPCCR WPCEC WPCES WPCGU
1955 0.772 0.702 0.770 0.768 0.755 0.767 0.766 0.767 0.767
0.724 0.719 0.716 0.718 0.704 0.719 0.718 0.719 0.718
0.730 0.726 0.727 0.725 0.725 0.725 0.725 0*725 0.725
0.747 0.742 0.745 0.742 0.741 0.742 0.742 0.742 0.742
0.757 0.753 0.758 0.751 0.751 0.753 0.752 0.753 0.753
1960 0.771 0.769 0.773 0.767 0,767 0.769 0.769 0.769 0.769
0.779 0.780 0.784 0.776 0.777 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779
0.781 0.779 0.784 0.779 0.778 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779
0.797 0.797 0.799 0.795 0.794 0.797 0.796 0.797 0.796
0.800 0.801 0.808 0.800 0.797 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.801
1965 0.812 0.814 0.818 0.813 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814
0.848 0.849 0.846 0.846 0.847 0.849 0.848 0.849 0.848
0 . 8 6 8 0.867 0.862 0 . 8 6 6 0 . 8 6 6 0.867 0 . 8 6 6 0.867 0.867
0.897 0.898 0.899 0.898 0.897 0.898 0.897 0.898 0.898
0.945 0.946 0.947 0.947 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946
1970 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.043 1.043 1.043 1.044 1.044 1.043 1.043 1.043 1.043
1.079 1 . 1 0 0 1.099 1 . 1 0 0 1 . 1 0 0 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.1 0 0
1.153 1.228 1.226 1.230 1.228 1.228 1.228 1.228 1.228
1.283 1.405 1.408 1.408 1.405 1.405 1.404 1.405 1.405
1975 1.406 1.398 1.397 1.401 1.398 1.398 1.397 1.398 1.398
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TABLE B.5 (continued)
Year WPCHO WPCMX WPCNI WPCPA WPCPE WPCUR WPCVE
WORLD 
WPC WEXP
1955 0.767 0.770 0.767 0.767 0.768 0.767 0.763 0.767 447217.
0.719 0.721 0.719 0.719 0.719 0.719 0.713 0.719 469277.
0.726 0.727 0.725 0.726 0.726 0.726 0.720 0.726 , 490864.
0.742 0.743 0.742 0.742 0.743 0.743 0.736 0.742 492744.
0.753 0.754 0.753 0.753 0.754 0.753 0.746 0.753 536212.
1960 0.769 0.769 0.769 0.769 0.770 0.769 0.762 0.769 565278.
0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.780 0.779 0.773 0.779 586571.
0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.772 0.779 624240.
0.797 0.797 0.797 0.797 0.797 0.797 0.791 0.797 671539.
0.801 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.800 0.801 710805.
1965 0.814 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.813 0.814 0.813 0.814 771339.
0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.849 0.848 0.848 851957.
0.867 0 . 8 6 6 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.867 0 . 8 6 6 0.867 897270.
0.898 0.897 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.897 0.898 977840.
0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 1060460.
1970 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 , 0 0 0 1120710
1.043 1.043 1.043 1.043 1.043 1.044 1.043 1.043 1215010.
1.099 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.099 1 . 1 0 0 1 . 1 0 0 1.099 1358670.
1.228 1.228 1.228 1.228 1.228 1.228 1.229 1.228 1554860.
1.405 1.400 1.404 1.404 1.404 1.405 1.407 1.405 1737350.
1975 1.398 1.381 1.398 1.398 1.397 1.398 1.399 1.398 1810110.
The last two letters indicate the country to which the consumer price index is external. 235
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To construct a rest-of-the-world Index for country 1, the 
following formula was used:
17 w
PR = i P t
t'i j=l 1 "" wt,l
where
Y' .
w  ---t,j 17
Z Yt k k=l
Hence the price levels have a base year of 1970 as do the unadjusted 
CPI’s. The weights of most countries were very small since the 
weight for the U.S. was nearly 0.9 for all years. This is apparent 
from Table B.5 in that the value the price index takes on in any 
year is similar for all countries.
I have included in Table B.5 a world price index covering all 
17 countries and the level of nominal world GDP denominated in U.S. 
dollars.
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Footnotes to Appendix B
1. Genberg (1975) also uses the principal components tech­
nique to develop world price indices using data on 21 OECD countries 
including the U.S., Canada and Japan (pp. 28-48).
2. Theil's (1971) textbook contains a better general 
discussion of the technique (pp. 46-55).
3. If the value for each principal component were the same 
for every year, a similar inference could be drawn. Except that a 
fixed weight, for all T, could be applied for each country to obtain 
a "world" price index.
4. Significant higher order principal components might also 
be indicative of differences across sub-periods of time.
5. See Theil (1971), p. 55.
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